THE THOMIST

A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DOMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JOSEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

VOL. XXIII JANUARY, 1960 No. 1

REFLEXION ON THE QUESTION OF GOD'S EXISTENCE IN CONTEMPORARY THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS

INTRODUCTION

THE suggestion of the question of God's existence in its philosophical development as a topic of fruitful discussion for the Thomistic philosopher might well meet with the response: Not again! Apart from minor squabbles over fine points, there is such unanimity on the matter that anyone acquainted with Thomism can with comfortable security take for granted " the *quinque viae* and all that sort of thing." What possibility for a discussion can be unearthed which has not already been considered and solved? Under scrutiny, however, the supposed monolithic front crumbles before the striking divergencies among current Thomistic presentations. The question does pertain to Thomistic philosophy; on this point alone there is unanimity. Regarding every stage

of its development, there are diametrically opposed views, witnessed by the following statement of some of them.

As to the place of the question of God's existence in philosophy:

It is the natural introductory question establishing the subject of Special Metaphysics, concerning uncreated being.

It is the term of Ontology or General Metaphysics, prior to the development of Special Metaphysics.

It is the natural term of the one science of Metaphysics, which admits of no division into General and Special.

It is to be treated at the outset of the unified science of Metaphysics, thus retaining the natural place it has in St. Thomas' own development of the question in the *Summa Theologiae*.

As to the development of the question:

The approach to the question in general:

The procedure of the *Summa Theologiae* with but slight modification is to be followed.

This procedure is to be rejected.

The approach to the question, in particular:

A nominal definition of God is to be established. When this position is accepted, however, there is yet a wide variety of nominal definitions proposed.

A nominal definition of God is not to be used as a vehicle of approach to the establishment of His existence.

The actual solution to the question:

The *quinque viae* of St. Thomas are suitable.

The *quinque viae* only approximate the solution.

The interpretation of the *quinque viae*:

In their process:

They are distinct proofs. They are formally one proof. They are formally distinct in their starting points, but immediately reach a conclusion that is formally one.

In their conclusions:

There are five formally distinct conclusions, afterwards to be united but without achieving God's unicity.

There is one real conclusion, the one God, Whose name is I am Who am, the Creator.

Obviously the issues involved are more than verbal. Metaphysics rules at the summit of rational knowledge; its right of primacy rests on the knowledge of God, the first cause, that it yields. As a philosophical science, metaphysics is presumed to be an organic development of the content, structure and progress which emerge vitally according to the principles of the science. Fundamental disagreement, then, in approaching the terminal phase of metaphysics can only be the result of equally radical differences as to the principles constitutive of its nature.

Disputes among philosophers are to be accepted as proverbial; discussion is the normal sign of philosophy's vitality. What is disconcerting about the incompatible positions outlined is that each is advanced with the claim of Thomistic authenticity and of fidelity to the thought of St. Thomas. That this is disconcerting presupposes such authenticity and fidelity to be desirable; that they are desirable rests upon the supposition, sanctioned by the Church, that they are guarantees of the truth. By profession dedicated to the pursuit of truth, the Thomistic philosopher, confronted by the situation indicated, can indulge neither in shoulder-shrugging indifference nor hand-wringing despair. He has the obligation of striving to attain the truth about the question of God's existence in Thomistic philosophy.

Prefatory to such an effort is the recognition that the term *Thomistic philosophy* itself admits of at least a duality of senses. Taken in its intrinsic nature, Thomistic philosophy should bespeak human wisdom as constituted in its systematic totality by principles formulated, developed or inspired by St. Thomas Aquinas. But Thomistic philosophy may also be understood as an historic reality, since as an intellectual per-

fection it can only reside in the minds of Thomistic philosophers. Nor is this residence a mere passive homage paid to authority; the philosopher designating himself Thomistic does so on the sole grounds of his own assimilation of and rationally convinced assent to the thought of his master. Thomistic philosophy in this concrete sense lies open to a wide diversity of interpretation. While St. Thomas left no *Summa Philosophiae* as a record of the philosophical system that is distinctively his, the variety of interpretations is not primarily due to this fact. Rather it is the necessarily personal assimilation of his thought by Thomistic philosophers that must be recognized as a source of confusion. The philosopher must by conviction make that philosophy he embraces his own. When Thomists present teachings that are drastically incompatible as Thomistic, e. g. the question of God's existence, then discernment between the content which is truly Thomistic and that which results from the historical or doctrinal conditions personally affecting the proponents of such teachings is demanded.

Clearly such discernment implies the task of judging; judgment in turn demands a norm. The only valid criterion for such a judgment is that which every Thomist professedly regards as the motivation of his own assent to the truth: the philosophical principles which are unquestionably those of St. Thomas himself. In view of the confusion surrounding the question of God's existence in Thomistic philosophy, the present study is undertaken as an attempt at such discernment. The end desired is that the authentic Thomistic meaning of the question will be distinguished from the ambiguities arising from historical influences and personal commitments inherent in the interpretations of current Thomistic philosophers. Consequently, this effort is designated as a *Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.*

Mode of Procedure

If the antinomies besetting the state of the question of God's existence oblige the metaphysician to the task of discernment, they should as well warn him of its hazards. The appropriate

and primary precaution imposed is an awareness of the precise character of the task of discernment to be undertaken. This awareness involves the delineation of a suitable mode of procedure. For the present study, a declaration of the terms of its title answers such a need; it is, indeed, a title that expresses the mode of procedure imposed upon the metaphysician both universally as a connatural feature of metaphysics, and particularly as exacted by the present problem.

Reflexion: The Prerogative of Metaphysics

Among all human sciences, metaphysics is properly self-conscious; to it, reflexion pertains pre-eminently. The reflexion here required is not the introspection proposed as philosophy when, in an attitude of Cartesian despair, wisdom surrendered to the positive sciences the privilege of knowing things, and became a knowledge of knowledge. The reflexion that belongs to metaphysics is one of the many features and prerogatives that it claims as the "first science" and "human wisdom."

Reflexion, first of all, is a characteristic of intelligence.[1] For a consideration of its own act is proper to the intellect, not only in the sense of an awareness of what is known—a trait common to all knowledge—but also, because in any act of judgment, the intellect knows its own proportion to what is known. The reason for this is that it knows its own nature, to which it belongs to be conformed to things as they are. Ultimately, the root of such self-knowledge is, of course, the spirituality of the intellect.[2]

Now a parallel can be drawn with regard to metaphysics. As the supreme rational science, it is designated as most "intellectual," for it is concerned with those things which are most "intelligible," which by reason of their universality are the source of the greatest certitude, which are the most immaterial.[3] As most "intellectual," therefore, metaphysics must also be most reflective, must enter most into itself, be most

[1] Cf. *In I Post. Anal.*, lect. 1, n. 1 (Ed. Leonina).
[2] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 1, a. 9; q. 22, a. 12.
[3] *In Met.* Prooem.

fully aware of its own nature and of its proportion to the things which it attains. As a matter of fact, to reflect upon all the speculative sciences belongs exclusively to metaphysics, as is implied by St. Thomas when he states that neither natural philosophy nor mathematics is capable of reflexion.[4] Metaphysics, the supreme rational science, has something further, namely, the prerogative of judging all the sciences, not excluding itself, with regard not only to conclusions, but even with regard to first principles.[5]

By delving further into the manner of the intellect's self-knowledge, the parallel can be extended to indicate the manner of metaphysics' reflective function. First of all, the intellect is reflective because it is a spiritual faculty, having consequently a universal object, within whose scope are embraced even the act of the intellect itself and the nature of the faculty.[6] But as a *human* intellect, the faculty of a soul which by its nature is united to a body as form, the intellect itself is not always in act. Since, however, anything is intelligible only insofar as it is actual, the intellect is not always actually intelligible, but only when it is actually functioning. As a consequence, it knows itself only through its own act. In other words, reflexion properly so called always presupposes an act of direct knowledge, and is always subsequent to such an act.[7] To be a complete and perfect knowledge of the faculty and ultimately of the nature of the soul itself, this reflexion must be an investigation in terms of first principles.[8]

In a parallel maner, metaphysics, whose object is universal, being as being, has the power to reflect upon itself because its own nature is embraced by this universal object.[9] But to exercise this reflective role, metaphysics must also presuppose

[4] Cf. *ibid.*, XI, lect. 1, n. 2165.

[5] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 57, a. 2, ad 1.

[6] Cf. *ibid.*, I, q. 87, a. 3, ad 1.

[7] Cf. *ibid.*, corp. and II *Contra Gentes*, C. 98; Q. D. *de Anima*, a. 3, ad 4, Marietti, 293.

[8] Cf. *Summa Theol., loc. cit.*; *De Ver.* q. 19, a. 8.

[9] Cf. *In II Met.*, lect, 1, n. 273.

that there has been a development of the science.[10] To be effective, to be thorough, this reflexion of metaphysics must be developed in terms of its first principles as a science, in terms of its natural constituents.

Further to explain the reflective role of metaphysics as wisdom, it is helpful to recall that in the general workings of human reason St. Thomas designates a kind of circular process. Seeking for truth concerning existing things, the human reason arrives in the order of discovery at conclusions from principles, then in turn it examines the conclusions discovered by resolving them in the order of judgment into their principles.[11] In a more detailed explanation, the Angelic Doctor assigns the elements of the process of discovery first to the habit of *intellectus,* the habit by which first principles are apprehended, culminating the human ascent from sense knowledge through memory and experiment to the intellect's grasp of the terms of the first principles. The habit of science continues this process of discovery, attaining conclusions by virtue of the first principles. The ordering and judgment that belong to the process of judgment are exercised by the habit of wisdom.[12]

By way of elaboration, it is to be noted that because its very nature links it to the body, the human intellect always manifests in its functioning a process, a transition; it achieves its perfection passing from utter potentiality to act, perfect knowledge. The general lines of this process are characterized by the twofold phase, "the way or process of discovery" and "the way or process of judgment."[13] The former is the movement from the term of potentiality to that of possession; the latter takes place once actual possession has been achieved. The process of discovery, ascending from the sensible to the apprehension of first principles, attains conclusions concerning reality in virtue of these principles, in the scientific stage of the process.

[10] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 3; cf. also q. 17, a. 1; cf. also *In I Post. Anal.*, 4, n. 5.

[11] *De Ver.*, q. 10, a. 8, ad 10; cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 8.

[12] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 79, a. 8, 9; *In III Sent.*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 2; *In I Met.*, lect. 1, nn. 14-18; *In II Post. Anal.*, lect. 20, n. 11 ss.

[13] Cf. Isaac, J., O.P., "La Notion de Dialectiques chez Saint Thomas," *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques,* XXXIX (1950), 481-506.

The attainment of such conclusions is perfect only when at each phase there is a judgment about the conclusions in the light of first principles. The entire process of discovery is itself perfected when its whole development is ordered and judged by the habit of wisdom, in the process of judgment.

Viewing metaphysics in terms of the whole structure of the intellect's evolution, the following steps are to be traced:

First, there is the process from the singular sensible to the constitution of the habit of *intellectus*. This is connaturally swift, furnishing as it does the very basis for all rational life. This habit of first principles is a kind of natural, pre-scientific metaphysics, that is sometimes referred to as *sensus communis*. It is not the science of metaphysics, for the primitive apprehension of being involved does not reveal the fulness of that notion, nor, consequently, are the first principles comprehended in all their vigor.

Second, the development of the habits of the rational sciences can take place. In this second phase of the process of discovery, the reason is by virtue of first principles enabled to investigate reality, attaining a fuller knowledge in conclusions, and generating the habits of the sciences. Such conclusions are grasped ultimately with certitude because they are analyzed and judged in the light of first principles.[14] It is first of all in the realm of the material and mobile that these conclusions are attained; thus, the habit of natural philosophy comes first in the genetic order of human science.

To this stage of the scientific evolution of the human intellect (in the order of discovery) belongs ultimately the genesis of metaphysics as a science. In virtue of first principles and its native power, reason now attains reality on a higher level, the level of being as being, whose properties and ultimate causes it attains. In virtue of metaphysics the analysis of all reality is completed, for not only are the first principles apprehended by the human intellect seen in their full import, but all reality is known scientifically, in terms of its absolutely ultimate explanation, the first extrinsic cause of whatever is.

[14] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 15, a. 1, ad 4; cf. *ibid.*, q. 17, a. 1.

Third, the perfection of the process of judgment occurs. The perfection of the order of judgment takes place insofar as the whole ambit of intellectual discovery, both process and conclusions, is viewed, ordered and judged in the light of absolute and ontological first principles. Thus metaphysics, now exercising its prerogative as *wisdom*, looks back upon the entire inquisitive process, even upon its own, and guarantees the certitude of all, not by an appeal to some extrinsic norm, but by what it posseses itself, by the principles it has come to penetrate and attain.[15]

The Reflective Procedure of Metaphysics Presently Required

In the normal development of metaphysics, its reflective role should be exercised over all its initial processes. The mere cataloging of the vagaries of Thomists regarding the matter of God's existence indicates the need for such a reflexion on this point. By applying the general characteristics of metaphysics' reflective phase, the constituents of such a procedure are revealed: the direct knowledge to be examined, and the principled judgment, i. e. the formal element of the reflexion concerning this knowledge.

Direct Knowledge: The Area to be Examined

The question of God's existence pertains to metaphysics. This stands almost alone as a point of agreement among the varied positions adopted by Thomists. Yet it is of some moment to state its implications. To include the consideration of God's existence in metaphysics is to follow the lead of St. Thomas himself:

> This first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God, as its ultimate end; that is why it is called also divine science.[16]

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[15] Cf. *In II Met.*, lect. 1, n. 273.

[16] Cf. *III Contra Gentes*, c. 25. Transl. by Bourke. *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith*, Book III, Part I, (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

To affirm that the consideration of God's existence belongs to metaphysics, without at this point sounding the precise tenor of this statement, is to affirm more than a fact. It is already to give a restricted sense to the question; it is in fact to view the question as a scientific investigation, a doctrinal inquiry about God in the strictly philosophical order. For there are many ways of discussing God. St. Thomas himself has already pointed out a " prescientific " knowledge of God.[17]

The metaphysical context of the question, however, is scientific, one that is as distinctive as the science itself is distinct both from non-scientific knowledge, and from the knowledge proper to other sciences. Exaggeration of this point is hardly possible. For if the question of God's existence is understood as pertaining to the context of metaphysics, then obviously its development depends upon the organic evolution of the science; this, in turn, is governed by the very constitution and nature of that science. Since what is here involved is a delineation of the area of investigation, it is sufficient to point out, with an awareness of a later need for examination, the sense of the term " metaphysics."

Reference has already been made to the relative supremacy of metaphysics, that is, its primacy among those sciences concerned with truths attained in virtue of the power of the agent intellect.[18] It is designated also as " first philosophy," " wisdom," " the divine science," or " theology." Of these names it is " metaphysics " which is used commonly to describe the supreme rational science. Arbitrary as the impo-

[17] Cf. *III Contra Gentes*, c. 38, 125-126. For a discussion of this prescientific knowledge of God's existence, cf. Del Prado, N., O.P. " Quaestionem Secundam Primae Partis Summae Theologiae An Deus sit Interpretatus est. Fr. Norbertus Del Prado, O.P." *Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und Spekulative Theologie*, XXIV (1910), 115 ss; Maritain, *Approches de Dieu* (Paris: Alsatia, nd), 9-23. Fr. Del Prado lists as the sources of this prescientific knowledge, the order of things, the common consent of men and a kind of natural inclination of the intellect to affirm what is true. (Verum enim est bonum intellectus ad quod naturaliter ordinatur. *I Phys.* lect. 9).

[18] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 12, a. 2, sed contra: Humana sapientia est quae humano modo acquiritur, scilicet per lumen intellectus agentis.

sition of the name may have been,[19] among scholastic philosophers it has come to signify "that science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to it in virtue of its own nature";[20] "the science that invesigates the first principles and causes";[21] "the science to which it belongs to consider being *qua* being."[22]

In the scholastic tradition such formulae have perdured; the name metaphysics has been accepted as signifying the science of being as being. Summarizing the varied nominal designations of the science, St. Thomas has explained them in this fashion:

> According to the three characteristics above mentioned according to which the perfection of this science is indicated, it receives three names. For it is called the *divine science*, or *theology* insofar as it considers the aforementioned separated substances; *metaphysics*, insofar as it considers being and those things which follow upon being, for these are discovered subsequent to the physical aspects of reality in the process of resolution, as the more common after the less common. It is called in addition *first philosophy* insofar as it considers the first cause of things.[23]

Thus metaphysics signifies the science of being *qua* being and of those things which either as properties or as causes pertain *per se* to the consideration of being. To this area of philosophic knowledge, the question of God's existence pertains.

To examine the question of God's existence in metaphysics, then, is to examine its scientific pertinence. Belonging to metaphysics, the question indeed stands at the peak of an arduous ascent.[24] To consider properly the question of the existence of

[19] Cf. Copleston, F., S.J., *A History of Philosophy* (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1947) I, 269.

[20] Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, 1003a 28; transl. Ross (Oxford Univ. Press: 1942).

[21] Cf. *ibid.*, V, 202b-8-9.

[22] Cf. *ibid.*, VI, 1026 a 32.

[23] Cf. *In Met.* Prooem. (Ed. Marietti. The numbers cited from this edition are those of Cathala's enumeration).

[24] Cf. I *Contra Gentes*, c. 4: Ad cognitionem eorem quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet, quia fere totius Philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur. Propter quod Metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter Philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda.

God as it occurs in metaphysics is to submit to its exigencies as a scientific question.

A further precision remains to be made. The question to be examined is God's existence as it belongs to Thomistic metaphysics. Since by name Thomistic metaphysics looks for inspiration from the principles and writings of the Angelic Doctor, it is important to advert to his scientific development of the question of God's existence. While in his philosophical works he did treat the question ex professo,[15] actually it is to the theological works of Aquinas that his followers, theologians and philosophers alike, turn for his exposition of the question of God's existence. Without expanding upon its theological context, it is enough to mention that the celebrated question two of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae has become the primary source of his thought on God's existence—the focal point of every study and dispute on the point. It is consequently appropriate to take brief cognizance of the content of this question:

Art. 1. Whether that God exists is per se known?[16]

The proposition God exists is self-evident in itself, since God is His own existence, the predicate thus being immediately contained in the subject of such a proposition.

It is not self-evident to us, who do not know the divine essence; thus it needs to be demonstrated, to be known mediately. Not a priori, however, for no such demonstration is to be had, since there are no principles prior to God, nor will St. Anselm's proposal of an analysis of the notion "God" suffice.

Art. 2. Whether that God exists is demonstrable?[17]

Yet a posteriori demonstration of God's existence is possible, however, since God is the creative cause whose effects are the things of this world. Given the effect, the proper cause must exist, and thus is demonstrable.

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[15] Cf. In Physic. [illegible] and especially XII [illegible].

[16] Parallel in Sent. I, [illegible] De Ver., [illegible] I Cont. Gent. [illegible] De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 11.

[17] Parallel in [illegible] I Cont. Gent. c. 12; De Pot. q. 7, a. 3.

Art. 3. Whether God exists,[28]

God is demonstrated to exist by the *quinque viae*, which have their inception respectively with motion; with the order of subordinated efficient causes; with transient duration of certain things, with the gradated share of things in simple perfections; with the teleological orientation of things lacking knowledge.

The recollection of these articles traces the general outline that the question of God's existence exhibits in Thomistic metaphysics. With some such development Thomistic metaphysicians offer their doctrinal presentations of the question. Its place in the context of the science of metaphysics has come to be the beginning of that part of metaphysics which is commonly called "natural theology" or "theodicy." Neither name is satisfactory;[29] what alone is important at this point is the recognition of the place given to the question of God's existence by Thomistic metaphysicians. In doctrinal presentations, it has received a definite, characteristic development, as part of that final phase of metaphysics designated as natural theology. This has come to be traditional; it is verified among contemporary Thomistic presentations.

The direct knowledge upon which the present reflexion of metaphysics is made is the question of God's existence, for it has been developed as part of the scientific context of metaphysics. In order to arrive at the end sought, the judgment proper to metaphysics, this direct knowledge must be examined. Its presentation by certain contemporary Thomists, significant for trends they represent or for their influence, must be indicated. Because the influence of the development of the question throughout the history of Thomism has its bearing upon the

[28] Parallel to Article 3: I *Sent.* d. 3 *div. primae partis textus*, *De Ver.* q. 5 a. 2, *De Pot.* q. 3, a. 5; *Comp. Theol.* c. 3 (28).

[29] The name Natural Theology suggests the false classification of "Natural" and "Sacred" under a genus "Theology." Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, Alvarez Gonzales, Angel, *Theologia Natural* (Madrid, 1949), 9-11. The origin of the name "Theodicy" in Leibniz is well known; cf. *Essai de Théodicée sur la Bonté de Dieu, la Liberté de l'Homme et l'origine du mal* (Amsterdam, 1710). Cf. also Owens, J., C.SS.R., "Theodicy, Natural Theology and Metaphysics," *Modern Schoolman*, XXVIII (1951), 134-135.

contemporary scene, something of this historical background must receive attention. With the indication of the state of the question of God's existence in Thomistic metaphysics understood in its concrete development by Thomists, the way will be opened for the reflective judgment of metaphysics to evaluate the question in terms of the specific nature of Thomistic metaphysics.

The Formal Element: Metaphysics' Reflective Judgment

As reflective, it pertains to metaphysics (from the vantage point of the order of judgment), to render an account of itself. The formal constitutive of the reflexion of metaphysics is its judgment concerning its own processes of discovery, viewing them in terms of first principles, in terms of its own nature and proportion to the truths attained. In the present case, it is the presentation of the question of God's existence that needs to be and is to be so examined. To insist upon the vantage point of the order of judgment in this reflective activity is of some moment. For it is not a question of reconstructing metaphysics. The sapiential task of ordering is directed towards the body of metaphysical truths and the developments that lead to their discovery in order to certify and to stamp with the guarantee of validity its discoveries, processes and conclusions. Concretely, in the present instance, it is the question of God's existence as it is presented in its pertinence to the body of doctrines designated as Thomistic metaphysics, that is to be examined.

From the place and the nature of the reflexion of metaphysics, the norms necessary for its judgment are readily discernible. Pertaining to the order of judgment, this reflexion is directed towards the question of God's existence as it is presented in the order of metaphysics' discovery of the truth. Regarding the presentation of the question among contemporary Thomists, it is to be presupposed that this process of discovery is being indicated by them. The order of discovery and the order of discipline are distinguishable; however, since most men do not discover truth unaided but from the teaching

of others, the latter should correspond to the former. Only, in fact, when the teacher recreates in the mind of the disciple his own processes of discovery, can he be said truly to teach.[30] To reflect upon the question of God's existence as proposed in contemporary Thomistic metaphysics, then, is to examine the question as it pertains to the order of discovery. A norm is here implied, for in the scrutiny of the doctrinal presentation of the problem, the conformity of the presentation with the order of metaphysical discovery must always be considered.

How finally is judgment to be rendered? To accomplish its task, metaphysics must exercise its judgment in terms of first principles, that is, in terms of its nature and consequent proportion to the discovery of the truth that God does exist. For Thomistic metaphysics it is presupposed that such principles, delineating the nature of metaphysics and its proportion to the truth, are to be sought in St. Thomas himself. Happily, while not elaborating in its fulness a tract corresponding to the modern "natural theology," St. Thomas has expressed himself explicitly, autonomously, and precisely on the place of God in metaphysics. His work has been constantly hailed as characterized by a clear demarcation of the orders of faith and reason. Perhaps this is why he has so sharply drawn the lines of competence at this point which is the summit of philosophy and the threshold of sacred theology. The point of apparent contact is reason enough to mark off the area of competence for metaphysics. The proportion of metaphysics to the natural truths concerning God, the sense in which it is to be designated "divine science," "theology," affords the principles from which the reflective judgment of metaphysics concerning its own attainment of God's existence is to be rendered.

His enunciation of these principles, found in so many texts of his works, is nowhere more plainly stated than in the *Commentary on Boetius' De Trinitate*. A methodology presupposes a philosophy. Written in the earliest days of his professorial career, this work of St. Thomas manifests a mastery of philo-

[30] Cf. *De Ver.*, q. 11, a. 1; *ibid.*, a. 3, ad 4; II *Contra Gentes*, c. 75; *De Spirit. Creat.*, a. 9, ad 7. (Ed. Marietti 404).

sophical learning which belies the youth of its author.[31] All found in questions five and six, devoted to the nature and distinction of the speculative sciences, are not isolated observations, but reasoned assertions, consonant with his total conception of philosophical endeavor, conformed to the philosophical system consistently present throughout his works. To choose the text from this work, then, as a focal point for the reflective judgment to be made, is simply to employ an expression, outstanding for its precision and forthrightness, of what is an authentic element, characteristic of St. Thomas' cast of thought. For this reason, it is a simple task to correlate and explain the text employed with germane assertions found in other works of the Angelic Doctor.

In accord, finally, with the mode of procedure indicated this study will be developed in the following manner:

Part One: The Presentation of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics.

Section I. Historical Background of the Contemporary Scene.

Section II. The Question of God's existence in certain Contemporary Thomists.

(*These sections are presented in this issue*)

Part Two: Reflexion on the Question.

I. Principles of the Reflective Judgment: St. Thomas and the place of God in metaphysics.

(*This section will appear in the April issue of* The Thomist.)

II. The Reflective Judgment on metaphysics' Attainment of the Existence of God.

(*This section will appear in the July issue of* The Thomist.)

[31] Cf. Chenu, M., O.P. *Introduction a L'Étude de Saint Thomas D'Aquin.* (Paris, Montreal, 1950) 238. In his critical edition of these questions, Wyser dates the work even earlier, 1255-1259. Cf. *In Librum Boethii de Trinitate Quaestiones Quinta et Sexta*, Wyser, Paul, O.P. (Freiburg, 1948), 18. References to these questions in this work are according to this text.

PART ONE

Section I. *Historical Background of the Contemporary Scene*

A. Remote Background

From a thorough inquiry regarding the historical background of the contemporary status of the question of God's existence, what emerges as significant is not primarily a chronological pattern. Rather it is the appearance and continuance of doctrinal threads which crisscross to form the backdrop of the tapestry, or perhaps crazy quilt, of the present day. Accordingly, with the nineteenth century Thomistic revival designated as the proximate background, divided against the prior history of Thomism, this part is to be developed as an exposition of pertinent doctrines rather than a mere chronological or fact-finding review. As indicated, the relevant doctrinal headings are the place of God in metaphysics and the mode of considering His existence. Apropos of these points the historical background, remote and proximate, has its impact upon the current state of the question of God's existence.

Thomism became a system with St. Thomas himself, and not, as one writer has maintained, with Cajetan (1408-1534) and John of St. Thomas (1589-1644), with Capreolus (1380-1444) as forerunner.[32] These very authors present and defend not scattered aphorisms of their preceptor, but his developed system of thought. St. Thomas is hailed at the end of the thirteenth century as the "common doctor of all"; there is an acknowledged Thomistic school.[33] The philosophical endeavors of the primitive Thomists, however, are found in single treatises or within commentaries on the Book of Sentences.[34] They did not devote themselves to the philosophical *cursus*.[35] For pre-

[32] Cf. Klubertanz, George, S.J., "Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics," *Modern Schoolman*, XXXII (1954), 4.

[33] Cf. De Wulf, M., *Historie de la Philosophie Médiévale*, 6ème ed. (Louvain, Paris: Vrins, 1936) II, 363.

[34] Cf. *ibid.*, 206 ff.; 363 ff.

[35] Cf. Chenu, M., O.P., "Les 'Philosophes' dans la Philosophie Chrétienne Médiévale" in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques* XXVI (1937), 28.

sent purposes trends of significance are found in later periods, namely, just prior, and subsequent to the Council of Trent, which occasioned such a fruitful resurgence of scholastic thought (1545-1563). That the resurgence faltered is witnessed by the need for the restoration of Thomism in the nineteenth century. Accordingly, the period of the remote background embraces ages of both glory and decline between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries. Because this background is remote, a review of it has not so much the purpose of indicating direct influence upon the present, as of profiting from the evaluation of the historical antecedents of trends currently affecting the metaphysical development of the question of God's existence.

General View

A superficial pattern is traceable in this remote background in the gradual transition from the philosophical commentary on the works of Aristotle to the manual. To be singled out both as typical and as important in this pattern are the commentators Dominic of Flanders (1500), professor of Cajetan, Cajetan himself, and Chrysostom Javelli (1488-1556); the authors of works departing from the commentary style, Francis Suarez (1548-1617) and John of St. Thomas; finally, the manualists Antoine Goudin (1639-1695) and Salvator Roselli (1783).

The commentators obviously follow the order and distribution of the corresponding works of Aristotle. Dominic of Flanders' commentary *In XII Libros Metaphysicorum* is of interest.[36] While he wrote many commentaries on the works of Aristotle, Cajetan in his classic commentary on the *Summa*

[36] *Perutilis atque praeclarae Quaestiones . . . Dominici Flandrensis . . . in Duodecim Metaphysicae Libros Aristotelis: Secundum Processum et Expositionem Doctoris Angelici Thomae De Aquino Ordinis Praedicatorum* (Venice, 1499). Cf. also ed. Morelles (Cologne, 1621).

Among the other commentaries of Dominic are: *In Octo Libros Physicorum; De Coelo et Mundo; Parva Naturalia; In Libros Ethicorum.*

On Dominic's life and work, cf. Mahieu, L., *Dominique de Flandres (XV siècle) Sa Metaphysique* (Paris: Vrins, 1942), (*Bibliothèque Thomiste,* XXIV).

Theologiae is to be examined.[37] Javelli, whose works span the whole philosophical field, provides matter for record in his *Quaestiones Metaphysicae.*[38]

Instead of the technique of the Aristotelian commentary, Suarez in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* envisions a presentation of material disposed according to his conception of the progress of doctrine.[39] This work has had a broad influence both among later scholastics and for a time in the Protestant universities of Germany.[40] John of St. Thomas' *Cursus Philosophicus* has had its influence felt especially since the nineteenth century Thomistic restoration. Never so entitled by the author, the work, lacking both a metaphysics and ethics, is not a complete *cursus.* A less radical departure than Suarez' work, the *Cursus Philosophicus* in its logic and natural philosophy presents a brief summary of the pertinent Aristotelian text, then the treatment of the matter is developed according to the author's own purposes.[41]

In the following generation, Antoine Goudin produces a work concise in comparison with its predecessors; it is a manual in the present significance of the term. Not a commentary following the order of Aristotle's works, it proceeds according to the division of philosophy given at the outset; logic, natural philosophy, metaphysics, moral philosophy.[42]

[37] Cajetan's commentaries on Aristotle include: *In Praedicamenta; In Posteriora Analytica; Super Tres Libros de Anima.*

[38] *Quaestiones Metaphysicae* (Venice, n. d.). Cf. also *Chrysostomi Javelli Canapricii, Ord. Praed. philosophi et theologi nostri aetatis eruditissimi omnia (quae) . . . inveniri potuerunt opera, quibus quicquid ad rationalem, naturalem, moralem ac Divinam Philosophiam pertinet, breviter, simul ac dilucide summa cum eruditione complectitur.* (Lyons, 1580).

[39] Cf. *Disputationes Metaphysicae* (Cologne, 1614). "Ratio et Discursus Totius Operis."

[40] Cf. Copleston, F., S. J., *A History of Philosophy*, III, 378. The author mentions that Suarez' work was admired by Leibniz and Wolff. Cf. also Gilson, E., *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1949), 112 ff.

[41] Joannes a S. Thoma, *Cursus Philosophicus,* ed. Reiser, O. S. B. (Turin: Marietti, 1930). The title *Cursus Philosophicus* does appear in the Rome edition of 1637 and that of Cologne, 1638. Cf. preface of Reiser, I, xii.

[42] Goudin, Antoine, O. P., *Philosophia juxta Inconcussa Tutissimaque Divi Thomae Dogmata* (Paris, 1851), I, 2.

What is designated as " modern philosophy " is usually indicated by historians as formally beginning in the seventeenth century. The various systems distinctive of this period find their model, direction and method in the physical sciences; their common enemy in scholasticism. Embarrassed with the *philosophia perennis* by such attacks, many Catholic thinkers sought intellectual respectability in devising new systems patterned after that of Descartes or of some other " modern." [43] While not going so far, Salvator Roselli, in 1777, takes note of the rampant anti-scholasticism in the preface of his work, and throughout reflects a defensive mentality and an eagerness to incorporate elements of the new systems into the Thomism he professes.[44] He first sets out a division of philosophy like that of Goudin.[45] This older division, however, is surrendered and in favor of the " custom of the moderns " speculative science and metaphysics are identified, and divided into ontology, cosmology, psychology and natural theology.[46]

Doctrinal Points: The Place of God in Metaphysics

What is of present moment is not merely the evolution indicated in philosophical works, but the doctrinal developments, whether simply concomitant with or consequent upon this evolution, concerning the place of God in metaphysics and the proof for His existence. The issues relevant to the former point are the unity of metaphysics and, closely allied, the meaning of the subject of metaphysics.

To raise the point of its unity implies that metaphysics faces a plurality of things to be considered. St. Thomas himself confronts and resolves this issue in the *Prooemium* of his commentary.[47] The authors designated, up to Roselli, all insist upon the specific unity of metaphysics as a science.

[43] For examples of such efforts, cf. Geny, P., S. J., *Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae*, ed. 3a (Romae, 1928) 286-291.

[44] Roselli, S. M., O. P., *Compendium Summae Philosophiae* (Romae, 1837) I, 8.

[45] Cf. *ibid.*, 9.

[46] Cf. *ibid.*, IV, 4.

[47] Cf. *In XII Met.*, Prooem.

A glance at the articles in the very first question of Dominic of Flanders' work reveals how closely he follows the *Prooemium* of St. Thomas in determining the nature and unity of metaphysics.[48] The unity of metaphysics is derived generically from the immateriality of the various things it considers. Specifically, however, the unity is derived from its one proper subject, being. Metaphysics has no branches; it is not an aggregate of separate parts; whatever it treats, it does so as pertinent to its proper subject, being.[49]

Javelli similarly affirms the fact of metaphysics' unity, based upon the unity of its subject, being, in connection with which everything touched on in the science is considered.[50]

Advisedly departing from the commentary style, Suarez makes a sharp division among metaphysics' elements. His intention in the first part of the *Disputationes* is to develop the doctrine concerning the universal notion of being; in the second part, to treat of the inferiors contained under the general notion, according to being's fundamental division into created and uncreated.[51] This division, however, does not indicate a division of the science; the author defends its specific unity on grounds that there is no basis for diversity. The things considered in metaphysics are linked in their abstract character, while the knowledge about God and the separated substances

[48] The following is a list of the articles of this question:

1. Utrum necesse sit una esse scientia quae est rectrix aliarum et gubernatrix.
2. Si sit, qualis sit illa scientia: an sit illa quae versatur circa maxime intelligibilia.
3. Si sit, quae est illa scientia: an, v. g., sit Metaphysica.
4. Si sit, an sit scientia una vel plures.
5. An Metaphysica sit de Deo tanquam de subiecto.
6. An substantia sit subiectum Metaphysicae.
7. An ens quod est commune Deo et creaturis sit subiectum Metaphysicae.
8. An ens quod immediate dividitur in decem praedicamenta sit subiectum Metaphysicae (I, q. 1).

[49] Cf. *ibid.*, also Mahieu, *op. cit.*, 61.

[50] Est ergo titulus talis, utrum ens sub ratione entis sumptum universalissime est subiectum adaequatum Metaphysicae, ita quod nullum participans rationem entis subterfugiat considerationem Metaphysicae et metaphysicus nihil consideret nisi ratione qua ens. Javelli, *Quaestiones Met.*, Lib. I, q. 1.

[51] Cf. *Disp. Met., loc. cit.*

contributes to that concerning the transcendental predicates common to them and to all things.[52]

John of St. Thomas, in connection with the specification of the speculative sciences, asserts the specific unity of metaphysics. His development of the doctrine on specification, reproduced in many modern texts, insists upon the constitution of the specifying subject *in esse scibili* according to its grade of abstraction, or, more properly, of "abstractibility."[53] Metaphysics, then, is the highest science, since its subject is defined in terms of the utmost immateriality; it is one specifically, not further divisible, because of the one formal aspect of its unifying and distinctive subject, being.[54]

Goudin presents the doctrine concerning the specific unity of the speculative sciences, according to their proper subjects and principles, distinct in their respective grades of abstraction.[55] Metaphysics is thus to be taken as one science, dealing with being, with that whose act is *to be*.[56]

Embracing the Wolffian division, Roselli thus abandons the unity of metaphysics. For in this new view, metaphysics and philosophy are synonymous, coextensive; it is divided as a kind of super-genus into the elements previously indicated. Not to metaphysics, but rather to each of its parts as to a distinct science is any unity to be attributed. In this, of course, there is an abrupt departure, of which the author seems quite unaware.[57]

The authors mentioned agree that metaphysics extends to a consideration of God; those who proclaim the unity of the science see this consideration as integrated into this unity.

[52] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. I, sec. iii, n. 9.

[53] Cf. *Curs. Phil.*, Logica, P. II, q. 22, a. 1, 818-830. John is at great pains to emphasize the grades of abstraction as the *objective* aspect of things in their order to human science; the grades are not subjective "lights." Cf. *ibid.*, 822, a. 36. In the light of these explanations concerning abstraction, it seems groundless to set John of St. Thomas against Aquinas, as does Fr. Klubertanz.

[54] Cf. *ibid.*, 825 b 22; 824, a 23.

[55] Cf. Goudin, *op. cit.*, Logica, q. 5, a. 3 I, 289.

[56] Cf. *ibid.*, Metaphysica, q. 1, a. 1 IV, 169.

[57] Cf. Roselli, *op. cit.*, IV, 4.

Yet there is a marked diversity in the sense of this integration, stemming from the various meanings of the subject of metaphysics, which is the source of its unity. Does the community of " being in common," subject of metaphysics, include God and the separated substances?

Dominic of Flanders answers negatively. Having based the unity of the science upon this, that all its considerations revolve about " being," its proper subject, he proceeds to explain the sense of this subject. It is not God; according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic canons of science, the existence of the subject must be foreknown; for man God's existence can be known naturally only by way of demonstration. Further, the subject governs the entire inquisitive process of the science; metaphysics' investigations extend to more than what concerns God.[58] For the latter reason as well, substance alone is not the subject of metaphysics.[59]

Then there occur the two principal articles in the question, indicating Dominic's understanding of " being in common." The community of being as the subject of metaphysics, does not embrace both uncreated and created being. Such a conception would favor the univocity of being advanced by the Scotists. Further, it would result in assigning as the subject of metaphysics, a pure abstraction which, precisely because it would have so much unity, would be found neither in God nor in creatures and might just as well include the being of pure reason. Thus metaphysics would cease to be a science of the real.[60] Continuing, Dominic maintains that if being in common, the subject of metaphysics, were such, it would destroy metaphysics as a science, as knowledge through principles. For such principles could not mean principles in being, for God has none; nor principles in knowledge, for being is the first thing apprehended.[61]

The result of his query leads the author to conclude that the subject, in the strict sense of this term, can only mean being as

[58] Cf. Dominic of Fl., *op. cit.*, I, q. 1, a. 5.
[59] Cf. *ibid.*, a. 7.
[60] Cf. *ibid.*
[61] Cf. *ibid.*

it is common to and divided into the ten predicaments.[62] His argument in this article rests both upon his previous eliminations and upon the requirements of a subject in any science, in accord with the nature of the human intellect. The latter point is crucial in the thought of Dominic. He insists that in attaining those things which are entitatively superior to him, man in the science of metaphysics, as in all his knowledge, does so only through the proper object of the human intellect. Thus just as God and the separated substances come under the object of the intellect not as directly attained but as reductively attained, so also they are attained through the proper subject of metaphysics, but are not directly contained in that subject.[63]

In no way does the proper subject thus assigned to metaphysics derogate from the perfection of the science as supreme in the human order. For being in common is not to be taken in that vague, imperfect sense that it has as the first object known by the intellect but in a scientific sense, the result of a difficult process.[64] Further, he shows his appreciation for this subject as perfective of the human intellect inasmuch as it includes *esse*, the perfection of all perfections, acording to St. Thomas' true conception.[65]

Summarizing his view of the unity and at the same time of the community of the science, Dominic ends his consideration by stating that metaphysics has indeed the greatest community *among those sciences which treat of created things as subject.* Thus its subject is most common: created reality. It does, however, also consider all being, material as well as spiritual, but not all of them as subject; some it treats exclusively as cause of its subject. As for Averroes' contention that since it is *divine* science, it considers God, the First Cause, as its subject, he is speaking of the subject in the widest sense, not of the proper subject, " the subject of attribution or of adequation." [66]

[62] Respondeo dicendum quod ens in quantum ens, quod dividitur in decem praedicamenta, est subiectum Metaphysicae. *Ibid.*, a. 8.

[63] Cf. *ibid.*, ad 7.

[64] Cf. *ibid.*, ad 8.

[65] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3.

[66] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 1, a. 6. Mention must here be made of Cosmus Alamannus, S. J.

Chrysostom Javelli maintains that the "more proficient Thomists" think the above position to be false.[67] For Javelli the adequate subject of any science is that under whose formal aspect everything is considered in the science, while in turn everything participating in this formal aspect comes under the consideration of the science.[68] This adequate subject for metaphysics is not merely predicamental being, but real *per se* being, finite and infinite, or created and uncreated; thus, being in its utmost universality.[69] To substantiate this position he advances first of all the statement that not only finite being is real being, but God as well, since He is most real and most perfect. Then a twofold proof is formulated. Real being in the sense indicated is the subject because the properties primarily and *per se* belonging to it are considered, and that is the subject in any science whose properties are considered. Further, since real being in the sense indicated has properties to be demonstrated, it is truly apt as a subject of science; it is, therefore, the subject of metaphysics, since this is first philosophy.[70]

While flatly rejecting Dominic of Flanders' teaching, Javelli yet admits that there is a difference among Thomists, with some favoring the former's position. He takes pains therefore to reject it, in arguing against the point that since the subject of metaphysics is that whose principles and causes are sought, and God has none, then He is not included in the subject.[71] He responds in the sixth book of his work, by defending the proposition that being as being, including God, does indeed have

(1559-1634) because of his close affinity with Dominic of Flanders. His *Summa Philosophiae* is noteworthy for its development of authentic Thomistic doctrine through the texts of St. Thomas himself, presented in the style of the *Summa Theologiae*. Alamannus adopts the same position as Dominic of Flanders on the true sense of the subject of metaphysics, defending it with the words of St. Thomas. This teaching is in the *Summa Philosophiae*, Part IV, *Metaphysica*, q. 1, a. 6, (ed. Ehrle, Paris: Lethielleux, 1891) III, Sec. vi, 11-18.

[67] Cf. Javelli, *Quaest. Met.*, Lib. I, q. 1.

[68] Cf. *ibid.*

[69] Cf. *ibid.*, tertia opinio.

[70] Cf. *ibid.*

[71] Cf. *ibid.*

principles and causes, by extending the meaning of the terms to principles and causes in knowledge, to whatever can serve as a medium to demonstrate properties of a subject.[72] The rejection continues with a refutation of the claim that St. Thomas, in the *De Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 4, and in the *Prooemium* to the Metaphysics, supports the position that metaphysics' subject does not include God. What St. Thomas is stating is simply the diverse mode in which the diverse real beings are attained, always as subject, in metaphysics.[73] The author points out the inability of his opponents to perceive, in the sense he indicates in Book VI, how being as such has principles and causes, and yet God, Who is contained under being, the subject of metaphysics, does not have any principle in being.[74]

Suarez also rejects the opinion of Dominic of Flanders. Making practically the same point as Javelli on the sense of "principles and causes," he maintains that what St. Thomas taught is that while God is attained under the formality of principle, He is nonetheless considered as included in the object or subject of metaphysics.[75] Nothing, says Suarez, is taken away from the character of the science in maintaining that its subject includes all real being, even God. It is still a knowledge of the principles and causes of its subject, taking the word *cause* in a wide sense, to include both the principles of the being of things, and of the knowledge of them. Thus even though it be true that being as being, including as it does God, has no cause in the strict sense, it does have certain formal reasons for its properties, at least conceptually distinct from what these

[72] Cf. *ibid.*, Lib. VI, q. 1.

[73] Cf. *ibid.*, Lib. I, q. 1. Adverte quod inter Thomistas est discrepantia quoniam aliqui tenent cum Flandrensi, alii autem cum tertia opinione, quam credo esse ad mentem Beati Thomae. . . .

[74] Cf. *ibid.*, in fine.

[75] Cf. *Disp. Met.*, Disp. I, sec. i, n. 16. In both Javelli and Suarez there is a certain ambiguity in their correction of Dominic of Flanders. The latter does not deny that God pertains to the consideration of metaphysics, nor that He is the object, principal by dignity; but that God is the subject in the proper sense. The twofold sense of subject (or object) is apparent in St. Thomas himself, *In Boet. De Trin.*, q. 5, a. 1; a. 4.

serve to demonstrate. This is true even of God and His attributes. Thus the position of Dominic of Flanders is unfounded.[76]

Positively, then, it is obvious from the very disposition of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* that for Suarez God is included in being as this is the subject of metaphysics. For him, being as such, the adequate subject of metaphysics, includes all real being. Only the being of reason and beings *per accidens* are excluded.[77]

The extension and comprehension of the subject are explained when the unity of metaphysics is discussed, especially by showing how God fits into this subject. The perfect knowledge of God and the separated substances yields the knowledge of all that is in them, and consequently of the transcendental attributes which belong to them in common with all other things. Since metaphysics is the supreme science, there is none higher which would furnish this knowledge concerning God; thus metaphysics must contain all that is necessary to a perfect knowledge of what its subject, being, implies. Thus the one science of metaphysics which considers special objects such as God and the separated substances, at the same time considers those predicates common to them and to all things. From this, the content of the one subject of metaphysics is to be judged.[78]

The need for the adequate subject of metaphysics to include God is further emphasized in the discussion of the causes of being. Here a twofold consideration of God in metaphysics is recognized, one about Him as first cause, the other as He is the primary being. Although the latter is a consideration ontologically prior, according to the genesis of human knowledge the causal consideration is prior. For the human mind, it must be remembered, arrives at a knowledge of God through effects; the complete picture of being, moreover, demands a discussion of its first cause. In this discussion nothing should be said about God as He is the primary being, either about His perfections, or even about His existence, which must be presupposed. With the supposition that there is a universal

[76] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. I, sec. i, nn. 27-28.
[77] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 24.
[78] Cf. *ibid.*, sec. iii, n. 9.

cause, uncaused, His causality with regard to the production, conservation and operation of all other beings is treated.[79]

In defining the total ambit of being, the subject of metaphysics, then, Suarez speaks of it as including being that is immaterial both positively and negatively.[80] The first is being in general; the second, God and the angels.[81] Thus it is true to say that of the two parts of metaphysics, the one deals with "being," the other with "beings."[82] This view of his concept of metaphysics has its roots in his notion of being, the subject of the science. When considering the point *ex professo* he affirms that there is no difficulty in saying that the community of being includes all beings, God among them. For this is a community of predication; in this sense there is no hint of anything real being placed prior to God, when He is included beneath the adequate subject of metaphysics. This subject is abstracted in such a way that it has this community.[83]

Much light is shed upon his notion of the unity of metaphysics, arising out of its subject, from his teaching concerning the unity of the concept of being. The formal concept of being is one, simply speaking, abstracting from those concepts which represent particular beings.[84] To this formal concept, there corresponds one adequate and immediate objective concept, expressly bespeaking all beings insofar as they are one in being.[85] This unity is further explained by insisting that all the differences of beings are excluded; otherwise no unity would be possible.[86] Thus the concept of being has perfect unity precisively. Turning to the contraction of this one concept to its inferiors, Suarez designates this not as a composition, but as simply the clarification of some particular already contained

[79] De Deo glorioso duplex est in Metaphysica consideratio, scilicet, quatenus est prima causa, et quatenus est primum ens . . . *ibid.*, Disp. XX, Prol.

[80] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. I, sec. iii, nn. 1-2.

[81] Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 23-24.

[82] Cf. *ibid.*, Tom. I, Ratio et Discursus Totius Operis; Tom. II, Prol.

[83] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. I, sec. i, n. 11.

[84] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. II, sec. i, n. 2.

[85] Cf. *ibid.*, sec. ii, n. 8.

[86] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 14; n. 20.

under the notion of being. It is a process from the indeterminate and confused to the determinate and distinct, not an addition or composition.[87] How this is so, when the concept of being actually excludes its inferiors, is not made clear, but it is in this way that the author seeks a position straddling the Scotistic univocity and the Thomistic analogy of being.[88]

Anticipating such an explanation of the unity of being, Suarez set out his notion of metaphysics and its unity arising from its one adequate subject. Literally, metaphysics' subject is being and beings. The first part is concerned with the concept of being, perfectly one, absolutely precised from its members; the second part, with these members, the distinct expressions of the one concept. In this way the science preserves its unity, for the members are determined not by addition, but by clarification. Thus the subject of metaphysics has a supercomprehension; it is so abstract that it has a perfect unity, perduring even when the science turns now to God, now to substance, now to accident, now to the infinite, now to the finite. These enter naturally into metaphysics as new expressions of the one concept, the one subject.

It has been said that Suarez did not make the distinction between general and special metaphysics.[89] This is true, speaking literally. But it will be seen that there is a marked similarity between his procedure and that of those who later do professedly maintain this division of metaphysics. To point this out is not to criticize; it is simply to draw attention to the character of the work of one whose influence in scholastic thought has ben widespread.

As to John of St. Thomas' understanding of the subject of metaphysics, there are only *obiter dicta* as clues. For example, the author says that while not applied univocally as to their entity, God and creatures are united univocally as regards their knowability, namely in metaphysics. This simply means

[87] Cf. *ibid.*, sec. vi, n. 7.

[88] For a discussion of the involved reconcilation, cf. Copleston, *op. cit.* III, 359-360.

[89] Cf. *ibid.*, 356.

that there is a connection of the truth concerning one with that concerning the other.[90] In another place the author, insisting that the immateriality by which sciences are distinguished is not merely the recession of the subject from matter, but the resulting intelligibility, states that while sacred theology, metaphysics and logic all leave matter behind, yet the mode of immateriality attained is different in each. Theology considers God through the light of revelation, while metaphysics attains Him in terms of being, as it abstracts from created and uncreated, an expression to be repeated in the Thomistic tradition.[91]

This expression seems in direct opposition to what Dominic of Flanders maintains. Yet in view of other expressions the opposition is not so emphatic. For John of St. Thomas distinguishes the diverse manner in which theology and metaphysics attain God in this, that the former proceeds as a participation of God's knowledge of Himself; whereas the latter attains Him only from natural effects.[92] More fully, he insists on the unity of metaphysics, even though it attains things so diverse as predicamental realities and God. The unity remains intact because of the formal aspect of the one subject of the science, resulting in the one mode of definition and one medium of demonstration in the science. That formal subject is being; by reason of it predicamental realities are attained since they all share in being; God is attained because He is the first cause of *all being*.[93] In addition, the demonstration of God's existence is proper to metaphysics. The medium of demonstration must then be something intrinsic to the science, namely the subject itself. God is attained, not as subject, but as first cause.[94] This, of course, is an inference from various statements of the author. Since no definitive discussion of metaphysics' nature is to be found in his work, this mode of procedure is not probative. There does, however, seem to be a basis for an

[90] Cf. Joann. a S. Th. *Cursus Phil.*, Logica, II P., q. 21, a. 4, 678 b38; a. 2, 662 b44.

[91] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 27, a. 1, 825 b7.

[92] Cf. *ibid.*, 829 b10.

[93] Cf. *ibid.*, 829 b20.

[94] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 24, a. 1, 757 b20.

agreement between this author and Dominic of Flanders, despite at least one statement that is directly opposed to the earlier author.

From Goudin's procedure, it is apparent that he too includes God in being, the subject of metaphysics.[95] It is noteworthy that he makes a point of substantiating the division of being, placed in the beginning of the tract on metaphysics, into created and uncreated by proving the existence of the latter. Beings which clearly indicate that their existence is received, show that there is a being that is self-explanatory, the cause of all others, being *per se and a se*. This being is God, uncreated being, from Whom all others participate in being.[96]

In Roselli, of course, there is no question of the unity of metaphysics, or consequently of a single subject. The rational knowledge about God is a distinct science concerning uncreated being, just as cosmology is the science concerning the beings of the material world.[97] At the outset of his ontology, the author also indicates the foundation of such a procedure, by justifying the division of being into created and uncreated through the necessity of admitting creation. Unless creation is admitted God would not be the universal, uncaused cause of all, but would presuppose something to His causality.[98]

The Existence of God

Because the question of God's existence has come to mean in Thomistic metaphysics the *quinque viae*, interest regarding the actual question in the era being considered centers around these proofs as a term of reference. There are two features to be noted, namely, arguments advanced for the existence of God, and the conclusion claimed for them.

[95] Cf. Goudin *op. cit.*, Metaphysica, q. 1, a. 1, t. IV, 169.
[96] Cf. *ibid.*
[97] Cf. Roselli *op. cit.*, t. IV, 4.
[98] Cf. *ibid.*, 53-54.

Arguments for the Existence of God

Neither Dominic of Flanders nor Javelli employs the *quinque viae* as such. While differing radically in their ideas of the place of God in metaphysics, following the style of the commentary on Artistotle, each considers the existence of God in examining Book Delta. Dominic actually advances his proofs in reply to a twofold question, namely, whether there exists a first separated substance and whether this is pure act.

To the first part of the question, the affirmative reply is sustained by two arguments. The one is a simple paraphrase of Aristotle's own words;[99] the need for an eternal, separated substance rests upon the eternity of movement.[100] Dominic, however, later on rejects this latter notion and also shows that there is no valid philosophical reason establishing the eternity of the world.[101] The other argument, resembling the *tertia via* of St. Thomas, but credited here to St. Albert the Great, is presented, the basic force of which rests in this, that *all things that are* cannot be corruptible things.[102] Actually, the principal concern of the author is God's pure actuality.

Javelli does regard the *quinque viae* as efficacious, but, as a commentator chiefly concerned with the text of Aristotle, does not reproduce them.[103] Among the points to be noted concerning the existence of God, is the author's consistency as to the reason for the question. Since God is included in the adequate subject of the science, it is necessary to demonstrate particularly, not just in the generic manner of the *Physics*, His existence.[104]

As to the proofs for God's existence, it is Aristotle's proof from movement that is his chief interest. He maintains that the proof as found in the *Physics*, or any proof based upon

[99] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Delta, c. 6, 1071b ff.

[100] Cf. Dominic of Flanders *op. cit.*, XII, q. 5, a. 1.

[101] Cf. *ibid.*, ad lum; a. 3, ad lum.

[102] Cf. *ibid.*, a. 3, ad lum.

[103] Cf. Javelli, *op. cit.*, Lib. XII, q. 9, *ad tertium principale;* also q. 5, *ad secundum principale.*

[104] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 3, *prima conclusio.*

physical movement, reaches "an unmoved mover" in that order, reaches, for example, what is called the "soul of the first heaven." To prove God's existence, Aristotle included in the *Metaphysics* movement by way of even final causality, thus reaching a first mover, absolutely unmoved.[105] He also mentions that from the principles of Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* St. Thomas formulates the proof from the grades of being, truth, goodness, and perfection.[106]

There is much less emphasis upon questions arising out of the text of Aristotle in Suarez and John of St. Thomas. In Suarez, first of all, there is much that is significant to the stream of scholastic thought about the exposition of the existence of God. The second half of the *Disputationes,* as has been noted, is devoted to a consideration of *beings*; it is here that God is considered, not as first cause, but as the primary being. The discussion of God in this sense is first pursued because of His excellence; subsequently, the notes common to the rest of the realm of being can be discussed.[107] Acknowledging this procedure to be a departure, Suarez justifies it as warranted by the order of doctrine. God is the principal object of the science, and knowledge about Him affords light upon all the rest.[108] He advances what has already been said about being in general, and its causes, as a sufficient preamble to natural theology.[109] The limits of this tract will be what the capacities of natural reason indicate; the realm of revelation will not be invaded.[110]

Naturally, the existence of God is the first question approached. By way of introduction, the author distinguishes, for the sake of clarity, between demonstrating the existence of

[105] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 9, *ad tertium principale.*

[106] Cf. *ibid.* Ubi datur magis et minus differre datur et maximum ex quo trahitur quod in quocumque genere datur magis et minus. Constat autem quod in rerum natura datur magis et minus ens, et verum et bonum et perfectum. Ergo datur maxime ens et verum et optimum et perfectissimum. Hoc autem apud omnes recte sapientes est Deus. Ergo. . . .

[107] Cf. Suarez, *Disp. Met.*, Disp. XXVIII, Prol., sec. i, n. 4.

[108] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 5. Suarez equates the order of doctrine with the ontological order.

[109] Cf. *ibid.*, Disp. XXIX, Prol.

[110] Cf. *ibid.*

uncreated being, and demonstrating the existence of God.[111] In either case, the first point to be settled concerns the suitable medium of demonstration. He insists that it must be a metaphysical medium, rejecting the argument from movement as insufficient. The key principle of this argument, " whatever is in motion, is being moved by another," is not evidently universal; it is the product of an induction and it is not evidently verified of all sorts of movements.[112] In any case, Aristotle's proof from movement is insufficient to reach uncreated being, and its attributes.[113]

The principle of the demonstration, the universally valid metaphysical principle, is rather to be this: " whatever is produced, is produced by another, whether it be created, generated, or produced in any other way." [114] From this principle Suarez concludes that, since all things in the universe cannot have been produced, there must be some unproduced uncreated being. The minor is proved by the impossibility of an infinite regress in efficient causes, even only *per accidens* subordinated.[115]

In his *Cursus Philosophicus* John of St. Thomas, at the place corresponding to the question in Aristotle's *Physics,* presents an argument for the existence of God as the first unmoved mover. First of all, however, he summarizes, according to his custom, the text of the Stagirite, chapters 4 and 6 of Book VIII.[116] Turning to his own development of the question, the author commences by inquiring about the possibility of the eternity of movement and of the first mover.[117] In the first two articles of the question, setting out the doctrine of the faith concerning the temporal beginning of the world, he presents St. Thomas' explanation of the question of the possi-

[111] Cf. *ibid.*, sec. i, n. 1.

[112] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 7.

[113] Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 7-19.

[114] Omne quod fit ab alio fit, sive creetur sive genceretur, sive quacumque ratione fiat. *Ibid.*, n. 20.

[115] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 21; n. 25.

[116] Cf. Joann. a S. Th. *Curs. Phil.*, Philosophia Naturalis P. I, 456 ff.

[117] Cf. *ibid.*, q. 24, de aeternitate motus et primi eius motore, 477 a23.

bility of creation from eternity.[118] In article three, presenting the argument for the existence of God, he leaves aside the eternity of movement in Aristotle's argument and paraphrases the argument from movement as found in the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas.[119] In conclusion, he states that the fact of movement in the world leads to a mover that moves others in such a way as to receive neither movement nor the power to be a mover from any other, but is immobile and *a se*.[120] A further point to be mentioned in connection with the author's understanding of the argument from movement is his reply to the first objection. Against the argument that a relatively unmoved mover would suffice to explain any movement, he insists that such a mover would explain only some particular movement, and by reason of the principle involved in the argument, the mind would be led to inquire whether this mover itself was subject to movement. Only an absolutely unmoved mover could ultimately explain even physical movement.[121]

For Antoine Goudin the question of the existence of God has as its reason, not a complete lack of this knowledge among men, but the need to show that the truth can be demonstrated scientifically.[122] The proof that it can is the demonstration itself, or rather five demonstrations corresponding to diverse divine attributes. These demonstrations are a kind of loose paraphrase of the *quinque viae*.[123] Once it is established that there is in reality a nature possessing these five characteristics, then the matter is settled; God's existence is demonstrated. Through these demonstrations, Goudin intends to refute the atheists.[124]

Roselli's natural theology is composed of two principal questions, one on the existence and attributes of God, the other on the divine operation with respect to the being and operation

[118] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 46, aa. 1-2.
[119] Cf. Joann. a S. Th., *loc. cit.*, a. 3, 484 b15-485 a19.
[120] Cf. *ibid.*
[121] Cf. *ibid.*, 485 a42.
[122] Cf. Goudin, *op. cit.*, Metaphysica, q. 3, De Ente Spirituali, 206.
[123] Cf. *ibid.*, and 211-212.
[124] Cf. *ibid.*, 206.

of creatures. The existence of God is approached as a confrontation of atheism. The name God is understood even by atheists to mean a being greater and better than which none can be thought: a being therefore consummately and infinitely perfect.[125] To prove, against the denials of the atheists, that a being involving such perfection is not impossible but really exists, is the author's intention. To achieve this end five arguments, substantially similar to the *quinque viae*, are first employed; then a sixth is added. The five arguments all have a similar form, exemplified by the first: A first, altogether unmoved mover exists; this is God; therefore God exists.[126]

What is rather amazing, and significant, is that the Thomist Roselli adds to these arguments a sixth, which is that of Christian Wolff: If the most perfect being is possible, it exists. Since there is no contradiction in a most perfect being, it is possible; since existence is a perfection, from the possibility of such a being, the existence follows. The author insists that there is no ontological argument here, because, unlike limited beings, the most perfect being has an essence which includes existence.[127] This incursion of foreign thought into the mind of a Thomist is quite striking.

Conclusions Reached by the Arguments

Both for reasons intrinsic to the authors of the era and because of contemporary interest, this final point concerning the conclusions of arguments for the existence of God is important. Contemporarily, the historian of philosophy, Carlo Giacon, refers to the debilitation of metaphysics in this period. This he exemplifies by referring to Cardinal Cajetan's observations about the conclusions of the *quinque viae*. Cajetan, he says, judges the *quinque viae* to be insufficient as demonstrations of God's existence. They reach some sort of superior being, but the proofs for the unicity and infinite perfection subsequent

[125] Cf. Roselli, *op. cit.*, IV, 292.
[126] Cf. *ibid.*, 291.
[127] Cf. *ibid.*, 294.

in the *Summa Theologiae* truly prove *God's* existence. This historian remarks that Cajetan is thus adverting to a difficulty previously seen by Scotus and Ockham, and subsequently to be alleged by Kant.[128] Cajetan's remarks are indeed crucial in this matter; they are not, however, unique.

Certainly Dominic of Flanders considers the proofs he offers to be proofs of the existence of God. He makes no special point of identifying the subject of the conclusion with God. For him the pure act with which he is concerned is " being by essence," God.[129]

Javelli does point out the difference between physics' generic demonstration of the existence of separated substances and metaphysics' demonstration specifically of these. He further examines the proof for the existence of God, that is, of a mover unmoved in any way. With reference to the proof from the grades of perfections, it is interesting to note that he employs the phrase, " among all judging rightly, this is God." [130]

It is Cajetan, however, who among the Thomists most emphatically raises the question of the specific conclusion of the *quinque viae*. The Cardnal's remarks have been a recurring factor in the history of the question ever since.

In his commentary on the *quinque viae*, Cajetan, after discussing the objections directed against the propriety of raising the question of the existence of God, the subject of the science, states this about the proofs themselves: In the article there is one conclusion, replying affirmatively to the question at issue; that conclusion is: *Deus est*, God exists. As is apparent from the context, for the author this signifies that theology, from principles " appropriated ministerially " proves that its subject, God, exists.[131]

Later the sense in which the proofs themselves reach such a conclusion is questioned. In one sense they can be seen as

[128] Cf. Giacon, Carlo, " La Seconda Scolastica." *Storia della Filosofia* a cura di Cornelio Fabro (Rome: Coletti, 1954), 401-402.

[129] Cf. Dominic of Flanders *op. cit.*, XII, q. 5, a. 1 and ad 3um.

[130] Cf. Javelli, *op. cit.*, Lib. XII, q. 9, *ad tertium principale.*

[131] Cf. Cajetan, *Comm. in Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, a. 3, comm. n. I, Ed. Leon.

directly and immediately concluding to God as understood by the faithful, with all His attributes. In this view the difficulty arises that it is not immediately evident that the proofs lead so high. The first proof, for example, need lead only to a mover as unmoved as the intellective soul. In another sense, the proofs can be seen as concluding to certain attributes or predicates which in truth do belong to God, the proofs as such, however, not being concerned with how these attributes are found in reality. The author insists that it is in this sense that they are to be understood as reaching the conclusion, God exists. For, establishing that the predicates are indeed found in reality, they establish directly but *per accidens,* as it were, that God exists, since these predicates belong properly to God. Not directly, but consequently, then, they are said to prove that God as God, the subject, the substrate of these predicates and of theology, exists. Thus, in brief, Cajetan teaches that the *quinque viae* directly and immediately prove that these five predicates exist; directly and *per accidens,* that God, as having these attributes, exists; that consequently only, the one perfect being such as we hold God to be " exists." [132]

John of St. Thomas, in his *Cursus Philosophicus,* from the outset clearly considers the proof from movement as concluding to the existence of God. He places the question: What does the philosopher demonstrate concerning God from movement? His reply is that directly and immediately it is demonstrated that there is a first mover, entirely unmoved; consequently, certain attributes belonging to divinity and to pure act are deduced.[133] In addition, he adds to the conclusion of the argument from movement, that there is a first mover, " and this we call God." [134] In this way, he makes the conclusion specific.

In his *Cursus Theologicus,* it should be noted in passing, John of St. Thomas also repeats Cajetan's remarks about the

[132] Cf. *ibid.,* n. III. For a discussion of this commentary, cf. Bersani, S., C. M., " De Mente Cardinalis Cajetani circa Vim Conclusionum Quinque Viarum " in *Divus Thomas* (PL) XXXVI (1933), 429-434.

[133] Cf. Joann. a S. Th., *Curs. Phil.,* Phil. Nat. P. I, q. 24, a. 3, 484 b8.

[134] Cf. *ibid.*

conclusion of the *quinque viae*, with, however, the modification of Dominic Banes who insists that movement in the *prima via* is to be taken as any transition from potency to act; that consequently it establishes an *absolutely* unmoved mover.[135]

Suarez also raises the issue of the conclusion precisely of *God's* existence. His solution is both different and indicative of a new direction in the development of the whole question. As has been noted, he distinguishes from the outset between the demonstration of the existence of uncreated being, and of the existence of God. To complete the demonstration of God's existence, he deems the proof given for an unproduced being insufficient. It could be alleged, for example, that in any given order an unproduced being might be established, without the establishment of God's existence being thereby made evident. Thus the pagans hold for gods of grain, of wine, and other things; the Manichaeans for principles of good and evil. For the Christian the statement, "*God exists*" can admit of no such plurality. Thus a demonstration that will show the unicity of the unproduced cause will alone suffice to prove that God exists, for then it will be clear that this being is the absolutely first cause, one in number, one in nature and essence, corresponding to what is meant by the word *God*.[136] In this way Suarez intends to solve the objection of Peter d'Ailly (Alliacus) (1350-1420), a nominalist, who said that to establish the existence of an uncreated being is not to establish the existence of God.[137]

In confronting the difficulty, Suarez by way of preliminary indicates the necessity for a nominal definition of God; he then establishes the appropriate nominal definition; finally he formulates the demonstrations.

[135] Cf. *Cursus Theologicus*, in Primam Partem, Disp. 3, a. 2, Ed. Solesmes (1930), I, n. 1, 419. Dominic Banes (1528-1604) repeats Cajetan's remarks substantially; he insists contrary to the Cardinal that the predicates reached in the conclusions are proper to God; that movement in the *prima via* is to be taken in the sense explained in the text. Cf. Banes, *Scholasticum Commentarium in Primam Partem Summae Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis*, Ed. Urbano, O.P. (Madrid: Biblioteca de Tomistas Espanolos, 1934), 113-115.

[136] Cf. Suarez, *Disp. Met.*, Disp. XXIX, sec. ii, n. 1.

[137] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 2.

As to the first point, he says that it can indeed be demonstrated that the *per se* necessary being, the font, the efficient cause of all things is and is consequently one; thus it can be demonstrated that it is God. But to such a process the nominal definition of God is the key. In other words, the sense of the term *God* must be preestablished to any reasoning about God.[138] In this predetermination, certain limits are to be observed. The sense of the word cannot be so broad as to include all the divine attributes. For then it would be necessary to demonstrate, contrary to the usual mode of procedure, all of these attributes before the existence of God would be established. Neither can the sense of the name be too restrictive. If it were to stand for one attribute, for example, " most perfect being," the illation from this to the conclusion *God exists* might not be evident. To those, for example, who might think that there is nothing besides the corporeal world, " most perfect being " might signify man or the heavens. Then the identification of the " most perfect being " with God would not truly mean God exists. Neither " first mover of the heavens " nor Suarez' own " *per se* necessary being " fulfill " what we intend by the name God." [139]

Keeping such limits, a nominal definition is then set forth:

> This name signifies a certain noble being, surpassing all others, from which as from their first author, all other things proceed; which therefore is the supreme divinity, to be worshipped and venerated.[140]

To demonstrate that such a being exists, then, is to demonstrate that God exists.

The actual demonstrations are two. One is *a posteriori*, from the order and harmony of the universe, seen not in terms of caused finality, but of vastness, concluding to the *one* first being, God.[141] The other is *a priori*, in the sense of a deduction from the *per se* necessary being, to its being one and therefore God.[142]

[138] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 4.
[139] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 5.
[140] Cf. *ibid.*
[141] Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 7-20.
[142] Cf. *ibid.*, sec. iii, nn. 1-2.

Suarez' handling of the demonstration precisely of God's existence, achieving the desired conclusion through the use of the nominal definition as the necessary vehicle of approach, is significant. Such an approach has since become quite common, as will be seen; at the time of its development by Suarez, however, it comes as a new direction in the exposition of the matter of God's existence.

For Goudin, also, the nominal definition of God is also of some moment in establishing, according to his intention, the truth that God's existence can be scientifically demonstrated. In the fourth proof, concluding to an infinitely perfect being, he adds that this is what all speak of as God, and thus God exists. In the fifth demonstration, he points out that since to be the first governor is the most notable mark of divinity, to deny the existence of this governor, even admitting the other attributes reached, would be to deny the existence of God.[143] With reference to the conclusion that God exists, but not as a vehicle of approach to the question, Goudin makes use of the significance of the name *God*.

For Roselli, the nominal definition assumes almost the key position in his procedure, because of his desire to establish a common denominator admitted even by the atheists. What they admit in the words used in their denial, he sets out to prove to be real. He thus preestablishes the fact that the name God is understood as meaning a being greater and better than which none can be thought, consummately and infinitely perfect.[144] Through this he establishes the conclusion *God exists* in each proof by identifying the predicate reached through the proof with this meaning of the name *God*. Thus the first unmoved mover is such a most perfect being, otherwise it would be in potency to some perfection. The first cause is most perfect because most independent.[145] As to the necessary being, this must not be matter, for it is not the most imperfect but the most perfect being that is the first necessary being.[146] The

[143] Cf. Goudin, *op. cit.*, Metaphysica, De ente spirituali, t. IV, 213.
[144] Cf. Roselli, *op. cit.*, IV, 292. [145] Cf. *ibid.* [146] Cf. *ibid.*, 293.

fourth and fifth arguments involve a similar process of identification with the most perfect being, and therefore with God, so that the conclusion *God exists* is established.

Conclusion

Remote as the era considered is from the contemporary scene, it truly forms a background emphasized by its doctrinal trends. Obviously the most radical point to be noted is the divergence relative to the place of God in metaphysics, arising out of attitudes towards the unity and subject of the science. The variety of arguments advanced for the existence of God, their function and direction in the respective authors, are all highly significant for an evaluation of the role of such arguments in any consideration of God's existence in metaphysics. The sense of the conclusion *God exists* as conceived and attained by the various authors points up a similar issue. In short, the contribution of this period to any reflexion concerning the contemporary status of the question of God's existence lies above all in its emphasis on the bearing of the context upon the whole development of the question in metaphysics.

B. Proximate Historical Background: The Thomistic Restoration in the Nineteenth Century

To speak of a restoration of scholastic philosophy in the last century is to take cognizance of the prior and subsequent state of that philosophy. By the end of the eighteenth century scholasticism was accorded universal scorn outside the Church, widespread oblivion within it.[147] The latter attitude, at least, ever since the epochal encyclical *Aeterni Patris* issued by Pope Leo XIII on August 4, 1879, has given place to a vigorous state of Thomistic studies, a contemporary glory. The Thom-

[147] The editor of the 1851 edition of Goudin's work mentions that the *Summa Theologiae* was incomprehensible to him until he discovered Goudin, because even his professors were unacquainted with basic Thomistic terminology. Cf. *op. cit.* Preface de l'Editeur (Roux-Lavergne), vii.

istic revival in its doctrinal character forms the proximate background of the current state of the question being considered. Because that doctrinal character has an essential influence, its evaluation is a necessary prerequisite. For reasons that will become obvious, the doctrinal aspect can best be set forth in terms, first, of its extrinsic sources, then, of its intrinsic traits. By extrinsic sources are meant both the motivation of the restoration, and the condition of those who accomplished it.

1. The Motivation of the Thomistic Restoration

As supreme pastor, Pope Leo XIII evidenced in his encyclical his characteristic awareness of the needs of the Church. He sought to offset the evils caused by the breach struck between faith and reason, theology and philosophy, religion and science, a breach left unspanned by any of the " modern " systems to which even ecclesiastics had given their allegiance. The Pontiff turned to the teaching of him who had so clearly shown the relationship between the two orders, whose work had borne reason to such heights while preserving its proper subordination to divine authority, St. Thomas Aquinas. The encyclical emphasized at length the benefits accruing to the defense of sacred truth from the use of the philosophical thought of the Angelic Doctor.

The movement already initiated among Catholic philosophers, Pope Leo thus crowned and assured its success. From its author and from its content the *Aeterni Patris* sponsored the restoration of Thomistic philosophy for an apologetic end. It is consequently not surprising that the philosophical texts written both immediately before and subsequent to the letter should reflect this defensive emphasis. Even in philosophical matters, the proponents of Thomism were quite frankly on the defensive. With desperate relief those who sought to serve the cause of Christian truth rediscovered in St. Thomas a scientific method and solid principles with which to defend the faith against the confusion so rampant that it cast doubt even upon man's ability to attain truth at all. One of the results of this motivation was the occasional incorporation of foreign elements

of thought that seem to agree in some way with St. Thomas. In this way a common ground could be sought with the adversaries of Christian philosophy. To point to such agreements was a kind of apologetic, because to men's minds the modern systems *were* philosophy. To show that some of the elements of these systems were in agreement with Thomism, was a form of argument for the latter's philosophical character.

2. Intellectual Condition of the Agents of Restoration

The rediscovery of St. Thomas was made by men trained in ways of philosophy far removed from his thought. Matthew Liberatore, S. J., for example, mentions that some told him he was insane when he set out to present the philosophical doctrine of St. Thomas.[148] Cajetan Sanseverino, S. J., was himself a convert from Cartesianism.[149] It is not surprising that in the monumental task facing the restorers of Thomism, they should have incorporated, perhaps even unconsciously, elements foreign to the doctrine they sought to reestablish.

The outstanding instance of such an alien influence is the since frequently decried, universal adoption of Christian Wolff's division of philosophy. Because this division forms the framework in which the nineteenth-century authors presented St. Thomas' philosophical thought, it inscribes a distinctive mark upon the character of the restoration. A scrutiny of this division in the philosophical context from which it springs is vital to an evaluation of the immediate antecedents of contemporary Thomists.

Christian Wolff's Notion of Philosophy

The discomfort of many of the nineteenth-century authors over the equivalence of "metaphysics" and "philosophy," and over the division into general metaphysics (ontology) and special metaphysics concerning the world (cosmology), the human soul (psychology) and God (natural theology) is evi-

[148] Cf. Liberatore, M., S.J., *Institutiones Philosophicae* (Prati: 1881), praef. auctoris, v.

[149] Cf. Geny, Honsp. *Hist. Phil.* 355.

dent. This is not surprising, for a methodology springs from the soul of a philosophy and the methodology of Christian Wolff (1679-1754) springs from a philosophy completely alien to that of St. Thomas. This author of students' manuals, a mathematics teacher turned philosopher, represents in his work the Baconian mentality that seeks systematization, with a view to mathematics as the prototype of all demonstrative science, to its method as the *desideratum* of philosophy as well.[150]

Dividing human knowledge into historical, philosophical and mathematical, Wolff defines philosophy as "the science of possibles insofar as they can be."[151] Its function is to give an intelligible explanation of historical knowledge, of those things, namely, that are or happen in the material and immaterial order.[152] Thus philosophy does not rest in mere facts, but seeks to justify why they are facts by explaining their possibility.[153] Yet it restricts itself to facts, admitting as "possible" those things which are evident by the experience of historical knowledge.[154] For Wolff, then, philosophy means scientific demonstration, transphenomenal knowledge, of a body of truths already empirically given.

Philosophy should be divided according to the kinds of being known, the data of historical knowledge, namely, bodies, the human soul, God.[155] To philosophize is to render an account scientifically of what is previously, but confusedly known about these things.[156] Another part, however, is necessary to phi-

[150] Logicae theoriam quam dedi praxi Geometrarum rigorem demonstrandi servantium consentaneam deprehendi. . . . Wolff, Christianus, *Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica* (Leipzig: 1740), Praef. b. 3. cf., *Theologia Naturalis Pars Prior* (Frankfurt, Leipzig: 1739), § 6, 6-7.

[151] Philosophia est scientia possibilium, quatenus esse possunt. *Logica, Discursus praeliminarius*, s. 29.

[152] Cf. *ibid.*, § 3, 1; s. 4, 2.

[153] Cf. *ibid.*, § 6, 3; s. 7.

[154] Cf. *ibid.*, § 10, 4. Wolff gives an example in the reason for a philosophy of law. Laws are taught in jurisprudence; there are reasons why these rather than other laws are passed in a nation. There is therefore a science of these reasons, the philosophy of law. Cf. *ibid.*, s. 39.

[155] Cf. *ibid.*, § 55; s. 56.

[156] Cf. *ibid.*

losophy as a preliminary. Ontology, the science of being, deals with general notions common to all beings, applied but not explained in the other sciences. Thus, without ontology, philosophy could not proceed in strict demonstrative fashion.[157]

The remarks of Wolff about ontology are revealing. As the science of being as being, it is called ontology; as presenting first principles and notions used in reasoning, it is called first philosophy. It achieves for " natural " ontology, what artificial logic achieves for " natural " logic, namely, makes clear and distinct notions already confusedly possessed.[158] His own protest that ontology is not a lexicon of philosophical terms is the most telling commentary on his conception. He seeks to counter the charge by the claim that ontology demonstrates, and does not merely list the notions common to all things.[159]

Metaphysics is the name that embraces all four parts of philosophy; it is the science of being, the world, the human soul and God.[160] This order is necessary because the subsequent parts depend upon the prior for the notions employed.[161]

Wolff's Natural Theology

The existence of natural theology is demanded because God is among the pre-philosophic data whose possibility must be explained. The explanation consists in demonstrating those things which according to Sacred Scripture are rightly taught by reason concerning God.[162] By demonstrating God's existence and attributes, the possibility of things known about God and His action on the world is established.[163]

Especially noteworthy in the treatment of God's existence by Wolff is his long discourse on the necessity of a nominal definition of God. The intention to demonstrate God's existence includes the preestablishment of what is to be pointed out

[157] Cf. *ibid.*, § 73, 34.

[158] Cf. *Ontologia, methodo scientifico pertractata qua omnis cognitionis humanae principia continentur.* (Frankfurt, Leipzig: 1730) Prolegomena, s. 23, 12.

[159] Cf. *ibid.*, § 25.

[160] Cf. *Logica, loc. cit.*, § 79, 36.

[161] Cf. *ibid.*, § 99.

[162] Cf. *Theologia Nat.*, § 2, 3.

[163] Cf. *Logica, loc. cit.*, § 57.

by the word *God,* even if it be unknown whether the being signified by this name is possible.[164] The basic requirement for the nominal definition is that it suit the demonstration to be fashioned. According to the canons of deductive procedure, three rules must be observed. The nominal definition, since it must be retained as the medium from which all divine attributes are deduced, must embrace these. Nor can it include anything extraneous, any attribute not intended to be deduced. Finally, it must be one, to avoid either a plurality of natural theologies, or a multiplication of labor, deriving the same attributes from a diversity of nominal definitions.[165]

Wolff's actual demonstrations, *a posteriori* and *a priori,* of the existence of God, are not relevant here.[166]

From this summary it is apparent that the operative key word in Wolff's thought is *demonstrate.* He conceives of philosophy as a process through which he can write his Q. E. D. concerning truths already given. Like mathematics, philosophy (or metaphysics, as he would have it) needs a body of primary notions and theorems, applicable to particular problems; whence his ontology. The world, man's soul, God are the data to be justified; whence the division of special metaphysics. To establish deductively and to proceed rigidly in the consideration of God, a nominal definition, carefully tailored, is a prerequisite and a governing influence.

In such a system, the division of philosophy in vogue among nineteenth-century Thomists has its roots and meaning. The strain of fitting St. Thomas' thought into this aprioristic framework will be reviewed later. The character of the restoration of Thomism as an influence upon the contemporary scene cannot be judged without an awareness of its own discomfort in its Wolffian trappings.

3. Intrinsic Character of the Restoration

Even before the effective impetus of the *Aeterni Patris,* the

[164] Cf. *Theologia Nat., loc. cit.,* § 5.
[165] Cf. *ibid.;* § 7; § 10.
[166] Cf. *ibid.,* c. I, s. 69, 55.

Thomistic restoration had begun. By an examination of the works of its more prominent protagonists both before and after the encyclical, its intrinsic character is clarified, for they are its spokesmen. Their work has received the crown of success. While recognizing it as the presentation substantially of the thought of St. Thomas, the extrinsic modifications must also be recognized. This is not a detraction from their work, but an aware approach to it. The relevant aspects of this restoration are the place of God in metaphysics, and the question of His existence.

The Place of God in Metaphysics

Little difficulty is encountered in discerning the lines of a general pattern among the Thomistic authors of the nineteenth century; they are the lines of the Wolffian division of philosophy or "metaphysics," generally adoped and acknowledged.[167] With Wolff's conception of metaphysics as coextensive with philosophy, both being synonymous with any "metempirical" knowledge of reality, metaphysics perishes as the science of things insofar as they are beings; rather it becomes the science of beings: bodies, the human soul, God—insofar as they are things considered nonexperimentally. Acceptance

[167] The authors sufficient for an indication of the nineteenth-century procedure, and significant for their prominence are these:

Liberatore, M., S. J., *op. cit.*

Sanseverino C., S. J., *Philosophia Christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata* (Naples: 1862); *Elementa Philosophiae Christianae* (Naples: 1864); *Philosophia Christiana . . .* in *Compendium Redacta* (Naples: 1873).

Zigliara, T., O. P., *Summa Philosophica in usum Scholarum* (Rome: 1876). The edition to be cited in this survey is ed. 13 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1902) I-II.

Schiffini, S., S. J., *Principia Philosophiae* (Turin: 1886); *Disputationes Metaphysicae Specialis* (Turin: 1888) I, II.

De Maria, Michael, S. J., *Philosophia Peripatetica Scholastica . . .* (Rome: 1892). The edition here to be cited is ed. 4 (Rome: 1913).

Remer, V., S. J., *Summa Philosophia Scholasticae* (Rome: 1893). The edition here to be cited, ed. 5 (Rome: 1925).

Lorenzelli, B., *Philosophiae Theoreticae Institutiones secundum Doctrinam Aristotelis et S. Thomas Aquinatis* (Rome: 1890). The edition here cited, ed. 2 (Rome: 1896).

Mercier, D. J., *Métaphysique Générale ou Ontologie,* ed. 7 (Louvain: 1923).

of Wolff's division of philosophy has led inexorably into an acceptance of the mentality from which it springs.

The trap appears most readily with regard to the philosophy of nature. Zigliara, for instance, holds no brief for Wolff's system;[168] he presents quite literally St. Thomas' doctrine on the specification of the speculative sciences;[169] yet, using Wolff's division, he assents to the notion of metaphysics because it considers the corporeal world *metaphysically*, not experimentally.[170] Liberatore makes a similar statement, since cosmology is an incorporeal consideration of bodies.[171] Remer explicitly recognizes such a practice as contrary to St. Thomas, but accepts contemporary usage.[172] Lorenzelli finally rejects the practice, removing all of natural philosophy except the consideration of the rational soul from metaphysics.[173]

The need for rationalizing the place of cosmology is inherent in the notion of metaphysics proposed as the science of being, immaterial both abstractly and positively, with the former consideration belonging to general, the latter to special metaphysics in its three parts.[174] If there is any science of being as being, it is ontology or general metaphysics, first of the sciences of the real to be presented. But the description of ontology likewise reflects Wolff's " guidebook " conception of it.

Liberatore credits Wolff and Bacon with the notion that ontology embraces the common notes and attributes of being.[175] It could be called the " logic of reality," insofar as it introduces the mind to the philosophical sphere by explaining notions and principles common to all the sciences.[176] Sanseverino speaks in

[168] Cf. Zigliara, *op. cit.*, Logica, I, lib. III, c. v., a. 2, n. iv, I, 175-177.

[169] Cf. *ibid.*, Log. II, lib. III, c. II, aa. 1-2, I, 296-302.

[170] Cf. *ibid.*, Cosmol. Prol., II, 8.

[171] Cf. Liberatore, *op. cit.*, I, 247.

[172] Cf. Remer, *op. cit.*, I, 7.

[173] Cf. Lorenzelli, *op. cit.*, II, 144.

[174] Cf. Liberatore, *op. cit.*, I, 245-246; Zigliara, *op. cit.*, Cosmol., Prol. II, 7; Schiffini, *Disp. Met.* treats of special metaphysics as distinguished from general in *Princ. Phil* ; De Maria, *op. cit.*, I, 291; Remer, *op. cit.*, I, 7; III, 2; IV, 1; Lorenzelli, *op. cit.*, I, 5. In all these authors, the phrase " ens inmateriale sive abstractive sive positive," or its equivalent, occurs.

[175] Cf. Liberatore, *op. cit.*, I, 247.

[176] Cf. *ibid.*, 248.

a similar vein.[177] For Zigliara it is first to be learned among the real sciences, because it establishes the nature or object of the universal principles discussed in logic.[178] De Maria cites St. Thomas for an identical statement, seeming to mistake the primacy of dignity attributed by St. Thomas to metaphysics for a primacy in discipline and a real subalternation of the other sciences to it.[179] Cardinal Mercier, while not subscribing to the Wolffian notion of metaphysics, still maintains that ontology must be first in order.[180]

Such positions were not elaborated without an awareness that they were inconsistent with St. Thomas' very words. Remer places the usual division of philosophy, i. e., metaphysics, together with its usual objects, alongside the *Prooemium* of the *Metaphysics* and question five of the *De Trinitate*. St. Thomas' words, he notes, clearly state that metaphysics is one science, distinct from and posterior to natural philosophy, considering being in common as subject and the separated substances as principles of the subject. But against this there is the prevalence of the current usage, to which he bows.[181] Lorenzelli is again more pronounced in his departure. He notes the error of placing ontology before natural philosophy.[182] He states that metaphysics, concerned as it is with being, does consider things that are immaterial, both in concept, such as being, cause and the like, and in reality, such as man's soul, the angels, God.[183] But relying upon the *Prooemium* of St. Thomas, he states that while metaphysics considers being, the most immaterial things, and first causes, it does not consider all as primary object. This can only be being; other things are considered as the causes of being, and are not the object but the end of the science.[184] Metaphysics is thus to be

[177] Cf. Sanseverino, *Phil. Christian. in Compend.* I, 3.

[178] Cf. Zigliara, *op. cit., Ontol.* Prol., II, 309.

[179] Cf. De Maria, *op. cit.*, I, 301, cites *I Post. Anal.* lect. 1.

[180] Cf. Mercier, *op. cit.*, 1.

[181] Cf. Remer, *op. cit.*, IV, 3; I, 2.

[182] Cf. Lorenzelli, *op. cit.*, I, 187. The author deems the idea of *Prima Philosophia* as an introductory science to have come from Descartes.

[183] Cf. *ibid.*, I, 5.

[184] Cf. *ibid.*, I, 193.

defined as the science of being taken most commonly insofar as it is naturally knowable.[185] By way of explanation, he states that it is being by participation that is naturally knowable; sensible being perfectly so; separated being, imperfectly, but positively so; being which is subsistent, solely by way of negation.[186] Cardinal Mercier, finally, insisting upon the unity of metaphysics, places definite strictures upon the admission of a division into general and special, in the light of St. Thomas' doctrine. The object of metaphysics is first substance.[187] As for the division of metaphysics, he maintains that there can be for the human intellect no science properly of the positively immaterial as such. The division into general and special is rather a disposition of material, according to which the general doctrines of ontology are applied in special considerations of immaterial things as humanly knowable. This is especially true of the natural study of God, about whom, proceeding through effects, we have knowledge in terms of truths of ontology concerning substance as such.[188] There is in sum but one metaphysics, since its object is formally one.[189]

God, in the mode of procedure generally followed, then falls within the realm of special metaphysics as this treats of positively immaterial being. While recalling the qualifications placed by Lorenzelli and Cardinal Mercier, and the insistence of all the authors that God is known solely through effects, it is still true that the general attitude sees God as the subject of natural theology, the science of God acquired by the natural light of reason. A rather common remark is that it is thus distinguished from sacred theology, the science of God through revelation. Eager to put reason's best foot forward in con-

[185] Cf. *ibid.* Igitur scientia maxime intellectualis definiri poterit: Scientia de ente communissime sumpto in quantum est naturaliter intelligibilis.

[186] Cf. *ibid.* nota 1. Ens naturaliter intelligible est omne id quod est ens per participationem, perfecte quidem intelligibile est ens sensibile; imperfecte quidem sed positive intelligibile est etiam ens immateriale. Ipsum autem esse subsistens in quantum est causa aliorum et secundum ea quae necesse est ei convenire tanquam aliorum causa, est naturaliter intelligibile per viam negationis. . . .

[187] Cf. Mercier, *op. cit.*, 12; 14.

[188] Cf. *ibid.*, 23.

[189] Cf. *ibid.*

sidering God, the authors generally assume the order and doctrine of the appropriate sections of the *Summa Theologiae* into their works.[190]

The Question of God's Existence

With God indicated as the subject of a specific part of special metaphysics, it is especially relative to His existence that the procedure of the *Summa Theologiae* is reproduced in detail. With God as the subject of natural theology, the initial motivation, the first scientific question for the science is obviously the challenge of establishing His existence. Obviously, too, the strictly rational procedure in executing this task demands the designation of the meaning of the name God, the nominal definition of God.

The nominal definition among the authors assumes a variety of versions. Always, of course, its necessity is dictated by the exigencies of the task of establishing the conclusion, by reason, that *God exists.* In some cases the nominal definition of God is equivalent to the concept "first mover," "first cause" and the like, according to the arguments used to establish the conclusion.[191] In other cases, some one nominal definition is contrived, and this in a variety of ways. God is said to signify an absolutely necessary being, perfect in all ways, distinct from the world and efficient cause of it. Then a notion, such as first mover, resulting from the arguments employed, is shown to be equivalent to this nominal definition.[192] Or, as the apologetic influence becomes explicit in the proposal that the name be accepted "as all men understand it," it is stated that the variety and frequent inadequacy of such acceptations are to be overcome by decreeing that whatever signification be accepted, it be proper to the true God.[193] Somewhat similarly, another

[190] Cf. Liberatore, *op. cit.*, II, 433; Sanseverino, *op. cit.*, II, 258 ff.; Zigliara, *op. cit.*, Theologia, II, 413 ff.; Schiffini, *Disp. Met. Sp.*, II, 7 ff.; De Maria, *op. cit.*, III, 5 ff.; Remer, *op. cit.*, VI, 1 ff.; Lorenzelli, *op. cit.*, II, 450 ff.

[191] Cf. Liberatore, *op. cit.*, II, 445 ff.; Zigliara, *op. cit.*, Theologia, lib. I, c. ii, a. 3, II, 443; Lorenzelli, *op. cit.*, II, 451.

[192] Cf. Sanseverino, *Phil. Christ. in Comp.*, II, 258; 266.

[193] Cf. Schiffini, *Disp. Met. Sp.*, I, 10.

nominal definition settled upon is that signification denied by atheists and admitted by the whole human race in recognizing some primary causal being.[194]

As to the actual demonstration of God's existence, the *quinque viae* are universally adopted, at least in some form. What is noticeable is that while being advanced as establishing the conclusion desired, *God exists*, there is a qualification to be made. The conclusion does stand, because of the predetermined nominal definition. But the conclusion is to be interpreted as solely establishing the existence of God, not as an affirmation of His unity or of any of the fulness of His perfections. It is Cajetan who is invoked for his explanation of the conclusion, so that Kant's charge of a repetition of the error of the ontological argument in all the "cosmological" arguments is refuted.[195]

Conclusion

The apologetic motivation of the Thomistic restoration and the intellectual background of its spokesmen are linked in the character of Thomistic philosophy of this period. The authors, seeking to reassert the philosophical teaching of St. Thomas, accept as the truly rational, philosophic format for their work, the Wolffian division. The result is an acceptance of metaphysics as synonymous with philosophy, a result against which, however, a growing murmur is heard. According to this sense of metaphysics, a necessary modification results regarding "being" as subject of metaphysics. Once the division is admitted, a subject proportionately divisible must also be advanced. The traditional formula "being in common" can only mean being abstractively immaterial, the subject of ontology, for the sciences within special metaphysics treat of *being* positively immaterial. Ontology seems indeed devoted to a pure abstraction, even as in Wolff's system it seems a kind of afterthought. The realization of being pertain rather to special metaphysics.

[194] Cf. Remer, *op. cit.*, VI, 14.
[195] Cf. Zigliara, *loc. cit.*, 441-2.

God's place, since He is presupposed as a positively immaterial being, is guaranteed in such a system. The thought cannot but suggest itself that there is a definite basis for amenability to Wolff's concept in the mineteenth-century mind. For Wolff natural theology is a justification of data about God, as He is known previously in factual, " historical " knowledge. For the authors of the restoration, God, His existence, and attributes are also " given " in the data of revelation concerning the natural truths of religion. Natural theology is a rational exposition of these truths. The rational, philosophic apparatus prominent in Wolff's system is the nominal definition of God as the indispensable approach and the guarantee of deductive consistency. The nominal definition is also significant in Thomistic authors, who assume as their task the rational vindication of the conclusion *God exists,* and use as the effective means to accomplish this the pertinent doctrines of the *Summa Theologiae*. Through the nominal definition, the arguments advanced are reduced to the conclusion desired, at least in the sense admitted by Cajetan.

This much is evident from the Thomistic restoration's handling of the question of God's existence: it is a conclusion explicitly to be proved as the first function of natural theology. This is so because God is the subject of this science, and His existence is not scientifically evident beforehand. That God is the subject of natural theology, in turn, results from this, that God is positively immaterial and as such is to be considered by a special part of metaphysics. Contemporary attitudes can now be evaluated in view of these preliminaries.

Section II. *The Question of God's Existence in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics*

At the outset of this study, reference was made to the divergent attitudes currently besetting the question of God's existence in Thomistic metaphysics. In the light of the historical background, it is clear that the status of the question invariably stems from the total context within any conception

of metaphysics. The Thomistic restoration of the last century is the heritage of contemporary Thomism. To some degree the present situation results from varied reactions to that heritage. Largely these are reactions of opposition, but it should not be surprising in view of the history reviewed that the opposition does not blend into a unanimously accepted resolution.

To catalogue exhaustively all contemporary positions would be a vain effort. A selection must be made. The basis for this selection, because of the great variety of presentations, should be twofold. Some authors will be selected particularly because of the extent of their influence in forming current Thomism. Others will be selected, not because their influence has been extensive, but by reason of the significance of the teachings they propose. There will be a general classification of authors into "manualists" and, with a rather arbitrary designation, authors of "special studies." Because of the already illustrated bearing of context, each author will be presented in the totality of his teaching regarding the place of God in metaphysics and the actual question of God's existence.

Manualists

The authors of Thomistic manuals assume an importance attendant upon the very use of their works as students' textbooks. The restoration of Thomism in the last century was largely accomplished by such authors. While their works are still in use, the present century has seen works appear which gradually resolve points of dissatisfaction felt by some even of the earlier authors. While the *Cursus Philosophicus* of Edward Hugon, O. P. is an early example of this trend,[196] the manuals of Joseph Gredt, O. S. B. and F.-X. Maquart are of wide current influence.

[196] Cf. Hugon, Ed., O. P., *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus* (Paris: Lethielleux, 1935) I-III. First published in 1913. The author rejects Wolff's division, restoring natural philosophy to its rightful place. Cf. I, 10-11. There is a consequent clarification of metaphysics' proper subject. For surviving confusions, however, cf. III, 1-2.

Joseph Gredt, O. S. B.

A pronounced, yet not complete break with the nineteenth-century procedure is found in the widely circulated manuals of Father Gredt.[197] Wolff's division of philosophy is rejected, for natural philosophy is not to be included in metaphysics, nor is ontology a preliminary science. But the division of the nineteenth-century authors is accepted as being reducible to his own.[198] Thus the author retains the division of metaphysics into general and special with its parts. The basis for the division is the subject of metaphysics, immaterial being as it abstracts from created and uncreated.[199] *Abstracts* apparently signifies *includes*, since in general metaphysics being in general is treated, while created being and uncreated being divide special metaphysics.[200] Since metaphysics *per se* looks to immaterial being, the consideration of any material accidents is *per accidens* to the discussion of created being.[201] As in the nineteenth-century manuals, God enters metaphysics as the subject of a part of special metaphysics.[202]

Since God is the subject of natural theology, and His existence is neither evident nor given, it is to be demonstrated at the outset.[203] The points embraced by the pertinent consideration in the *Summa Theologiae* are included. St. Thomas' proof for demonstrability, the key being that creatures are God's effects, is, however, replaced by a simple statement that there are indeed *a posteriori* proofs.[204] The first point in the question

[197] Gredt, Jos., O. S. B. *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, ed. 10 (Friburg, Breslau, Barcelona: Herder, 1953) I-II. Reducible to Fr. Gredt's mode of procedure are the following: Boyer, S. J., *Cursus Philosophicus* (Paris: Désclee, 1937) I-II; Grenier, H., *Cursus Philosophicus* (Quebec: 1937) I-II; Phillips, R. P., *Modern Thomistic Philosophy* (London: Burnes, Oates, 1939-1940) I-II.

[198] Cf. Gredt, *op. cit.*, II, n. 615, 2.

[199] Cf. *ibid.*, 1.

[200] Cf. *ibid.*

[201] Cf. *ibid.*

[202] It is noteworthy that after the manner of Suarez and others, Fr. Gredt establishes the division of being into uncreated and created at the outset of special metaphysics. Cf. *ibid.*, II, n. 704, 104.

[203] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 789, 194.

[204] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 784, 186-190; n. 789, 193.

of God's existence is the nominal definition of God as *being a se*, and the meaning of this.[205] Again, as an immediate introduction to the proofs, the nominal definition is emphasized as meaning uncreated being, known as distinct from created being. The proofs conclude to God's existence, then, by establishing the reality of what the name "God" signifies in the concrete expressions "first mover," etc.[206]

The proofs themselves are the *quinque viae*, faithfully reproduced and Thomistically interpreted. A sixth argument, the author's own, is added.[207] With the nominal definition functioning, the conclusion *God exists* is established. The nature of God, even that there is only one *being a se*, however, is not involved. The voice of Cajetan echoes in the relegation of such points to subsequent questions. According to the six distinct proofs offered, there are six sorts of first cause, identified with *being a se*, the nominal definition of God.[208]

F.-X. Maquart

Frequently voiced protests[209] and unfavorable comparison with the teaching of St. Thomas culminate in the definitive rejection of Wolffian incursions, as in Fr. Marquart's work.[210] The Wolffian division is totally rejected, in its inclusion of natural philosophy in metaphysics, in the general and special partition based upon a subject that means both a vague

[205] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 784, 187.

[206] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 789, 193.

[207] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 790, 194-200.

[208] Cf. *ibid.*, n. 789, 193.

[209] Early issue was taken by such writers as:

Geny, P., S. J., *Questions d'enseignement de philosophie scolastique* (Paris: 1913).

Ramirez, J., O. P., "De Ipsa Philosophia in Universum secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-Thomisticam" in *La Ciencia Tomista*, July-Dec., 1923, 5-35, (Wolff is considered on 16 ff.); Jan.-Feb., 1924, 26-27.

Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O. P., "Dans quel ordre proposer les sciences philosophiques" in *Révue Thomiste*, XXIX (1924), 18-34.

Sertillanges, A. D., O. P., "La Science et les Sciences Spéculatives d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Révue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, X (1921), 5-20.

[210] Maquart, F.-X., *Elementa Philosophiae* (Paris: *Blot*, 1938) I-III.

"being" and determined beings.[211] Positively, the author's own view sees metaphysics embracing being in common, as its subject, and God as the extrinsic cause of this subject.[212]

The subject, being in common, is explained as real being, common as abstracted in the order connatural to man, the order of sensible reality.[213] This subject is not the prescientific being that is man's *primum cognitum,* nor being as attained by a mere total abstraction. The former is non-scientific, the latter simply a universal, a prerequisite to all science, but not sufficiently distinctive to constitute the supreme speculative science.[214] Being in common means being as attained by the supreme degree of formal, scientific abstraction, perceived with difficulty as the ultimate aspect of reality. The author emphasizes St. Thomas' inclusion of *esse* in this subject of metaphysics as the most formal aspect of reality.[215]

In the course of the investigation of this proper subject, God comes within the purview of the metaphysician. Gone is the constitution of natural theology as a distinct science dealing with God. Now it is an integral part of metaphysics, concerned with the first cause of being in common.[216] God is considered solely as the cause of being; there can be no properly philosophical science with God as its subject, for the knowledge required about the subject of science is unattainable regarding God.[217] What is formally involved in natural theology is not the investigation of God in terms of being, but the investigation of being in terms of its cause, God.[218]

Dedication to this view characterizes the presentation of

[211] Cf. *ibid.*, Pars I, Introductio ad Metaphysicam, III, 8-9. These points are made in opposition to the Suarezian author, P. Descoqs, S. J., Cf. Descoqs, P., S. J. *Institutiones Metaphysicae Generalis* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1925) I, 17.

[212] Cf. *ibid.*, 9.

[213] Cf. *ibid.*, Tract. 1, q. 1, prooem., 7.

[214] Cf. *ibid.*, 7-9. Fr. Maquart regards Suarez as designating being attained by total abstraction as metaphysics' subject.

[215] Cf. *ibid.*, 10-11.

[216] Cf. *ibid.*, Tract. II, Introd., 248.

[217] Cf. *ibid.*

[218] Cf. *ibid.*, . . . haec autem consideratio est quidem materialiter consideratio Dei, formaliter vero creaturarum.

God's existence. The need and possibility of the demonstration are not treated positively as in the *Summa Theologiae*, but as refutations of varied forms of ontologism and agnosticism.[219] The nominal definition of God is not predetermined as a vehicle of approach to the demonstration of God's existence. Rather the *quinque viae* are immediately presented and studiously explained, with emphasis on their procedure as distinct resolutions of effects to their proper causes.[220] As indicative of an appreciation for this point, Cajetan's remarks are quoted and explained.[221]

Upon the completion of the proofs the nominal definition of God is introduced, in connection with the question, not of God's unity, but of the univocity of the five proper causes attained, in the name " God." [222] Although the point does touch on God's nature, it is raised lest there remain unresolved the query: *does God exist?* That is, does some being greater than the beings of this world, as all who acknowledge the name God agree, exist? [223] More precisely, in distinction to the beings of this world, the name God is to be taken for a being in whom essence and existence are identical. Maquart resolves the question by showing that the causes affirmed in the five conclusions agree univocally in the name God as it signifies a being in whom essence and existence are identical.[224] The conclusion to this entire procedure is that, essence and existence being identical, the five proper causes attained are analogical causes, and that the name God in its given signification belongs univocally to them. Thus do the *quinque viae* conclude to the truth:

[219] Cf. *ibid.*, 249-277.

[220] Cf. *ibid.*, 291. Again, the chief opposition of Fr. Maquart is to P. Descoqs' *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis* (Paris: 1932; 1935) I-II.

[221] Cf. *ibid.*

[222] Cf. *ibid.*, 328-9. Ex quinque viis S. Thomae supra expositis ad has conclusiones pervenimus. . . . Utrum autem mereatur idem nomen Dei, illud ens ad quod pervenit unaquaeque via, an designet, non dico quinque entia vel unum ens,—hoc infra dicetur . . .—sed quinque entia naturam specifice diversam vel eamdem habentia, ita ut hoc nomen Deus eis conveniat aequivoce vel univoce.

[223] Cf. *ibid.*

[224] Cf. *ibid.*, 330. Has causas univoce nomen Dei mereri, quippe quae habent essentiam cum esse identificatam.

God exists. They do not yet, however, affirm that the one God exists, but that there is a univocal meaning to the statement, God exists, no matter which of the causes reached is transferred into the statement via the nominal definition. The truth that one God exists, is brought out by the demonstration of God's unicity.[225]

Authors of Special Studies

From the vitality of contemporary Thomism, there flows an unending stream of literature on philosophical matters; it is widely characterized by an opposition to the procedure of the "manualists." Under the general designation "special studies," a few writings concerning the question of God's existence in metaphysics are here selected by reason of their significance. First to be considered is Canon Fernand Van Steenberghen, whose name immediately connotes the University of Louvain, and whose work expresses a distinctive line of thought among those authors who classify themselves as Thomists.[226]

At the outset, let it be stated that for this eminent author there is no distinct philosophical science dealing with God as its subject. "For the philosopher God forms the object of a conclusion to general metaphysics." [227] Indeed "the existence of God is the principal conclusion which this science establishes." [228] Rejecting St. Thomas' thought on the specification of sciences, however, the Canon places ontology as the fundamental philosophic discipline, not as the apex of speculative science. It is to be placed immediately after epistemology, a necessary preliminary, and to be followed by a twofold special metaphysics, concerned respectively with man and the material world.[229] Save then for restoring God to ontology, the Canon retains Wolff's division.

[225] Cf. *ibid.*, 329.

[226] Cf. Van Steenberghen, F., *Ontology*, tr. Rev. Martin Flynn (New York: Wagner, 1952), 5. Here the author proposes St. Thomas as guide.

[227] Cf. *ibid.*, 157-158; also the author's *Epistemology*, tr. Rev. Martin Flynn (New York: Wagner, 1949), 290.

[228] Cf. *Ontol.*, 14.

[229] Cf. *ibid.*, Introd., 16-17.

Ontology's fundamental role rests on the basic character of its subject, being as being. Contrary to some scholastics, this is not to be understood as a vague abstraction, something "above" the physical or sensible.[230] Nor does ontology's subject mean being materially taken (*ens materialiter sumptum*), abstracting from actually exercised existence, denoting any subject apt to exist.[231] The idea of being does not primitively connote a subject-act, essence-existence duality.[232] Positively, a general expression of being, the subject of ontology, is "the concrete real, taken in all its richness."[233] Actually, it is the *primum cognitum*; forced upon the mind in an analysis of the data of consciousness, being is seen in epistemology as a first undeniable datum.[234] By his characteristic mode of procedure, reflection on the content of consciousness, the author determines the sense of the *primum cognitum* as the subject of ontology, in terms of material and formal object. The material object is any and all data of experience, as facts, complex, and unstable.[235] The formal object is the common value hidden in every object of experience, synthesized, universalized, stabilized in the idea of being which represents this common value.[236] Thus ontology is concerned with the reality of the real, the existence of the actual existent, being as it is being.[237]

> Metaphysics will undertake to study precisely this common value, to find out what it implies in the real, and what value this synthetic representation has. In other words, the formal object of metaphysics is the value of being, which is understood in every object of experience.[238]

It is in the investigation of the implications of the common value of being in the real that ontology is led to God, as the ultimate ontological condition for the existence of things. This is the reason for the integration of the consideration of God into ontology as the latter's necessary complement.

[230] Cf. *ibid.*, 15.
[231] Cf. *ibid.*, 43-44.
[232] Cf. *ibid.*, 28.
[233] Cf. *ibid.*, 15.
[234] Cf. *ibid.*, 19; *Epistemology*, ch. VI, 108 ff.
[235] Cf. *Ontol.*, 21.
[236] Cf. *ibid.*
[237] Cf. *ibid.*, 42.
[238] Cf. *ibid.*, 22.

The mind of Canon Van Steenberghen about ontology's attainment of God's existence is revealed in his presentation both of the actual attainment and of the sense of the scientific question involved in this attainment. Regarding the attainment itself, it seems justifiable to discern a distinction made by him between the conclusion to an absolute reality, and to the unique, infinite being who is God. The former is derived at the outset of ontology from an analysis of the idea of being resulting in an apprehension of its transcendence, then on through the analysis of the experience of conditioned beings, to the realization of the impossibility of total reality's being conditioned. This is the process initiative of the realization of an absolute reality, at least in the sense that some element in the sum total of reality must be unconditioned. The nature, unicity or plurality, of the absolute are not at this point to be sought.[239]

The initial realization is the apprehension of a fact; the scientific explanation of the fact is the proof for the existence of an infinite being, God. This explanation consists in the realization of the notion of finiteness in being, and of the order, the relation of dependence, among the finite, viewed both statically and dynamically.[240] This order is shown to be metaphysical, so that finite beings as such are totally relative and the order of the finite, totally relative.[241] The necessary sequel is the existence of an infinite being, thus expressed by the author:

> The metaphysical inference which reveals the existence of the Infinite Being to us is very simple. An absolute reality forces itself upon us; we cannot find this absolute reality in the order of finite beings; consequently it must transcend the order of finite beings, and is therefore non-finite or infinite. In this way we pass from proper but confused knowledge of the unconditioned being to the improper or analogical but distinct knowledge of the Infinite Being, by means of the proper and distinct knowledge which we have of the essentially relative finite being.[242]

[239] Cf. *ibid.*, 40-41.
[240] Cf. *ibid.*, 42.
[241] Cf. *ibid.*, 140.
[242] Cf. *ibid.*, 141. The "logical schemata" of the process are on 142.

The author's remarks about this procedure express his attitude towards the sense of the scientific question of God's existence. The proof for the existence of an infinite being is a reevaluation of the data of experience in terms of being; the infinite being is to be reached as a metaphysical implication of experience.[243] Only a metaphysical proof establishes the existence of God; only the proof he offers, or one reducible to it, is metaphysical and as such successful.[244] The basis for this claim is the signification of the name "God," the establishment of whose reality is the philosophical problem of God:

> The term "God" is, indeed, ordinarily taken to designate the Creator of the universe, that is the first unique cause of everything which exists. Any nominal definition which did not express this point would be insufficient because it would not indicate the true God, the first principle and last end of all things, especially of man. Now in order to show the existence of the first unique cause, one must go beyond the limits of the finite as such, we must show the relativity of the finite as such, and that can only be done by a critical metaphysical evaluation of its existence and activity.[245]

What is implied regarding the meaning of the philosophical question of God's existence is expatiated elsewhere by the Canon, who resolves the following three questions: 1) Is there a problem about the existence of God; 2) if so, in what terms must it be framed; 3) by what method is there hope of a solution.[246]

1) That there is a philosophical problem in regard to God's existence is clear from the difficulties of those who from religious or personal conviction wish to affirm an absolute being. The problem consists in the need to overcome such difficulties by supplying a scientific reason for the certain knowledge of God's existence.[247]

[243] Cf. *ibid.*, 144.

[244] Cf. *ibid.*, 146.

[245] Cf. *ibid.*

[246] Cf. Van Steenberghen, "Le Problème Philosophique de Dieu," *Révue Philosophique de Louvain*, XLV (1947), 5-20; 141-168; 301-313. The questions indicated are the burden of this article.

[247] Cf. *ibid.*, 6-8; 141.

2) The terms in which the problem is to be framed are dictated by the nature of the problem itself. That which is sought must have a definite meaning; thus a nominal definition of God as unique, provident Creator of the universe, must be accepted. The problem can then be advanced in terms of a search for scientific certitude concerning the existence of God so designated.[248]

Such a formulation is demanded because the terms of a scientific problem must be scientifically determined. "Provident Creator of the universe" is the signification of the term *God* which alone satisfies the requirements of the present problem. For the problem of God has three senses, as a human problem, as a religious problem, as a scientific problem. "Unique, provident Creator of the universe" is determined in such a way that the shades of meaning involved in the uncritical acceptance of the common understanding of the name God are eliminated.[249]

As scientifically determined, however, the nominal definition encompasses what is involved in the human and religious sense of the problem of God. In general it pertains to science as organized human knowledge, to systematize and view critically the data of ordinary knowledge. Thus the scientific problem of God takes into account the question of God met on the level of human aspirations and of religion, in order to situate the question in some particular science, and to determine its exact formulation and solution.[250] To be formulated properly, the problem of God demands the nominal definition of God as indicated. For this nominal definition envisions the human overtones of the question of God as a transcendent being, the explanation of human life, destiny and moral obligations. It embraces religion's sense of a personal being, with attributes determined according to Jewish, Christian or Mohammedan tenets. Formulated in terms of the nominal definition given, the scientific problem of God takes into account the human

[248] Cf. *ibid.*, 141.
[249] Cf. *ibid.*, 10.
[250] Cf. *ibid.*, 13-14.

problem, the search for God's reality, and the religious problem, in terms of reason's need to examine the fundamental presuppositions for religion, the need for an apologetic.[251] With the nominal definition of God so determined as to express the monotheistic connotations of the name God, then, the scientific problem is thus to be formulated: To what extent can it be known with certitude that a unique, provident Creator of the universe exists? [252]

3) The method to be employed in solving this problem has already been indicated. Only his metaphysical argument can cope with the problem as so formulated. The scientific problem of God, then, is a metaphysical problem and demands a metaphysical solution. This point is made negatively by the rejection of all the other arguments advanced historically to prove God's existence. The general condemnation lies in this, that such proofs are either non-metaphysical, as are those from the consent of mankind or from empirical grounds, or they are mere approximations to the metaphysical argument. Consequently, none of the arguments thinkers have offered leads to a certain knowledge of the one true God, provident Creator of the universe.[253]

In the light of Thomistic procedures already indicated, the author's reduction of the *quinque viae* of the *Summa Theologiae* to mere approximations to the metaphysical argument required is significant and that indeed seems to be the principal occasion for the expression of his own views. The lack of progress in natural theology is the result of an intellectual servility to the letter of St. Thomas, to an uncritical repetition of the *quinque viae* that sacrifices his spirit.[254] Actually the *quinque viae* fall short because the one metaphysical argument, the *quarta via,* is intrinsically defective, and the other arguments are cosmological and as such insufficient to establish the existence of the provident Creator.[255]

[251] Cf. *ibid.,* 10-11.
[252] Cf. *ibid.,* 16-17.
[253] Cf. *ibid.,* 149-150.
[254] Cf. *ibid., 5.*
[255] Cf. *Ontology,* 148-149. Since the critique of the *quinque viae* is identical with that of the article previously cited, the *Ontology* will be used here, as available in

In detail all the cosmological arguments need to be prolonged. The prolongation of the *prima via*, if it is to establish the unique first mover, requires the establishment of the changeableness of finite being as such; then the unique, infinite being will be seen as alone unchangeable.[256] The *secunda via* fails by not establishing the hierarchy of cause and effect so that the dependence of finite being as such would be clear, and lead to a unique first cause.[257] The *tertia via* is questionably formulated in the *Summa;*[258] in any case it only establishes the need of one or more absolute beings, necessary of themselves.[259] The *quinta via*, in using the example of the directed arrow which lacks a determined nature, does not bring out the need of natures that are determined still to be directed by an extrinsic intelligence. What needs to be shown is that the finite as such demands an intelligence, directive because of the finite's relative teleological orientation, and creative because the finite is conditioned. Only then will the provident Creator be attained.[260]

The only metaphysical argument, the *quarta via*, is defectively formulated. The principle, " the more and the less are so called with respect to a maximum," as the Canon phrases it, is not universal. The more or less hot, in the example, is said with reference to a thermometer, not to some most hot reality, " as St. Thomas claimed on the basis of a physics which is today

English. These words of the article in the *Rev. Louv.*, however, are significant with reference to the *prima via* as reaching God: . . . déduction difficile, du reste, lorsqu'on part de la conclusion logique de la *prima via*, car il s'agit de passer du ou des principes de devenir à la cause créatrice: pour le faire legitement il faut établir que tout être fini est " mobile " au moins dans son activité, et que dès lors être infini et unique cause créatrice de tous les êtres finis. . . . Le Problème Phil. 163-164; cf. also 310-311.

[256] Cf. *Ontol.*, *ibid.*

[257] Cf. *ibid.*, 149.

[258] For a full examination of the Canon's views on the *tertia via*, cf. " Réflexions sur les Quinque Viae," *Acta III Congressus Thomistici Internationalis* (Rome: 1950). An analysis of this opinion is to be found in Connolly, T. K., O.P. " The Basis of the Third Proof for the existence of God." The Thomist, XVII (1954), 281-349.

[259] Cf. *Ontol.*, 150.

[260] Cf. *ibid.*, 152.

outmoded." Even restricted to the absolutely simple perfections, the principle, while true, is not evident immediately but only subsequent to the proof for the existence of the "*maximum reale*." [261] The other principle, that the greatest in any order is the cause of all in that order, is true only in precisely determined conditions.[262] The modification of the proof as found in the *De Potentia* q. 3, a. 5, is approved by the Canon, but in any event it coincides with his own valid metaphysical proof.[263]

From the viewpoint of the elaboration of his theory, the final remarks of the Canon anent his own proof should be noted. He affirms that this proof, by reason of its premisses, the totality of finite reality as relative, reaches a Creator, the total cause of the order of finite being.[264] "To create" means "to give existence to that which does not exist of itself." [265] Secondly, the proof reaches the unique, infinite being, possessing the other required attributes. God, thus understood in terms of the determined nominal definition, does exist, and is known with certainty.

From the works of Canon Van Steenberghen a distinctive attitude is evident. The difficulties besetting the place of God in metaphysics are solved in a manner which integrates natural theology with the consideration of being and rejects the sense of being attendant upon the consideration of natural theology as a distinct science. The problems connected with the establishment of God's existence, especially the unity of the conclusion as reached through the *quinque viae*, are eliminated, by the disposal of the *quinque viae*. The establishment of God's existence is guaranteed by an argument that befits the exigencies of a predetermined nominal definition of God, which

[261] Cf. *ibid.*, 151. In the original edition, the author thus states this principle: "le plus et le minus se disent par rapport à un maximum." *Ontologie* (Louvain: 1952), 161.

[262] Cf. *ibid.*, 151-152; *De Potentia* q. 3, a. 5. The Canon paraphrases the *prima ratio* of this article, it seems, as he finds it identical with his own proof. Cf. *ibid.*

[263] Cf. *ibid.*

[264] Cf. "La Problème Phil.," 308.

[265] Cf. *Ontol.*, 185.

itself synthesizes the total meaning of the problem of God in human knowledge. The metaphysical argument of the author establishes definitely the existence of the one God, the unique, provident Creator of the universe.

The Gilsonian School

For anyone familiar with current Thomistic literature, especially in North America, designation of M. Etienne Gilson as head of a school needs no explanation. To the lay mind he is recognized as a kind of official spokesman of Thomism.[266] Among Catholic philosophers his influence is pervasive in its distinctive mark, suggestive of the Pauline phrase he often quotes: *Non enim erubesco Evangelium*. Difficulties have been seen in conjunction with the desire of Catholic philosophers to defend the natural truths concerning God, yet to do so in a strictly rational framework. Such difficulties are evident in the notion of natural theology as a distinct science, and especially in the treatment of the existence of God relative to the variety of nominal definitions and the unification of the *quinque viae*. The thought of M. Gilson, denoted by the Pauline phrase because of its frank appraisal of Christian philosophy, and especially of Thomism, in its intimate connection with revelation, is therefore of the highest pertinence to the status of the question of God's existence. Its significance is to be seen from what can be called a general thesis evaluating Thomism in its philosophic character, and from the application of this thesis to the present question by M. Gilson himself and by others.

The Thesis of Gilson

The thesis of M. Gilson extends generally to all Christian philosophy, and to his particular application to Thomism.[267]

[266] Cf. *Time*, Jan. 10, 1955, 31; *Newsweek*, Feb. 7. 1955, 30-31. The impression that Gilson's point of view creates is indicated in the latter review's report of his ideas: Thomism as a philosophy has as its initial premise the existence of God; it builds a logically coherent system thereon, and even finds logical arguments in support of the initial presupposition.

[267] The occasion for a statement of these views was the dispute concerning "Christian Philosophy." For a view of this dispute, cf. *La Philosophie Chrétienne*

It is this: the assistance of revelation to the human intelligence has been responsible for the constitution of all scholastic philosophies, Thomism included. Consequently, the most fruitful prosecution of scholastic philosophy, especially metaphysics, will be assured by its restoration to its native environment.

As historian, the author establishes the antecedent. He first of all defines Christian philosophy as that which, while keeping distinct the two orders, considers nonetheless Christian revelation as the indispensable aid to reason.[268] The assistance given reason consists both in the choice of objects or problems, whereby the philosopher is directed to those matters which influence his religious life; and in the very exercise of intellectual activity, in which the moral support indispensable to philosophical success is bestowed.[269] History proves the contention of the author:

> The research in medieval thought which began by being concerned with the philosophies of the Middle Ages, is tending more and more to restore these philosophies within the theologies which contain them.[270]

Since, however, *res eodem modo conservantur quo creantur,* the inference is clear: to be restored to itself, any scholastic philosophy must return to theology. This is not to deny the formal distinction of objects "so dear to the dialecticians": but to distinguish these objects is not to separate them in the order of exercise.

> The historian can safely state by whom scholastic philosophy will be given a true life in the future: the scholastic philosophers will always be the theologians.[271]

(Paris: Ed. du Cerf), a resumé of the meetings held Sept. 1933 at Juvisy. A bibliography on the issue is found in Baudoux, N., O.F.M., "Quaestio de Philosophia Christiana," *Antonianum,* XI (1936), 487-552. M. Gilson has voiced his views in many of his works, to be noted in due course.

[268] Cf. Gilson, *Spirit of Medieval Philosophy* (New York: Scribner's 1940), 37; cf. also 35.

[269] Cf. *ibid.,* 37-41.

[270] Cf. Gilson, "Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism," *Modern Schoolman,* XXIX (1951), 4. This is the author's adaptation of his own address, delivered at the International Scholastic Congress, Rome, Sept. 10, 1950. Cf. "Les recherches historico-critiques de la Scolastique," *Antonianum,* XXVI (1951), 40-48.

[271] Cf. *ibid.,* 9-10.

In reference to the philosophical thought of St. Thomas, the same thesis is discussed.[272] Under the chapter heading *Le Révélable* the understanding and activity devoted to philosophical matters by St. Thomas are discussed. The term "revealable" for M. Gilson signifies truths in themselves accessible to unaided reason, but *de facto* revealed because of man's *de facto* need. Since theology considers revealed truth, it includes, not only what is properly revealed as surpassing reason's power, but also the revealable, in the sense explained. Theology treats of both sorts of revealed truth, all the while retaining its proper unity, since in all cases its end remains the same, the salvation of souls.[273] The author maintains that while theoretically St. Thomas did not identify the revealable and philosophy, in fact the saint's philosophical thought is primarily found in his theological works.[274] As historian, then, M. Gilson claims the right to expound the thought of the Angelic Doctor along the lines of its original development, as the revealable.[275] But it is likewise apparent that the author as philosopher is convinced that the sole way to construct a philosophical exposition *ad mentem D. Thomae* is to proceed from God to creatures, not from creatures to God. The latter process would necessitate the inversion and dislocation of texts, and would result rather in a philosophical system *ad mentem Cartesii*.[276]

Obviously this general thesis has implications in the context of the question of God in philosophy. Agreeing that for Aristotle metaphysics deals with a definite type of actual beings,[277] M. Gilson sees St. Thomas' concept of metaphysics

[272] Cf. Gilson, *Le Thomisme* (5ème ed., Paris: Vrin, 1947).

[273] Cf. *ibid.*, 15-25.

[274] Cf. *ibid.*, 26.

[275] Cf. *ibid.*, 16; 37-39.

[276] Cf. *ibid.*; also 26, note 3. So effective is the author's influence on this point that there is a widespread refusal to admit the philosophical commentaries of St. Thomas as expressions of autonomous thought; they are often regarded as mere historical arrangements of Aristotle's doctrine, to which the commentator does not commit himself. Cf. *Le Thomisme* 15; *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, (New York: 1955), 367. Cf. also, however, Chenu, O.P., *Introduction a l'Etude de S. Thomas*, ch. VI, 173-190.

[277] Cf. Owens, J., C.SS.R., *The Doctrine of Being in Aristotle's Metaphysics*, preface of Gilson, v., vii.

as profoundly changing this notion, because of the influence of the word of God: "I am Who am." (Exod. 3 : 14) [278]

In raising our thoughts to the consideration of Him Who is, Christianity revealed to Metaphysics the true nature of its proper object. When with Aristotle a Christian defines Metaphysics as the science of being as being, we may rest assured that he understands it always as the science of Being as Being, *id cuius actus est esse*, that is to say, God.[279]

Similarly, the author paraphrases the opening chapter of the *Summa contra Gentiles*, therein seeing St. Thomas maintain that the true object of metaphysics is not any truth, but first truth.[280] While being in general is not set aside from the immediate attention of the metaphysician, it is not his true end. When St. Thomas speaks autonomously, he leaves aside the metaphysics of being in general, and defines the science in terms of the supreme object, the supreme principle of being, which is God.[281]

The core and the genius of St. Thomas' metaphysical thought lie in his penetration of the revelation of God as He Who is.[282] The Angelic Doctor hails this revelation as *hanc sublimam veritatem*.[283] Through it, says M. Gilson, he raises metaphysics from the level of a logic of essences to the contemplation of the existential truth which has two facets: God is His own existence; of nothing else is this verified. In recognizing God as *ipsum esse* St. Thomas surpassed his predecessors, perceiving *esse* as the ultimate reality of all. The being of his metaphysics never loses sight of this existential note.[284]

In his exposition of St. Thomas' metaphysical thought along the lines of the revealable as already explained, the author first

[278] Cf. Gilson, *Sp. of Med. Phil.*, 51.
[279] Cf. Gilson, *ibid.*, 80.
[280] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 27-28.
[281] Cf. *ibid.*
[282] This theme is the underlying motive of such works of the author as: *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Scribner's, 1937); *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto: Pontifical Inst. of Medieval Studies, 1949).
[283] Cf. I *Cont. Gent.*, c. 22.
[284] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 135-139.

considers God's existence. The approach to the question consists in an elaboration of the existential sense of being, which leads to the very position of the need of a cause of finite existence.[285] The key to the whole question in the *Summa Theologiae* is seen as the *sed contra,* " I am Who am," of article three. The first two articles are viewed as an existentialist metaphysician's confrontation of " essentialist " attitudes.[286] For St. Thomas the process to God is not from essence to existence, but *a posteriori* from concrete existents to the conclusion of God's existence.[287]

Influence of Gilson's Thesis

M. Gilson's thesis has been taken up by others, who seek to apply it to the formulation of a true Thomistic metaphysics. Prominent among these is his protegé, Joseph Owens, C.SS.R.[288] A general outline of Fr. Owens' view of metaphysics and God is thus stated:

> If the present day developments in interpreting the metaphysical doctrines of Aquinas from the viewpoint of existential act are to achieve success, they would seem to prohibit any science of being in general which is not thereby the science of the real principle of being, God. The act of existing is attained by the human intellect not through conceptualization but through judgment, and immediately in finite things only. In these things the existential act lacks the character of necessity that is required for any scientific treatment. How can such an act be scientifically grasped except in reference to the Being whose essence is to exist, in whom the act of existing is absolutely necessary? [289]

The author proceeds to explain that for St. Thomas the corporeal world, the proper area of man's knowledge, considered as to its essences, is the subject of natural philosophy; considered as to existential act, the subject of metaphysics. Since

[285] Cf. *ibid.*, ch. I, " Existence et Réalité."
[286] Cf. *ibid.*, 71-85.
[287] Cf. *ibid.*, 85-87.
[288] Cf. Owens, *op. cit.* . . . preface of Gilson.
[289] Cf. Owens, J., C.SS.R., " Theodicy, Natural Theology and Metaphysics," *Modern Schoolman,* XXVIII (1951), 136-137.

God is the principle, efficient and final, of being, He must be treated in this science of *ens commune*. There is thus no possibility of distinguishing general metaphysics, from philosophical theology.[290]

Confronting a particular philosophical problem, Fr. Owens elaborates upon his conception of being as metaphysics' subject.[291] Being means the act of existing, *esse*, a complete nature in God alone; everything else is something other than its *esse*.[292] The Thomistic acceptance of the subject of metaphysics, being as being, means that this subject contains no other *ratio* than that of being. It is common being, extending to God and to creatures. God is its principle. How is being, thus understood, the subject of science? It is nowhere grasped as a nature, because in sensible existents it is other than the nature; in God it is a nature, but is not attainable as such by man. Positively, being is grasped by an act of judgment concerning the concrete individual. Then it receives conceptual expression in the common *ratio* "being." This common quidditative concept is not severed from the basis of real and actually exercised existence, but is proportioned to the existent thing which is grasped as individual by the senses. As such, the *ratio* of being is the basis for metaphysical conclusions, as in the *quinque viae*.[293]

Metaphysics' process of investigation in accord with this subject should thus manifest these general lines: begin with being as immediately grasped by judgment as the act of sensible things; continue by isolating that act, thus showing it to come from extrinsic causes; ascend to God, *ipsum esse;*

[290] Cf. *ibid.*

[291] Cf. Owens, "Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," *New Scholasticism*, XXVIII (1954), 454-467. The occasion of this article is the question: whether the establishment of the subject of metaphysics depends upon natural philosophy as a necessary preliminary. The question is raised by the paper of Dr. Vincent E. Smith, "The Prime Mover: Physical or Metaphysical Consideration," *Proceedings of The American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XXVIII (1954), 78-94.

[292] Cf. *ibid.* The author cites *I Cont. Gent.*, c. 22; *II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1.

[293] Cf. *ibid.*, 458 ff.

terminate by perfecting its process in the light of God as principle.[294]

Fr. Owens thus indicates the familiar formulae regarding metaphysics' nature, in terms of M. Gilson's doctrine, and suggests the mode of adaptation of the doctrine to a process of metaphysics *ad mentem D. Thomae.*

The *Natural Theology* of Gerard Smith, S. J. is an example in a systematic presentation of the influence of M. Gilson's thesis.[295] Natural theology is to be understood as integral with metaphysics; it is the consideration of God as first cause of being.[296] Approaching the question of God's existence in terms of the need for its being demonstrated, the author reflects M. Gilson's influence by viewing the various positions upon the matter through the classification "essentialist" and "existentialist" already seen. Attention is called to the revelation of creation as the key to the existential thought of Christian philosophers.[297] St. Thomas' own emphasis on the existential sense of being is pointed out relative to the criticism of St. Augustine's proof from truth in the human mind.[298] There is constant insistence, in contrasting existentialist and essentialist attitude, upon metaphysics' concern not solely with essence, but above all with existence.[299]

Noteworthy concerning the Gilsonian thesis, then, is the integration of the consideration of God within the one metaphysics. The existential character of being in Thomistic thought, indeed, depends upon this. The revelation of the God Who is *ipsum esse* is the boon conferred upon Thomism, and is so distinctive that M. Gilson recognizes as truly Thomistic a metaphysics which follows the presentation of the "revealable" in St. Thomas' theology. The existentialist emphasis makes for a sharp contrast, by its roots in the sensible existent, with the being of metaphysics as presented by the

[294] Cf. *ibid.*, 466.

[295] Cf. Smith, Gerard, S.J., *Natural Theology* (New York: Macmillan, 1951), vii-197.

[296] Cf. *ibid.*, 17.

[297] Cf. *ibid.*, 31.

[298] Cf. *ibid.*, 42-47.

[299] Cf. *ibid.*, 65.

manuals of the nineteenth century, their precursors and their imitators.

Application of the Gilsonian Thesis to the Question of God's Existence

The application of M. Gilson's thesis to the actual development of the question of God's existence amounts in general to this: St. Thomas and the truly Thomistic philosopher, because of the indicated influence of revelation, see the *quinque viae* as concluding immediately to God as *ipsum esse*, the " I am Who am " of Exodus, the God Who in the beginning created heaven and earth and all things, according to Genesis 1 : 1.[300] This application is seen verified in M. Gilson's own works, and in those of Frs. Owens and Smith.

M. Gilson, considering the privileged conspectus given the Christian philosopher, surpassing Aristotle's understanding of the universe, thus states the transcendent commitment of the beneficiary of revelation:

> Whoever undertakes to prove the existence of God *per ea quae facta sunt* undertakes in advance to prove His existence as Creator of the universe; in other words he is committed to the view that the efficient cause to which the world testifies can be none other than a creative cause, and thus also that the idea of creation is necessarily implied in every demonstration of the existence of the Christian God.[301]

The point is applied to the *quinque viae* of St. Thomas. Surveying the general outlines of these proofs, the author shows that beginning with distinct starting points, the process proper to each renders the existence of the starting point intelligible through the application of the principle of causality.[302] It is in terms, not of the numerical aspect, but of the proper cause necessary that the possibility of the infinite series of causes is rejected in favor of the necessity of a cause to which all others are secondary.[303]

[300] Cf. Gilson, *Sp. of Med. Phil.*, 64-68.
[301] Cf. *ibid.*, 72-73.
[302] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 113-115.
[303] Cf. *ibid.*, 114. The author refers to *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1; *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 21.

The distinct starting points and processes notwithstanding, however, the *quinque viae* all conclude immediately to Him Who is. The point is made by raising the question in regard to St. Thomas' first mover as it surpasses Aristotle's in signifying not merely a cause moving by being desired, but by being the efficient cause of movement.[304] The same sort of question is posed regarding the other proofs.[305] The general response considers St. Thomas to have transported the proofs to the plain of a creative, efficient causality by reason of his deeper insight into being.[306] The author's verification is carried out with respect to the *prima via*. That the relationship of effect to cause linking up nature with God rests upon the level of existence, *esse*, is supported by the author with texts of St. Thomas about God's universal causality.[307] Basing himself upon another text, the author states concerning the *prima via* together with the *secunda*:

> The first efficient cause cannot cause the existence of effects which other causes produce unless it causes first of all the existence of these causes. The first unmoved mover cannot cause the existence of the effects of the movement of the heavens unless it first causes the existence of that movement.[308]

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[304] Cf. *ibid.*, 99.

[305] Cf. *ibid.*, 101; 105; 111; 113. Regarding the author's analysis of the proofs, the following are to be noted:

The *secunda via* is explained not in terms of the order of efficient causes as such, but in terms of the existence of the causes and their effects, i. e., the principle of causality in the porof is understood solely in the entitative order, not in the order of causes as such (cf. 99). Thus the conclusion is to the first cause, not of causality as such, but of existence.

The *tertia via* is explained according to a text which, while found in the Leonine edition, is admittedly not the preferred reading, and which raises serious difficulties in interpreting the proof. The text accepted by the author is: Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt talia semper esse. The preferred reading: Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse. The Leonine itself notes that the good codices omit the word *semper*. Cf. Connolly, "The Basis for the Third Proof," cf. also *Summa Theologica*, Ed. la Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos (Madrid: 1947) Muniz, F., O. P., "Introduccion a la Cuestion II," 126-127.

[306] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 116.

[307] Cf. *Sp. of Med. Phil.*, 73-77. The author refers to *Compendium Theol.*, c. 68.

[308] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 119. The author refers to *II Cont. Gent.*, c. 6: Ostensum est enim supra per demonstrationem Aristotelis, esse aliquam primam causam

From the same text, the author more fully interprets the *prima via*:

It is obvious that if God creates things solely because He moves the causes which produced these things by their movement, God must be a mover as Creator of movement. In other words, if the proof by the first mover suffices to prove creation, then this proof must of necessity imply the idea of creation. Now the idea of creation is wanting in Aristotle, and so the Thomist proof of the existence of God, even if it merely literally reproduces an argumentation of Aristotle's, has a meaning altogether of its own, a meaning that the Greek philosopher never intended to give it.

Even if we admit that the first mover is the first of the motive causes which move by transitive causality, the very being of the movement would still escape his causality. But the case is very different in a Christian philosophy, and that is why St. Thomas when he would demonstrate creation, needs only to recall the conclusion of his proof of God by movement.[309]

Summing up his opinion as to the conclusion of all the *viae*, M. Gilson states:

It is necessary to admit that the Thomist proofs for the existence of God are developed upon the existential plane, as the demonstrations that there exists a first cause of the existence of movements . . . a first existential cause of all causes and their efficiency; a necessary existent, cause of the actualization of all possibles; a first term in the orders of being, truth, goodness, cause of all in that order; a final end, whose existence is the reason for all, the reason for anything at all existing.[310]

The heart of all the proofs is summed up in the argument for the subsistent *esse* in the *De Ente et Essentia*.[311] What this proof reaches, so do the *quinque viae*:

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efficientem quam Deum dicimus. Efficiens autem causa suos effectus ad esse conducit. Deus igitur aliis causa essendi existit. Item ostensum est in primo libro per rationem eiusdem, esse aliquod primum movens immobile, quod Deum dicimus. Primum autem movens in quolibet ordine motuum est causa motuum qui sunt illius ordinis. Cum igitur multa ex motibus coeli producantur in esse, in quorum ordine Deum esse primum movens ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit multis rebus causa essendi.

[309] Cf. *Sp. of Med. Phil.*, 76. The author refers to the same text of the *Cont. Gent.*

[310] Cf. *Le Thomisme*, 119.

[311] Cf. *ibid.*, 120. He refers to the *De Ente et Essentia*, ch. v, n. 4.

God is existence pure and simple, without any addition, distinct from all other existents in virtue of this very purity. . . . Such is the God which the proofs of St. Thomas, by five different ways, envision and finally reach.[312]

The interpretation of M. Gilson is followed by Fr. Owens in a detailed examination of the conclusion of the *prima via*.[313] The entire *quinque viae* are not diverse proofs but five expressions of the one proof, each isolating existential act in sensible things and proceeding to its source, subsistent *esse*.[314] The *prima via* in this sense is more manifest and efficacious, for the last three *viae* are difficult, while the second, although more apparently proceeding from *esse* and its cause, is actually less manifest, since substantial change is less evident than change in general, the starting point of the *prima via*.[315] After an exposition of St. Thomas' surpassing of Aristotle,[316] the author endeavors to establish that the Angelic Doctor viewed the proof from movement from the following standpoint:

A thing cannot be moved except through acquiring new existential act, and this ultimately can proceed only from the substantial act of existing.[317]

This point is sustained by textual support and by the refutation of Cajetan's observations concerning the conclusion of the proof.

[312] Cf. *ibid.*, 121; cf. also 122; 135.

[313] Cf. Owens, "The Conclusion of the *Prima Via*," *Modern Schoolman*, XXX (1953), 33-53; 109-121; 203-215.

[314] Cf. *ibid.*, 214.

[315] Cf. *ibid.* It must here be noted that to interpret the *secunda via* in terms of substantial change, is to ignore the words of the very text: Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium. . . . Attending to the properiety of St. Thomas' words, the following interpret the proof in terms of efficiency:

Dafarra, M., O.P., *Cursus Manualis Theologiae Dogmaticae* (Turin: Marietti, 1945), 67.

Del Prado, N., O.P., *De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae* (Freiburg: 1911), 222.

Garrigou-Lagrange, R., O.P., *God, His Existence and His Nature* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949) I, 289 ff.

Maquart, *Elementa Phil.* III, 300.

Muniz, "*Introduccion* . . .," 123.

[316] Cf. Owens, *ibid.*, 37-55.

[317] Cf. *ibid.*, 116.

The textual arguments follow. In the *Summa contra Gentiles*: the passage from non-being to being, *non-esse* to *esse*, is coupled with the passage from potency to act; the argument from movement is later used to establish the identity of essence and existence in God.[318] In the *Summa Theologiae*: the argument reaches the unique, creative God of Christian revelation because of its existential base.[319] In the *De Potentia*: " being moved " and " receiving *esse* " seem to concide as far as reaching the entirely immobile mover; the notion of act as entirely free of potency is the act of *esse*. Thus the argument reaches a being which is *ipsum esse* because it is pure act.[320] In the *Compendium Theologiae*: the immediately attained conclusion to the argument, which is the only proof used in this work, is employed to establish that God exists necessarily. Again the transition from potency to act is coupled with that from *non-esse* to *esse*.[321] That God's *esse* is eternal is also attained from the same immutability of the argument's conclusion.[322]

The author summarizes the evidence advanced:

> The act and potency envisaged in the *prima via*, accordingly, include essence as potency to the act of *esse*. Just as goodness or humanity, so the motion of sensible things seems to be looked upon as being act through its *esse*.[323]

Regarding the conclusion of the proof, then, this is to be inferred:

> On the basis of an analysis of sensible motion as ultimately made actual by existential act,[324] the movement that is not being moved by anything, in the sense explained in the text, of not being actuated by anything in imparting its motion, can only be the ultimate act which does not actuate an essence and so is the substantial act of existing, *esse*, without addition or possibility of

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[318] Cf. *ibid.*, 113, cites I *Cont. Gent.*, c. 13; c. 16; c. 22.
[319] Cf. *ibid.*, 114.
[320] Cf. *ibid.*, 115, cites *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 5, *Tertia ratio*.
[321] Cf. *ibid.*, cites *Comp. Theol.*, c. 3; c. 6.
[322] Cf. *ibid.*, cites *Comp. Theol.*, c. 8; c. 11.
[323] Cf. *ibid.*, 118.
[324] These texts are cited: IX *Met.* lect. 3, n. 1806; III *Cont. Gent.*, c. 66.

addition. Evident at once to Christian, Jew or Moslem is the identity of this act with Him Who in Exodus revealed Himself as I am Who am. Such is the immediate conclusion of the *prima via*.[325]

Fr. Owens charges Cajetan with overlooking the real distinction between essence and *esse* as it is involved in the proofs, and of consequently regarding them as attaining an essence or predicate, later to be shown to be proper to God. But this would demand either an invalid passage from the essential to the existential order, or else the reconsideration of the proof which would find what was there all the time, the divine *esse*. The latter reevaluation would merely confirm what St. Thomas meant by saying "this all understand to be God."[326]

Contrary to Cajetan, the immobile mover in subsequent questions is not further determined as the act of existing; as pure act is shown to preclude its being the actualization of either matter or essence.[327] Neither could the predicate, immobile mover, be common to God and to other movers. For then only by the addition of a different, proper element, could this predicate be shown as proper to God. The different element is already present, but neglected by Cajetan, who overlooked the existential character of the proof. It is this element that renders all of the proofs efficacious in reaching Him Who is.[328] To see the pure act of the *prima via* as applicable indifferently to the Aristotelian movers and to God, is to reach an entity based upon finite essences without granting to existential act the role it enjoys in Aquinas' metaphysics. No matter how far protracted, the argument viewed without this existential element will never express the divine essence in terms of "genuine existential act."[329] If act is taken in the argument in the Aristotelian sense of form, the pure act will be form only.

If, on the other hand, the form towards which motion tends is treated as part of an essence in potency to existential act, then the

[325] Cf. Owens, *loc. cit.*, 215.
[326] Cf. *ibid.*
[327] Cf. *ibid.*, 205.
[328] Cf. *ibid.*, 205-207.
[329] Cf. *ibid.*, 215.

elimination of all potency whatsoever will result immediately in a subsistent existential act. Such a pure act cannot at any state be looked upon as indifferently an intellectual soul or a finite separated substance or as the Christian God. It is seen at once to be identified with the " I am Who am " of Exodus.[330]

Last to be mentioned is Fr. Smith's application of the Gilsonian concept to the systematized procedure of natural theology concerning God's existence. The author maintains that the *quinque viae* are not merely different processes to a first cause in each category of effect. This is but the immediate terminus of each.[331] In a profounder sense their one term is pure being, unqualified by any categorization:

> If being (the act of existence) did not apply to God differently from the way it applies to His effects, we should have included in His being the meaning of creatures' being. Now this is not to prove that *God* exists, it is to prove that something like a creature exists.[332]

Proceeding along systematic lines Fr. Smith lays down the requirements, logical and metaphysical, for the *quia* proof of the existence of cause through effects. Logically, a foreknowledge of the nominal definition of the subject is required. Not merely the etymology of the subject's name, the nominal definition is rather the common and true acceptation of the subject as induced from experience. In the proof for the existence of a cause the nominal definition is in itself the effect of the subject, and the middle term in the demonstration.[333] As indicated by St. Thomas in I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, the nominal definition of God imposed from effects is required in the proof for His existence. The nominal definition designated by Fr. Smith is " cause of the existence of things," so that the proof amounts to this:

> God is the cause of the existence of things. (M)
> The cause of the existence of things (M) exists.
> Therefore, God (S) exists (P).[334]

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[330] Cf. *ibid.*
[331] Cf. Smith, *Nat. Theol.*, 86-87.
[332] Cf. *ibid.*, 87-88.
[333] Cf. *ibid.*, 73-74.
[334] Cf. *ibid.*, 76.

This nominal definition of God, however, seems to violate the canon that the nominal definition be the effect of the cause whose existence is to be demonstrated. Fr. Smith fashions an intricate reply. God's creation as it is in some sense transitive, is in the thing produced.[335] Thus as transitive action is the effect as referred to its cause, so, according to St. Thomas, the creative action of God is the dependence of the creature upon its principle. Creation is thus something (*res quaedam est*), an effect (*neque increata est*) and not created by any other relation.[336] The "cause of the existence of things" is in this sense the middle term desired; it is passive creation, is in a creature and is a creature.[337] "In this sense 'the cause of the existence of things' is creatures, effects of God's creation, which are causes of our knowledge that God is their cause. . . ." [338]

To clarify what seems "to strain the intelligibility of language to the breaking point," [339] Fr. Smith adds the explanation of the metaphysical basis for the validity of the proof. This amounts largely to an insistence upon the formal acceptance of effect as effect and cause as cause, that it is not a question merely of an effect's not being able to exist without a cause, but of the impossibility of an existing effect actually existing without a cause.[340] The proof for the existence of God thus demands, not only that participated beings which exist be caused, and that therefore a cause exists, but demands the realization that nothing short of the cause of their existence will account for the existence of that whose existence is caused. Only then will the existence of God, the cause of the existence of things, be proved.[341]

Turning to the *quinque viae*, the author seeks to establish the profound unity of their conclusion, both textually and by

[335] Cf. *ibid.* The author cites Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, c. 8, 1050 a23.
[336] Cf. *ibid.* Cited are II *Cont. Gent.*, c. 18; *De Potentia*, q. 3, a. 5; also ad 1um.
[337] Cf. *ibid.* Cited is *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2um.
[338] Cf. *ibid.*, 77.
[339] Cf. *ibid.*
[340] Cf. *ibid.*, 81. Cited is II *Cont. Gent.* c. 16. Actus autem agentis ut a quo, est patientis ut in quo. . . . Cf. also 83; 88.
[341] Cf. *ibid.*, 83.

his own doctrinal exposition. Textually, the name *viae* implies that for St. Thomas they all arrive at the one *ipsum esse*. Then the phrase " this all understand to be God," or its equivalent, suggests a reflexion by which the existent attained is seen as *ipsum esse*; otherwise St. Thomas would not have employed such a concluding phrase. Furthermore, from the proofs is drawn *ipsum esse*, or its equivalent, in the demonstrations about the divine nature.[342]

The doctrinal exposition points out first of all, as a general feature of the proofs, the import of St. Thomas' distinction between the cause of becoming (*causa secundum fieri et non directe secundum esse*) and the cause of the being of an effect (*causa non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi*).[343] While this distinction is not explicitly mentioned by Fr. Smith, preparation for its application is apparent in the explanation of causality as involved in the proofs.[344]

The particular exposition of each of the *viae* endeavors to show how each reaches the subsistent *esse*, cause of the existence of things. The process can be illustrated in terms of the *prima via*. The proof is reduced to four propositions:

1) There are things in motion.
2) Things in motion are moved by another.
3) The " other " which moves things in motion cannot adequately explain motion unless it be itself unmoved.
4) Therefore, there must be an unmoved mover, whom all understand to be God.[345]

It is with regard to the fourth proposition that the author makes his distinctive point. There is no difficulty, by reason of the process, in admitting the conclusion regarding the unmoved mover; but why is this understood to be God? If it is not conceded that God is a mover in a more excellent way, the first mover cannot be understood to be God, for the first mover would then be left within the category of effects.

[342] Cf. *ibid.*, 88.
[343] Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 104, a. 1.
[344] Cf. Smith, *loc. cit.*, 90-100.
[345] Cf. *ibid.*, 102.

The intricacies of the extrication of the first mover from the categories, seem to encompass the tracing out of the following steps:

1) To exist in a category of being is for the being in that category to exist.
2) It is a composite, a subject with accruing qualifications that does exist.
3) In the case of movement it is a subject-existing-as-changing which exists.
4) Since dependence is involved, it is the whole which is being caused to exist, inasmuch as the cause is causing the composite, thus to be. Thus water being caused to be hot is being caused to exist precisely because water caused to be hot is for that water to exist as becoming hot.
5) The cause then is:
   a) not the subject before it is a composite existing as changing, because then it does not exist;
   b) nor movers which presuppose an existent subject to move or change. The subject existing as becoming cannot be presupposed; it is this that needs to be caused. The very problem is about a subject existing as becoming; this, not a subject existing as a potential subject of actual change, needs explanation. Thus secondary movers, those which presuppose an existing subject, are insufficient.
6) The only answer is a cause which does not presuppose the existence of a subject of becoming, but causes that existence. . . . The cause is a cause which cannot presuppose a subject-existing-as-moved (there is no such subject before its movement) but causes the subject-to-be-existing-as-moved.[346]

Thus is God extricated from the categories. For as first cause of a thing-existing-as-moved, God is His own existence; He cannot acquire the act of existence as moved things acquire their existence from Him. The only category in which God could be situated would be the category of existence. For He is His being. But the act of existing cannot be a category. Further, since the act of existing does not belong to God as to a distinct subject, there is no "different" subject by which

[346] Cf. *ibid.*, 110-118. The process with regard both to the *prima* and *secunda via* is later summarized, *ibid.*, 159-160, note 1.

God could be in a distinct category. Thus the existence reached by the proof is unqualified, *ipsum esse*.[347]

In such a manner, then, the *prima via* is explained as reaching God, the sole cause of existence. Final emphasis is placed upon the involvement of the cause of existence in all the proofs by the remarks concluding their exposition. The causality of the *causa non solum fiendi sed etiam essendi* is unfolded.

> An efficient cause of being is one whose proper effect is the act of existing. In default of such a cause there would be nothing: nothing antecedent to the subject of becoming, nothing which remains achieved after the process. Sometimes a cause of becoming is called a qualified (*secundum quid*) cause of being. This means only that a cause of becoming is the cause of the qualification, accidental or substantial, of a subject of an act of existing. . . .[348]

As the cause of existence, God is outside the order of His effects. In all the proofs God is so attained; He is *ipsum esse*. The *quinque viae* are, then, different ways, but one proof, a proof concluding to God, the cause of existence of things.

The Gilsonian mentality is perhaps the most prominent and vocal position in Thomistic metaphysics on this continent. It cuts through many of the procedures previously reviewed regarding God's existence. In its constant reference to the text of St. Thomas it proclaims its authenticity, and emphasizes the need for reflexion on the opposing trends concerning the question of God's existence.[349]

[347] Cf. *ibid.*

[348] Cf. *ibid.*, 154.

[349] Cf. also Klubertanz, G., S. J., "Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics," *Modern Schoolman*, XXXII (1954), 1-17. He also maintains that the conclusion of the proofs of St. Thomas is He Who is, God as subsistent act of existing. Paramount in Aquinas' thought, the author maintains, is the judgment of separation by which the act of existing is attained as not identified with material essence. This is the point of departure for metaphysics. From this the metaphysician is led to a subsistent act of existing, about which all that can be said is: It is. He finds it ironical that Cajetan should have made his remarks about the proofs; for though there are many valid proofs for a being which is first, necessary, infinite, provident, and who happens to be God, only St. Thomas' proofs attain Him Who is. Cf. 15-17. Cf. also his "St. Thomas and the Learning of Metaphysics"; "The Teaching of Metaphysics," *Gregorianum*, XXXV (1954), 3-17;

Antoninus Finili, O.P.

An approach toward the question of God's existence suggested by Antoninus Finili, O.P., though much less widely publicized or adopted, is noteworthy in what it advances as a truer philosophical orientation of the question. The tenor of the suggestions of Antoninus Finili, O.P. is to be gauged from his concluding remark:

> If asked to answer the question at the head of these notes, we should be tempted to reply: Yes, there is a philosophical approach to God, but only the believer knows it for what it is.[350]

This conclusion, so startlingly opposed to the Gilsonian attitude, stems from the author's challenge of the propriety of metaphysics' assuming to pose the question of demonstrability regarding God's existence. He sees natural theology's incorporation of this point from the *Summa Theologiae* to have resulted in a non-philosophical procedure. The whole question of God's existence in the *Summa* is theological—theology's examination of a proposition which the theologian knows to be true, from the very *Credo* which is his first principle. The theologian examines this truth as demonstrably evident. For the philosopher to set out expressly to prove God's existence would be a *petitio principii*.[351] Yet this very thing is done implicitly by posing the matter of the demonstrability, which includes the determination of a nominal definition of God. St. Thomas states that God's existence can be proved *a posteriori*, because as Creator God has effects from which the necessary nominal definition can be imposed.[352] Because these effects are evident to reason, the theologian can formulate the rational demonstration and through the nominal definition point out that the first cause of the philosopher is the Christian God.[353]

187-205. But cf. also McInerney, R., "A Note on Thomistic Existentialism," *Sapientia Aquinatis* (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1955), 509-517.

[350] Cf. Finili, A., O.P., "Is There a Philosophical Approach to God?" *Dominican Studies*, IV (1951), 101. An author who presents similar thoughts with reference to the *Summa Theologiae* is White, Victor, O.P., "The Prolegomena of the Five Ways," *Dominican Studies*, V (1952), 134-158.

[351] Cf. *ibid.*, 81. [352] Cf. *ibid.*, 84-85. [353] Cf. *ibid.*, 86.

Philosophy cannot rightfully be interested in establishing *a priori* theses; it is a process of discovery and resolution of its discoveries in terms of first principles.[354] The author recognizes the inclusion of the issue of God's demonstrability to be the result of the *a priori* Wolffian division of philosophy with natural theology a distinct part about God.[355]

Positively, the search of metaphysics is a process in which the philosopher must be led by the exigencies of the investigation to an ultimate explanation of reality.[356] The existence of God, then, will not be attained as a by-product of philosophy, but will constitute the heights of its discovery, the ultimate explanation of all that is. But "it is the believer, not the philosopher as such who sees in this supreme being the God of the Creed."[357] To be excluded from natural theology, then, is the question: *utrum Deum esse sit demonstrabile?* The philosopher can presuppose neither the existence of the first cause nor of *its* effects. When he does discover the first cause, then he will recognize the immediacy or mediacy of the evidence of its existence. As believer he will also recognize the God of the Creed.

Fr. Finili, then, puts still another construction on the question of God's existence in metaphysics, one that challenges a whole line of procedure common to the other contemporary authors just considered. For Fr. Finili, the order of the *Summa Theologiae* of St. Thomas is to be avoided, and no nominal definition should be predetermined. There are no presuppositions in the process of discovery. The process rises from effects which are known to the highest cause which was previously unknown.

Conclusion to Part One

The historical background has emphasized the bearing of the context of any author's conception of metaphysics upon his treatment of the question of God's existence. In terms of this orientation the contemporary status of the question can be summarized in the following manner:

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[354] Cf. *ibid.*
[355] Cf. *ibid.*, 89-90.
[356] Cf. *ibid.*, 91 ff.
[357] Cf. *ibid.*, 97.

The Place of God in Metaphysics:	*The question of God's existence:*
Gredt:	
Subject of special metaphysics, the uncreated being.	Order of the *Summa Theol.* Approach by nominal definition, *ens a se.* *Quinque viae,* distinct proofs. Conclusion one in the nominal definition.
Maquart:	
As cause of the subject of *one* metaphysics, the science of being as formally abstracted in sensible reality.	*Quinque viae,* five distinct proofs. Posterior question on univocal application of name "God" to five proper causes attained.
Van Steenberghen:	
As cause of subject of ontology, being, the *primum cognitum* in its note of existence.	Nominal definition of *God* essential to placing the question. Nominal definition, "unique, provident Creator." *Quinque viae* not satisfactory, merely approximate because not metaphysical, i. e., not reaching God as defined.
Gilson:	
As true object of metaphysics, *ipsum esse,* first to be considered in the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas.	Order of *Summa Theol.* *Quinque viae.* One conclusion, "I am Who am."
Owens:	
Included in consideration of being (*esse*) as its cause.	*Quinque viae.* One conclusion, "I am Who am."
Smith:	
Natural theology integral with the metaphysics of *existential* being.	Order of *Summa Theol.* Nominal definition as approach, "cause of existence of things." One conclusion for *Quinque viae,* God as *ipsum esse.*
Finili:	
As cause of subject of metaphysics.	Order of *Summa* to be avoided. No nominal definition predetermined.

The statement of the views concerning the question of God's existence currently advanced as Thomistic has been set forth so as to achieve some appreciation of the foundations of such views. There is thus emphasized the historically verified truth that the question of God's existence will depend in its development upon the intellectual organism, the scientific framework in which it is set. The diverse historical settings and influences do account for a wide variety of opinion as to the nature and development of Thomistic metaphysics with special reference to the question of God's existence. In the face of this diversity, however, the problem is forced on the Thomist: who, as Thomist, is right? The answer to this question can be given after the problem of God's existence is appraised in the light of the principles of St. Thomas himself. Only then can judgment be made as to which of these is the authentic Thomistic presentation of the question of God's existence in metaphysics.

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(*To be Continued*)

EMPIRICISM AND AESTHETICS

IT is not strange that an age that marks its greatest achievements in the physical sciences should be tempted to re-examine traditional philosophical statements about the nature of truth and goodness and beauty with the tool that has been revealing so many other secrets of the universe. Consequently, in an effort to delimit the terms of a discussion of values in the humanities, one encounters innumerable aesthetic positions, each approaching man and art differently and, therefore, each analyzing the relationships of empiricism and aesthetics in its own way. Even a simple definition of terms must be defended since it inevitably will favor one or another point of view. Instead of assuming an eclectic approach or discussing only one opinion, this study will examine three positions: Positivism, Pragmatism, and Thomism. Their solutions to the problem of the significance of empiricism, in terms of disparate aesthetic positions are, to a certain degree, substantially different. If there is any common ground here, it is not in aesthetic definitions or in the relevance of empiricism. Moreover, even within the ranks of these philosophies there are minor squabbles. Thomists, Pragmatists, and Positivists have their own family arguments. But, in general, the positions are representative of various approaches that have been assumed.

At any rate, the subject matter involves the acts, powers, and habits of man and his "art." At this point it is safer to omit any discussion of "values" since this word is a signal to spring to the defense of one's philosophical position; it is wiser to look for agreement at the start.

It seems that one can begin by defining empiricism and evoke fewer objections from various stands. In its broadest meaning, empiricism is the study of phenomena and changing dimensions in the region of particular experiences. This definition is so wide as to include any kind of self-analysis, either the intro-

spection that observes what is common experience shared by all men, the type used by Aristotle or Aquinas: spontaneous utterances of everyone's sense of reality; or introspective analysis of a special experience, a scientific tool developed by Külpe and the Würzburg school of psychology.[1] In order to avoid the objections generally leveled at introspective methods by behaviorists or structuralists, this paper will exclude any kind of self-analysis from the meaning of empiricism.

Obviously, observation of experience can be of various kinds. For example, in 1938 a New York radio station polled its listeners and discovered that Beethoven's fifth and seventh symphonies were first and second among favorite compositions requested in 23.9 and 18.3 per cent of letters received. Tschaikovsky's fifth, sixth, and fourth symphonies took third, fifth, and seventh place; and Beethoven's ninth, third, and seventh ranked fourth, sixth, and twelfth, respectively. Wagner and Brahms just about tied for third in these tabulations.[2] However, despite the huge populations and percentages which seem to lend a certain amount of authority and scientific aura, any conclusions from such a loosely organized popularity poll are suspect. Of what significance is the poor showing of a composer like Bach or of a form like opera? A more rigorous control of subjects and materials is needed for a study to qualify as top-drawer empiricism. More must be known about the subjects than that they are "music lovers" who listen to serious music on their radios.

A more ideal empiric approach is represented by Charles Morris' study of human values.[3] In his research he attempted to determine the values basic to human nature by means of statistical investigation. Morris submitted a questionnaire describing different "ways of life," Christianity, Buddhism, et

[1] Robert Brennan, *Thomistic Psychology* (New York: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 58-9; and John Dashiell, "Introspection," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1958 ed., XV, 272.

[2] Wallace Brockway and Herbert Weinstock, *Men of Music* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1939), p. 194n and p. 481n.

[3] Charles Morris, *Varieties of Human Value* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

cetera, to carefully screened groups from all parts of the world. Each individual in the survey ranked these ideologies according to his own feelings about moral standards. A similar study was made of the relative aesthetic values of several paintings. Although there may be argument about the particular questionnaire statements regarding the various ways of life chosen by Morris or about the study's failure to distinguish between what is value and what is preference, Morris attempts a clear delineation of his subjects and test materials. Whether this method can study intrinsic moral and aesthetic values and is not merely a better controlled popularity vote, remains to be established. In general, in this paper, empiricism will mean studies which use a rigorous scientific method, that is to say, inductive verification. Empiricism, therefore, is a way of approaching a problem based on disciplined observation and, to whatever degree possible, experimental evidence.[4]

The crux of the problem at hand is to determine to what extent aesthetic considerations are within the scope of empiricism. Each of the aesthetic systems under consideration involves some notion of "value," be it relational preference, pleasurable emotion, beauty, or whatever. The determination of what is "value" in a particular system is its key to the solution of this problem.

However, this is not the only aspect of aesthetic systems. Both the examination and appraisal of the aesthetic significance of empirical data presuppose a general position that involves a psychology, concerning the nature of human perception, and a philosophy, concerning the specification of "beauty" and "value." Moreover, in such a critique of empiricism one must first decide whether the focus of aesthetic discussion is to be on the art object, or on the individual's purely subjective estimation and reaction, or on a balance among all the related considerations of object, subject, and enveloping culture. Going one step further, the analyst must commit himself to an act of faith in definite philosophical and psychological criteria

[4] Max Otto, "Scientific Method and the Good Life," *Science and the Moral Life*, ed. E. C. Lindeman (New York: New American Library, 1949), p. 96.

which spring from the root of his over-all system of values. He must answer these questions. Is there anything in the work of art beyond what can be seen at the sense level, beyond or beneath or implicit in tangible reality? Can one dismiss speculation about the essential nature of the work and objective beauty and concentrate on considerations of what is latent in the observer's direct experience of the work of art? Is there a final or relatively stable specification of aesthetic significance? Where does one look to find it? The problem is basic to any philosophy:

> If other entities do exist which by their very nature are inherently incapable of being given in sense experience . . . there is no apparent reason why we should not be able to refer to them intelligibly. No reason, that is, apart from some initial metaphysical bias as to the capacities of the human mind. Positivism starts out by denying the philosophy of being, and assumes the metaphysics of flux from the beginning.[5]

The fundamental issue in any psychology is the view taken of the "body-soul" problem. Many solutions in various forms of monism and dualism have been proferred from Plato to Langer. In a consideration of empirical methods this issue is important since it colors thinking about perception, observable behavior, and their interpretation. None of the positions under consideration holds the monistic idealism that only the psyche exists, such as might be found in the psychology of Berkeley or Hume.[6] The conceptions of the empirical natural sciences are, to a degree, opposed to idealism since they are based on the relations of particular phenomena in reality, on their mechanisms.[7] Susanne K. Langer expresses the monism of materialism, that the only existent is the soma:

> That man is an animal I certainly believe; and also, that he has

[5] Bernard Phillips, *Being and Process* (New Haven: Yale University, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, 1940), p. 31.

[6] George Berkeley, "Of the Principles of Human Knowledge," *Age of Enlightenment*, ed. Isaiah Berlin (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 132-142; David Hume, "Of Modes and Substances," *Age of Enlightenment*, p. 176.

[7] James E. Creighton, "Idealism," *Encyclopedia Americana*, 1958 ed., XIV, 663-4.

no supernatural essence, " soul " or " entelechy " or " mindstuff," enclosed in his skin. He is an organism, his substance is chemical, and what he does, suffers, or knows, is just what this sort of chemical structure may do, suffer, or know . . . if we ask how physical objects, chemically analyzable, can be conscious, how ideas occur to them, we are talking ambiguously; for the conception of " physical object " is a conception of chemical substance *not* biologically organized. What causes this tremendous organization of substances, is one of the things the tremendous organisms do not know; but with their organization, suffering and impulse and awareness arise.[8]

This position is completely compatible with the last of Auguste Comte's three stages of development of knowledge, i. e., Positivism: whatever is real can be investigated by the scientific method.[9] Practically speaking, this is also the attitude of Pragmatism as represented by William James: it makes little practical difference whether matter or spirit is dominant since the behavior of the biological organism is to be the basis of pragmatic psychology.[10]

On the other hand, there are various dualistic explanations of human nature. For Plato, later followed by Descartes, body and soul are two separate substances in a kind of " rider on a horse " relationship.[11] The dichotomy is substantially absolute but there is interaction in operation. There are those, for example the school of Wundt and Fechner, who would grant to the soul at least a theoretical existence: the parallelists. Ultimately, the problem of how or why there is this parallel operation is, for them, an insoluble one. Their interpretation of " mind " or " soul " is obscure: psychic activities may be only one aspect of physical activities.[12]

St. Thomas Aquinas opposes any interaction or parallelism

[8] Susanne K. Langer, *Philosophy in a New Key* (New York: Mentor Books, 1954), pp. 31-32.

[9] Henry D. Aiken, *The Age of Ideology* (New York: New American Library, 1956), pp. 120-122, 125.

[10] William James, " What Pragmatism Means." *The Age of Analysis*, ed. Morton White (New York: New American Library, 1955), pp. 160-173.

[11] Brennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 77-80.

in which the soul is considered some mysterious supernatural "other thing" independent of the body though fitted into its operations in some "rider-horse" manner or in some unknowable way.[13] He follows Aristotle in his adaptation of hylomorphism. For Thomists, soul is the principle by which an organism is alive. It is the informing principle of organization from which flow all vital activities of the body.[14]

Though it is often difficult to assign absolute positions, pragmatist opinion seems to lie either within materialistic monism or parallelistic dualism. Positivists are materialistic monists. But even here it is difficult to arrange neat "pigeonholes." For example, "the 'mind-stuff' enclosed in his skin" that Langer denies seems to be the sort of soul of interactionism or parallelism that Aquinas dismisses in his hylomorphic position.[15] The biological organization that Langer appeals to does not seem to be as far removed from the Thomistic theory as her declaration that there is no soul or supernatural essence implies.[16] Obviously, semantic difficulties obscure the problem. But generally these are the premises of the psychologies involved. As a psychology tends toward the monist position that only matter exists, mind, which in this consideration is a certain neural organization of matter, is completely within the scope of empirical investigation. The traditional philosophic concepts of value, human destiny, truth, morality, and beauty in art are disregarded as fossils of a defunct metaphysical methodology or, at best, re-explained in mechanistic accounts of how these "misconceptions" arise. Problems which are incapable of mechanistic solutions are called "pseudo-questions" insoluble by any method.[17] This is as blatant an a priori assumption as the "castles in the air" that the mechanists accuse metaphysicians of building.

[13] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos edition, 1952), I, q. 75, a. 2.

[14] *Ibid.*, I, q. 75, a. 1; and Brennan, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

[15] Aquinas, *ibid.*, I, q. 75 and q. 76.

[16] Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[17] Langer, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to try to establish which philosophical attitude solves the ultimate question of value in a consideration of aesthetics. Nevertheless, there are several solutions offered. Positivism must either deny value or accept it as only a mistaken notion of the meaning of related subjective preferences. Pragmatism and Thomism recognize its existence but in terms of different premises. If man's final objective consists in the meaning of his attempt to " in some way, however slight, carry the universe forward " by entering into " the moving unbalanced balance of things " in order to bring about the existence of the better;[18] or if values are involved in a hierarchy of being and a recognition of related objective natural and supernatural goals, empiricism cannot specify what the ultimate significance is. Each individual's thinking about aesthetics will be determined by his honest choice from among these three disparate positions: there is no final goal; such a goal probably exists but is unknowable; there is in fact a goal that can be known and it is the responsibility of human nature to aspire to it.

These different concepts of the principles and goals of man's acts and powers are reflected in different psychological approaches. Two distinct disciplines are involved: one approaches psychology from the point of view of science (the materialist would maintain that this is the only valid approach);[19] the other approaches from the viewpoint of philosophy (the Thomist holds that both approaches are valid and both are directed toward knowledge of the corporeal reality, each, however, in a different way). As Robert Brennan puts it:

> Philosophic psychology . . . studies the nature or essence of man, whereas scientific psychology is confined to an analysis of the acts, powers, and habits of this essence. There is another distinction . . . namely, that philosophic psychology studies the essence of man's acts, powers, and habits; whereas scientific psychology analyzes the accidental modes and quantified correlations of these acts, powers, and habits.

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[18] John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1929), p. 419.

[19] Otto, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-109.

The relation . . . is simply a concrete instance of the broader relations that obtain between natural science as a whole and the philosophy of nature as a whole.[20]

Science is perinoetic, studying the "mobility of corporeal substance"; philosophy is dianoetic, analyzing the "nature, origin, and destiny of mobile being." [21]

The philosophies of Pragmatism, Positivism, and Thomism each assign various roles to scientific and metaphysical methods. A brief examination of the various conflicting views on methodology will clarify the place that empiricism finds in each system.

The concept of development in Hegel, Darwin's evolution theories, and the motor concept of learning accenting activity of William James are summed up in Dewey's idea of thinking as a tool for overcoming obstacles. His biological theory of art hinges on his idea of mind and of the conditions occasioning thought. The ultimate discipline of Dewey's Pragmatism depends on a logical theory, the method of inquiry.[22] Consequent from this proposition is the thesis that all first principles are precluded; no metaphysical and epistemological a priori assumptions are presupposed as foundations of inquiry.[23] If there are to be any such conclusions resembling those of traditional metaphysics, they must be the outcome of the process of inquiry. All knowledge is the result of conscious inquiry; and the most concise and inclusive knowledge is the sum total of what makes up science, according to the means available for inquiry at a certain time. However, for Dewey, any inquiry into human values is philosophical and, at best, proposes hypothetical solutions to the problems implicit in the data culled by science. Philosophy cannot propose final solutions

[20] Brennan, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[22] Donald A. Piatt, "Dewey's Logical Theory," *The Philosophy of John Dewey*, vol. I of the *Library of Living Philosophers* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University, 1939), p. 109.

[23] John Dewey, *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry* (New York: Holt and Co., 1938), pp. 20-21.

which overreach the realities touched by science without becoming propagandistic.[24]

The Pragmatism of John Dewey analyses perception in terms of a fluctuating natural continuum in which organism and environment are distinguishable only to the extent that there is tension between them. But even this distinction is meant to stress interdependence.

> Integration [i. e., of organism with environment] is more fundamental than the distinction designated by interaction of organism *and* environment. The latter [interaction] is indicative of a partial distintegration of a prior integration, but one which is of such a dynamic nature that it moves (as long as life continues) toward re-integration. . . . There is no such thing as a final settlement, because every settlement introduces the conditions of a new unsettling.[25]

Humans do not have experiences; they are part of an experience in which the only distinctions are logical, not real.[26] This interaction of organism and environment becomes inquiry through consciousness or control.

> Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.[27]

Aesthetic experience—experience at its best—does not per se involve control of formation and development of the experience; it involves, rather, being the organism that is formed and developed in the experience. Inquiry, which includes empirical study, is therefore distinct from aesthetics. The problem remaining is to determine whether the ultimate significance of aesthetic experience can be specified by empiricism.

It seems that if aesthetics is an account of values implicit in

[24] John Dewey, "The Determination of Ultimate Values," *The Thirty-Seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education*, Part II, p. 474.

[25] Dewey, *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 34-35.

[26] Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1929), p. 8.

[27] Dewey, *Logic: the Theory of Inquiry*, pp. 104-105.

art or the experience of it, Pragmatism holds that such an account must be a hypothetical critique of empirical discoveries. The bare culling of the facts concerning experience, if that is where one places the burden of his aesthetics, or even of objective structural features of the art work, can be thorough and exact, within the techniques available for present-day empirical study. To take into account the consequences of these facts on human welfare, to determine their bearing on success or failure in improving our living or attaining valued ends, one must philosophize. And, although one may hold with Pragmatism that a final definition of " pure truth " and ultimate objectivity is illusive and always a hypothetical answer, nevertheless, in the very attempt to maintain this position one must transgress the bounds of empirical fact.[28]

It is at this point one must decide: either " pure truth " and ultimate objectivity do not exist or they do. If they exist in terms of some ontological goal or destiny, either one can know what this truth is or one cannot. John Dewey did not deny this goal, but he did issue the challenge that we have yet to know what it is:

> We agree that we are uncertain as to where we are going and where we want to go, and why we are doing what we do.[29]

According to the Thomistic position, without a hierarchy of being a philosophy must dispense with any intrinsic hierarchy of value. The Positivist is quite satisfied to do just this. It is inevitable that conflicting tendencies will arise in formulating channels of action. The Pragmatic approach, based on the notion of interactive operation which organizes the indeterminate, confronts a fundamental difficulty in trying to discover ultimate goals, a difficulty which a metaphysics of being does not find insuperable.[30] This is a primary criticism generally leveled against an exclusively Pragmatic approach. For only

[28] Dewey, *Experience and Nature*, pp. 51-52.

[29] Dewey, " Challenge to Liberal Thought," *Fortune*, XXX (1944), 155.

[30] Paul K. Crosser, *The Nihilism of John Dewey* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 20.

the determination of the general aims of society and the individual will establish the guides for subordinate aims.[31] However, Pragmatism and Thomism are agreed that this is a function of philosophy and is beyond empiricism.

Rudolf Carnap furnishes an expression of the logical positivist or materialistic position. Traditional metaphysics is considered meaningless; and the ultimate criterion of any valid meaning is the logic of mathematics and empiricism. Concepts of metaphysics such as essence or substance which are not touched directly by these tools are considered illusory.[32] Dewey objects to the opinion that discussion of reality independent of measure is meaningless.[33] This awareness of the importance of aesthetic and moral traits in experience and of their meaning in a philosophy distinguishes Dewey's Pragmatism from Logical Positivism.[34] Carnap's stand is based on an admiration for empiricism as a unified body of knowledge compared to the apparent confusion supplied by conflicting metaphysical analyses. There is a potential fallacy of division lurking here. If a search for a common denominator in conflicting views results in confusion or general incompatibility of opinions, one cannot logically conclude that no one particular metaphysical approach is sound.[35] The evidence supplied by empiricism (though not necessarily every interpretation of it) is incontrovertible fact. However, disagreement among various metaphysical schools is not a proof of universal fallibility of metaphysics as a science.

The Thomistic position on the methodologies involved can be best clarified by a consideration of its doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction.[36] Knowledge begins with various indi-

[31] Robert J. Hense, "Hutchins and Dewey Again," *The Modern Schoolman,* XV (1938), 32.

[32] Morton White, "Logical Positivism: Rudolf Carnap," *The Age of Analysis,* pp. 203-225.

[33] Dewey, "Nature in Experience," *Philosophical Review,* XLIX (1940), 256.

[34] Anne Mary Tamme, *A Critique of John Dewey's Theory of Fine Art in the Light of the Principles of Thomism* (Washington D. C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1956), p. 18.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 85.

[36] Jacques Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge,* trans. Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson (Glasgow: Maclehouse and Co. Ltd., 1938), pp. 44-58.

vidual concrete experiences. At the first degree of abstraction are the physical sciences, which consider the mobile and sensible aspects of bodies as bound up in matter and experimentally verifiable. This is the level of empiricism: phenomena and behavior. The second degree deals with quantity abstracted from sensible matter. This is the level of mathematics, whose theorems exist conceptually, divorced from concrete bodies. Finally, metaphysics, at the third degree, abstracts from the quantities and considers only the being of things. To each of these levels, and to each of the sub-sciences within these levels, an individual method is appropriate.

> Nothing could be more incorrect than to regard these differing methods as isolated, for the method of a more abstract science dominates that of the more concrete sciences, and extends to their domain: but they are specific methods and remain distinct, inasmuch as every order of the real requires by reason of its very distinctness an appropriate mode of investigation. Thus Wisdom, or first philosophy, or metaphysics, lays down the guiding principles of all other sciences, and humanly depends on none of them: as the others study different modes of being, so it studies being itself, in its essence and its properties: it is the science of being as being; mathematics is the science of quantity; physics is the science of beings as subject to motion, biology of living beings, psychology of rational beings, and sociology of human beings living in society.[37]

The determination and control of quantitative functions is doubtlessly the backbone of the scientific method. Fundamentally biological theories of the nature of human intelligence and the conditions occasioning thought, such as William James' conception of the psyche and Darwinian scientific notions, stress this method for analysis and regulation of distinctly human activities. If one holds that all qualitative notions involved in the problems of human experience are ultimately reducible to quantitative determination, then aesthetics is simply the field of inquiry about the highest level of empirical data. Only the absolute materialistic viewpoints take this stand. As a matter of fact, in this context, the term " value "

[37] Etienne Gilson, " The Distinctiveness of the Philosophic Order," *A Gilson Reader,* ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Doubleday, 1957), p. 60.

has little meaning beyond " complex data that is difficult to quantitize." More modified theses, among which seems to be that of John Dewey, withhold this final decision and posit ultimate value concepts as unsolvable or, at best, hypothetical determinations. For Thomists, the data of empiricism are valuable for interpreting how art works. But to discover the ultimate regulators of this activity or to go beyond relational preferences and investigate value, a discipline of a higher order of abstraction is required. J. W. N. Sullivan quotes Sir Arthur Eddington, British astronomer and physicist, in illustration of a realization that contradicts the extreme Positivist position:

> Leaving out all aesthetic, ethical, or spiritual aspects of our environment, we are faced with qualities such as massiveness, substantiality, extension, duration, which are supposed to belong to the domain of physics. In a sense they do belong; but physics is not in a position to handle them directly. The essence of their nature is inscrutable; we may use mental pictures to aid calculations, but no image in the mind can be a replica of that which is not in the mind. And so in its actual procedure physics studies not these inscrutable qualities, but pointer-readings which we can observe. The readings, it is true, reflect the fluctuations of the world-qualities; but our exact knowledge is of the readings, not of the qualities. The former have as much resemblance to the latter as a telephone number has to a subscriber.[38]

There is a limit to the scope of empiricism. Alfred North Whitehead notes this especially in regard to aesthetic needs: the " materialistic basis " of science " has directed attention to *things* as opposed to *values*." [39] Concretely there is no antithesis, but at a certain level of abstraction (what Maritain describes as the first degree) " ultimate values " are excluded.[40] This is apparent to some of the scientific world and a new outlook is replacing the old logical positivism:

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[38] Sir Arthur Eddington, " The Domain of Physical Sciences," Essay in *Science, Religion and Reality*, quoted by J. W. N. Sullivan, *The Limitations of Science* (New York: New American Library, 1956), p. 141.

[39] Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: New American Library, 1925), pp. 202-203.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 203.

Science has become self-conscious and comparatively humble. We are no longer taught that the scientific method of approach is the only valid method of acquiring knowledge about reality. Eminent men of science are insisting . . . on the fact that science gives us but a partial knowledge of reality, and we are no longer to regard as illusory everything that science finds itself able to ignore. . . . The universe of science, if accepted as the final reality, made of men an entirely accidental by-product of a huge, mindless, purposeless, mathematical machine. And there are men of science sufficiently human to find such a conclusion disconcerting.[41]

Consequent on this outlook is the rejection of the arguments that aesthetic, metaphysical, or religious interpretations of reality are necessarily illusory.[42]

Science studies phenomena inductively and consequently is restricted to certain " scales of observation." [43] Laws are formulated according to observations made at a certain level. At the base of these laws is a system of probabilities. For example, laws of pressure have at their base the fluctuations of billions of molecules. These laws apply only according to what is true " on the average " of these billions and do not predict what each individual molecule might do by chance. But since the minimal differences of individual fluctations are not important on a higher scale of observation the law is relatively valid.[44] The subjectivity of these laws is the reason for the revisions necessitated by newly discovered phenomena on other levels of observation.

Our scientific laws are always *a posteriori*, and governed by the facts to which they must submit. They are relative to man, who is the thinking-recording instrument, and merely express a relationship, or a series of relationships, between him and the external cause. They only describe the succession of psychological states determined in us by these causes. They are, therefore, essentially relative and subjective and their validity is strictly limited to

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[41] Sullivan, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 147.

[43] Lecomte Du Noüy, *Human Destiny* (New York: New American Library, 1947), p. 17.

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

man and depends on the identity of the reactions of the other individuals to the same external stimuli.[45]

Consequently, any empirical study of art by its very methodology is confined to examining the technical structure of the art work or the behavior of the observer of the work. Obviously this knowledge is valuable; and ever since Bacon and Hobbes and the whole school of British Empiricism many have claimed that the philosophy of sensible experience is the only one which can formulate valid conclusions. The deductive method of Scholasticism was rejected and philosophy, therefore, was limited to the methods of the natural sciences. An insistence on this position makes any resolution of questions of value, beauty, or goals only a relative one, valid at a certain " scale of observation " as described by Du Noüy. J. W. N. Sullivan, in the conclusions to his study, observes:

> The fact that science is confined to a knowledge of structure is obviously of great " humanistic " importance. For it means that the problem of the nature of reality is not prejudged. We are no longer required to believe that our response to beauty, or the mystic's sense of communion with God, have no objective counterpart. It is perfectly possible that they are, what they have so often been taken to be, clues to the nature of reality. Thus our various experiences are put on a more equal footing, as it were. Our religious aspirations, our perceptions of beauty, may not be the essentially illusory phenomena that were supposed to be. In this new scientific universe even mystics have a right to exist.[46]

If one denies that essence or the objective ontological order studied by metaphysics has a significant bearing on value judgments or in estimating what is " beautiful," then one says that the highest level value decision can be investigated and solved through empiricism, that is, through a consideration of the experience that the individuals of a certain culture have of art objects developed in the frame of the stylistic practices of the culture. Positivism insists on this through its rejection of metaphysics and deductive syllogistic inquiry.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

[46] Sullivan, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

If relationships, reactions, and experience at the highest are art, then empiricism gives most of the answers. John Dewey tried to construct a practical philosophy which could guide choices and furnish a theory of value. But a philosophy which restricts itself to a process perspective faces a serious difficulty in the inability of these methods to scale values.

Thomism assigns special roles to each methodology. If beauty is one aspect of being or substance, then the empirical data function to explain how art works. A metaphysical approach is necessary to tell us what art and human nature are and how art is valuable for achieving the goals of that nature.

Philosophy is the study of wisdom. It includes then within itself the sum of the sciences, each of which is trying to forge the instrument adapted to the order of the real which it undertakes to explain; but beyond the problems raised by the different modes of being, there is the problem raised by being. And it is not: How does such-and-such a thing exist? It is: What is it "to exist"? In what does existence consist? Why is there existence at all, since that given to us does not appear to contain in itself a satisfactory explanation of itself? Is it necessary or contingent? And if it is contingent, does not it postulate a necessary existence as its cause and its explanation? Such, then, is the object of the ultimate science to which the human mind rises in the order of purely natural knowledge—the science of existence beyond the sciences of ways of existing. It is called "metaphysics"—a science which was founded by the Greeks, who clearly realized the need for it, and one which Christian philosophy will never allow to die . . . because its object is the problem without which there would be no other problems.[47]

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[47] Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

OCKHAM AND EFFICIENT CAUSALITY

SOME four hundred years before David Hume wrote his *Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding* a fourteenth century philosopher and theologian had already encountered amazingly similar difficulties with the validity of the causal proposition. William of Ockham had consistently attacked the arguments for the existence of God which he found in the works of his predecessors. The underlying basis for that attack is to be found in the theory of causality which Ockham held. It is the purpose of this article to explain that theory and to investigate the reasons which led Ockham to accept it. It will be evident, I think, that these reasons not only anticipate the difficulties of Hume concerning causality, but that they are at the root of many modern attacks on the validity of the causal proposition.

In the second place Ockham's theory of causality makes it quite clear what happens to our knowledge of the metaphysical structure of reality, when the human intellect is restricted to an intuition of singular, sensible existents. St. Thomas had left no doubt about man's capacity to know the existing, sensible thing. He, however, had also made it quite clear that the mind could come to a certain knowledge of principles and relationships, which could not be directly intuited, but which were necessary for the existing sensible thing to be and to function the way it did. Thus he was able to assert the reality of such principles of being and operation. As a result, the universe of Aquinas is one composed, not only of things, but of real principles of things which necessarily co-exist to make the thing what it is and which explain, not only the whatness of the thing, but also the reason for its presence in the realm of limited existents. Such a universe can be validly approached from the viewpoint of philosophy and can be given a philosophically valid explanation.

Such, as will be made clear from what follows, is not the case with William of Ockham. Reality for him is no such composite structure. There are no realities which compose the real. There are just singulars, unique and uncomposed. The mind can and does abstract various aspects or formalities from these singulars, but such formalities cannot possibly be conceived as having any reality of their own outside of the abstracting intellect. For Ockham there is only one way to get at existence, and that is in an intuition of the sensibly existing singular. Any further intellectual activity prescinds from existence. Such an intellect can never again assert the extra-mental reality of any of its formulations or abstractions.

It is not surprising, then, that in examining the question of the possibility of proving the existence of God, Ockham had decisively rejected the validity of the ontological argument. If one could prove that God did exist, there was only one way to do it. That was to start with that world of experience which was the *primum cognitum* and from that world build an argument which would prove conclusively that such a world was unintelligible, unless there existed a God. It would seem that, if ever there was a man capable of arguing from the data of experience to the existence of a first cause of such data, that man was William of Ockham. With his theory of intuition of the singular existent, he had placed himself in direct contact with the existing world. He insisted on the contingency of that world and on its complete dependence on God. Did not that contingency demand necessity somewhere for its ultimate explanation? And was not causality a fact in that world of facts with which Ockham was concerned? And if the mind intuits the existing, contingent singular, does it not see in that contingent singular the evidence that marks it indelibly as an effect?

It is a bit startling, then, that Ockham not only answers in the negative but proceeds to attack the traditional arguments which had been used to prove the existence of God. It is impossible to understand that attack, unless one first understands Ockham's teaching on the nature of causality. In his

treatment of causality Ockham willingly admits the Aristotelian division into four genera of causes. To each of these genera there corresponds its own proper type of causality. To be an efficient cause is to effect something or to act. The material cause gives being in a material sense. The formal cause communicates being formally to the composite. About the nature of the final cause he expresses some doubt, since he finds difficulty with the definition which is given: the causality of the final cause consists in moving the efficient cause to act.[1] We shall restrict the present investigation to the nature of efficient causality.

In the *Summulae in Libros Physicorum*[2] the efficient cause is divided and subdivided into various kinds. At the start, we may consider an efficient cause in the strict sense, in a wider sense, or in the widest possible sense. In the last sense the term *efficient cause* may be applied to anything which moves another thing, and it is called an efficient cause for no other reason than it is in some sense a mover. In the less wide sense an efficient cause is that which gives another thing a definite determination, as, for example, the builder does to the house he is building. In the strict sense an efficient cause is that which brings something new into existence, as when fire produces fire. This last type of efficient cause can be subdivided into various kinds. There is the sufficient cause as opposed to the insufficient, the

[1] *II Sent.*, 3, G. (Lyons Edition, 1945). "De motione finis notandum est: quod sicut sunt quattuor causarum genera, sic cuilibet causarum correspondet propria causatio. Causatio autem efficientis nota est satis quod est efficere quodlibet vel agere." . . . . . .

"Causatio causae materialis est dare esse materialiter."

"Et causatio causae formalis est dare esse formaliter composito. Sed de causatione causae finalis est magis dubium. Dicitur enim communiter quod causatio ejus est movere efficiens ad agendum. Istud movere non est realiter aliud nisi ipsum finem amari ab agente vel saltem ipsum amari vel aliquid fieri vel aliquid velle propter finem amatum."

[2] *Summulae in Libros Physicorum*, pars 2, c. 3. (Venice, 1506). "Causa efficiens tripliciter accipitur: stricte, large et largissime. Dicitur stricte quando causat rem noviter existentem, ita quod nihil illius rei praecessit, sicut quando ignis causat ignem. Dicitur large quando est illa quae facit aliquid esse aliquale, et sic artifex est causa domus. Dicitur largissime causa efficiens pro omni movente, nec propter aliud dicitur efficiens nisi quod movet."

universal as opposed to the particular, the immediate as opposed to the mediate, and the first cause as opposed to secondary causes. The sufficient cause is identified with what is termed a total cause, and it is defined as "that which, when given all the proper conditions, is sufficient to produce its effect," or more exactly, perhaps, "a total cause is that which is sufficient to produce some effect and without which such an effect would not be produced."[3] Elsewhere the completely sufficient cause is described as that which produces the whole effect.[4] A universal cause is a cause which concurs with other causes in the production of their effects, while a particular cause produces just one effect, or at least only a few.[5] An immediate cause is one which, when placed, produces an effect and without which there can be no effect. God, we are told, is such a cause with regard to creatures.[6] Here in the immediate cause we find real and proper efficiency. It is the *causa efficiens in stricto sensu.*

So far, then, we can say that according to Ockham an efficient cause in the strict sense of the word must be an immediate cause. It must here and now be responsible for the effect, and that effect must depend on it to the extent that without this cause there would be no effect. Such an efficient cause need not be the total cause of the effect, although it can be; and it will

[3] *Quodlibeta,* I, 1. (Argentine, 1491). "Causa totalis dupliciter describitur. Primo causa totalis est illud quo posito omne alio circumscripto potest effectus sufficienter produci. Illo modo causa totalis est sufficiens. Secundo causa totalis est illud quod potest aliquem effectum sufficienter producere et sine eo non potest produci talis effectus, et sic causa totalis et praecisa sunt idem. Primo modo dico quod idem effectus numero potest simul habere duas causas totales, sicut idem color potest produci a sole et igne aut duobus ignibus. Secundo modo duae causae totales sunt contradictio. Effectus habens duas causas totales primo modo non dependet essentialiter ab altera."

[4] *II Sent.,* r, 5 Z. "Esse causa totalis est producere totum effectum. Deus concurrit cum creatura et de facto non est causa totalis, quamvis potest esse."

[5] *Summulae in Libros Physicorum,* 2, 3. "Causa universalis est illa quae cum diversis causis concurrrit ad effectus illarum causarum."

"Causa particularis est illa quae non potest nisi in unum effectum vel saltem pauciores effectus."

[6] *II Sent.,* 4-5. "Causa immediata est illa qua posita habetur effectus et qua non posita non habetur effectus. Deus est hujusmodi respectu cujuslibet creaturae."

always be total in this sense that without it there will never be any effect. Such a cause is by its nature a sufficient cause, and it is universal or particular as the case may be.

There may also be and there frequently are many efficient causes at work in the production of an effect. They all may be necessary and immediate causes to the extent that, if any are absent, the effect would not be produced. Hence we can talk about primary and secondary causes. The primary, or first cause, however, is not necessarily unique and primary in all orders of causality. Here we have the first hint of a break in the causal line short of God; and, as we shall see later, it was a break which Ockham never managed to bridge. A cause is defined as primary or first in various senses. It can be a first cause according to primacy of perfection, as, for example, the sun is in relation to fire, when they both concur to produce an effect. Secondly, a cause can be called a first cause according to a primacy of non-limitation, as when one cause concurs in producing many effects. Thirdly, a cause may be a first cause with regard to a primacy of duration. This priority may be one of understanding, *natura prius*, or one of fact, *duratione prius*.[7]

Order between Causes

Between these first and secondary causes an order of some sort exists. At times this order is an accidental one; at other times it is essential. The latter type of order is defined as that according to which the secondary cause depends on the first cause in its very act of causing. It also may mean that the secondary cause requires the first cause in order that the secondary cause may act as a cause. Lastly, it may mean that the secondary cause receives some power or influence from the

[7] *I Sent.*, 45. "Causa prima vel est prima primitate perfectionis: sic si sol et ignis concurrunt ad causandum effectum, sol erit causa prior primitate perfectionis. Vel est prima primitate illimitationis: haec est illa scilicet quod concurrit vel concurrere potest ad plures effectus producendos. . . . Vel causa dicitur prima primitate durationis et hoc potest esse dupliciter: vel quod procedat secundum suam naturam vel quod prius duratione causat."

first cause. Here it is interesting to note that Ockham seems to mean that this conferring of power by the first cause on the second cause may take place previously, so that the secondary cause may operate afterwards only by reason of this power conferred and not in strict conjunction with the first cause.

> . . . God may cause some effect and afterward permit another secondary cause to conserve it and consequently to act, although this is not universally true; in fact, it rarely or never happens.[8]

This again seems to break the link between a series of ordered causes going back necessarily to a supreme first cause. Even if this never happens, the fact that it could happen is enough to throw some disturbing doubts upon any proof that attempts to demonstrate God as the first cause.

Nor does Ockham stop there but proceeds to question the analogical character of such essentially ordered causes. Scotus had stated that essentially ordered causes were specifically different and of diverse orders because one was superior to and more perfect than another. Ockham replied that *superior* can be taken to mean either a priority of perfection or a priority according to non-limitation. To take it in the first sense is to beg the question. It is to say that one cause is in a different order than another cause because the more perfect is the more perfect. The statement, therefore, must be taken in the second sense and must mean that every more universal cause is more perfect than a less universal cause. This, however, is simply not true. The more universal cause is sometimes more perfect and sometimes less perfect. A heavenly body, for example, which is not living, is less perfect than a living animal. But it concurs with an animal in producing another living animal. Here is obviously a case wherein a cause which belongs to a superior order is less perfect than its subordinate cause in an

[8] *Ibid.*, H. "Secundo dicit (Scotus) quod Deus est causa prima primitate illimitationis et primitate durationis primo modo dicta. Patet quod Deus est perfectior omnibus, concurrit etiam ad omnem effectum, quod non facit quaecumque alia causa. Negativa etiam patet, quia quamvis Deus possit causare aliquem effectum et postea permittere aliam causam secundam conservare et per consequens agere, non tamen hoc est universaliter verum, imo raro vel numquam accidit."

inferior order. Neither is it necessarily true that where essentially ordered causes are concerned, one can never act without the other. Animals are produced, not only in conjunction with a heavenly body and a particular agent, but also by putrefaction without the aid of a particular agent.[9]

Ockham's discussion of essentially ordered causes comes down to this: the essentiality of such an order seems to be a merely factual one. There is no intrinsic necessity demanding that all work in unison. In fact, at times the superior cause can and does skip an inferior cause in producing an effect which is in other circumstances connected with the inferior cause. Secondly, the superior cause is superior only in the sense that it is more universal; that is, it can reach to more effects. It is not superior in the sense that it has a higher order of perfection. Now in a series of causes where there is not necessarily a difference of perfection, where all may be of one order, or where the various orders may be mixed indiscriminately, there is no longer any reason for a necessary ordering of one to another. The only real connection seems to be that they must all exist, but it is not clear that even this existence must be simultaneous. Certainly it is clear that not all of these causes necessarily enter into the effect; hence, not all of them need be immediate causes. The distinction between essentially ordered causes and those only accidentally ordered fades away almost to nothing. This will become clearer, when we turn to a consideration of how Ockham comes to a knowledge of causality. In the meantime there is one more fact to be noted. Nowhere in his discussions of efficient causality does Ockham mention anything like a causal influx. Nowhere does he speak of the universal cause of the existence of things. There is no reference to a divine causality which has something strictly proper to it and which only such a cause can give to every effect. The effect is always one singular thing, and, while many causes may concur to produce that thing, there is no room in the thing itself to admit of various effects which can be traced to various

[9] *I Sent.*, 2, 10.

causes. To say that one cause gave existence, while another produced specification, would be meaningless to Ockham. Not only would it be to destroy the unity of the existing singular, but it would be an explicit denial of the previous identification he had made between the essence of a thing and its existence.[10]

Knowledge of Causality

That Ockham admits that there are causes actually operating in the real order seems evident enough. There has been some discussion about whether he admits causality as a universal metaphysical law. Manser thinks that it is undeniable that Ockham doubted the validity of causality in this sense, and he argues from Ockham's denial of the proposition: *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur.*[11] Gilson seems to say that, while Ockham admitted the validity of the causal proposition, his understanding and explanation of what it signified are, in reality, a denial of the proposition.[12] Abbagnano states that Ockham's denial of the proposition, *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur,* was a denial of a physical principle and does not necessarily include a denial of causality itself.[13] Let us turn to Ockham himself and learn, if we can, how a cause is known and what validity the causal proposition possesses.

We can begin by recalling two principles of which Ockham was very fond, and of which he makes constant use in his

[10] *Summa Totius Logicae,* (Venice, 1506). "Unde quando homo non dependet sicut tunc non est, ita tunc non est homo: et ideo non est plus imaginandum quod essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse, quam quod est indifferens ad essentiam et non essentiam. Quia sicut essentia potest esse et non esse, ita esse potest esse essentia et non esse essentia; et ideo talia argumenta: essentia potest esse et non esse, ergo esse distinguitur ab essentia, non valent sicut nec talia valent: essentia potest esse essentia et potest non esse essentia, igitur essentia distinguitur ab essentia; essentia potest esse sub opposito essentiae, igitur essentia distinguitur ab essentia."

Cf. *Quodlibeta,* 2, 7. "Unde idem omnino significatur et consignificatur per unum et reliquum (essentia et esse)."

[11] Manser, "Drei Zweifler am Kausalprinzip," *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Spec. Theologie,* 1912.

[12] Gilson, E., *Unity of Philosophical Experience,* Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1946, pp. 87 seq.

[13] Abbagnano, N., *Guglielmo di Occam,* Lanciano, 1931.

discussions, not only of cognition, but also of causality. The first principle is that only intuitive knowledge brings the mind into contact with the real order of things. It is in this way that the mind grasps the singular existent and grasps it in its singularity. All other knowledge is necessarily abstract. The second principle is that this real order consists of concrete singular things and of them only. These things, furthermore, are absolutely distinct from one another and are known as such. If there are actually causes at work, and if causality is something real, these will be known only in the mind's intuitions of existing objects. In these intuitions of the real order, what the mind apprehends is either a conjunction of two things or a succession of one thing after another. We know fire. We see that, when fire is brought into contact with wood, the wood gets hot. Take the fire away and the wood cools off again. Because in our experience this is always so, we say that fire is the cause of heat.

We have seen that for Ockham the real and proper efficient cause was an immediate cause. He had defined such a cause as one at the presence of which an effect was produced, and at the absence of which no effect was produced. That he is defining a proper cause in terms of being present, he makes quite clear.

> Properly speaking any cause is called a real cause at whose presence the effect is produced. From this it follows that a remote cause is not really a cause because its presence is not enough to produce an effect. Otherwise Adam could be called the cause of me. But that is false because non-being cannot be called the cause of being.[14]

What he means is that not only must cause and effect exist simultaneously, but that they must also be experienced simultaneously. But is even this simultaneous experience of what he calls cause and effect enough to guarantee that the one thing

[14] *II Sent.*, 5, K. "Proprie loquendo quaelibet causa proprie dicta ad cujus praesentiam potest poni effectus, et ipsa non posita non potest poni effectus, potest dici causa immediata. Ex hoc sequitur quod causa remota non est causa quia ad ejus praesentiam non sequitur effectus: aliter Adam potest dici causa mei, quod non est verum: quia non ens non potest dici causa entis et similiter causa et effectus proprie loquendo simul sunt . . . et *si* Deus concurrat cum causa secunda utraque est immediata. (Italics are the author's.)

is really the cause of the other? The answer is No. When I say, for example, that God is an immediate and principal cause, I can mean one of three things: first, that God could produce all effects without the aid of any creature; secondly, that when God co-operates with a creature, He does so only because He does not wish to produce the whole effect Himself; thirdly, the creature could not produce any effect, unless it were helped by God.[15] Accordingly, it cannot be demonstrated that any effect is produced by a secondary cause. Although in my experience it always happens that, when fire is brought near to something inflammable, that inflammable thing always burns, it could still be true that fire is not the cause of that combustion. God could so have arranged things that He Himself would cause the burning, when fire was brought near to something burnable.[16] All that the cognitive intuition gives me is the same sequence of events, when two things are brought into proximity with one another. There is no intuition of a causal influx. Hence, I can never assert with certitude that the one thing is the cause of the other.

In all this Ockham seems to be admitting that there is such a thing as causality, but that it is impossible to know concretely in what particular things causality is verified. Add to this the fact that the things which I experience, I experience as distinct one from another. The apprehension of one such object contains in itself no knowledge of another object. However perfectly I may know one thing, that knowledge will never lead me to the knowledge of another thing distinct from it.[17] Even

[15] *II Sent.*, 5, Q.

[16] *Ibid.*, R. "Ex hoc sequitur quod non potest demonstrari quod aliquis effectus producitur a causa secunda; quia licet semper ad approximationem ignis ad combustibile sequatur combustio, cum hoc tamen potest stare quod ignis non sit ejus causa, quia Deus potuit ordinasse quod semper ad praesentiam ignis passo approximato ipse solus causaret combustionem."

[17] *Quaestio Prima Prologi*, 9. (Edited by P. Boehner, O. F. M., Paderborn, 1939.) "Inter causam et effectum est ordo et dependentia maxime essentialis, et tamen ibi notitia incomplexa unius rei non continet notitiam incomplexam alterius rei. Et hoc etiam quilibet in se experitur, quia quantumcumque perfecte cognoscat aliquam rem, numquam cogitabit cogitatione simplici et propria de alia re, quam numquam prius apprehendit nec per sensum nec per intellectum."

if it were granted that one particular thing did cause another, it still is not necessary to say that the knowledge of the one must cause in me the knowledge of the other.[18] As a matter of fact, it can never be known with certainty that one thing is the cause of another. As we have seen, the real and only cause may be God. Not only can God do whatever any existing object can, but there is also the possibility that in created nature an effect can be produced by another and unknown cause.[19]

To the objection that once an effect is known, we can know the cause from which such an effect naturally depends, Ockham answers that we can only know that in general there is a cause and that that cause must have some proper characteristics. What that cause is in particular, however, we can never know.[20] From the existence and the beauty of a painting, we can argue to the existence and the ability of a painter. But we can never know directly the particular painter who did the work. The correspondence which is required between knowledge and its object to have objective validity is of an entirely different nature from that which exists between an effect and its cause.[21]

Nor is the similarity which exists between cause and effect enough to lead to a knowledge of the cause. The similarity will be meaningless, unless we already know that thing or person

[18] *In Prolog. Sent.*, 9, L. "Non obstante quod entitas unius rei sit causa entitatis alterius, non tamen oportet quod notitia esset causa notitiae."

[19] *II Sent.*, 5, R. "Unde per nullum effectum potest probari quod aliquis sit homo, maxime per nullum effectum quod apparet in nobis, quia omnia quae videmus in homine, potest angelus in corpore facere. . . . Ideo non est mirabile si non potest demonstrari quod aliquid sit causa."

[20] *I Sent.*, 1, 4. "Quocumque causato cognito potest cognosci quaelibet causa in universali, puta quod habet finem et efficientem, et multae conditiones illarum causarum possunt ex illa re cognosci. Sed illud quod est causa non potest ex quocumque causato in particulari cognosci vel cognitione propria sive equivalenti."

[21] Giacon, C., S. J., *Gulielmo di Occam*, Milano, Societá Editrice, Vita e Pensiero, 1941, T. 1, p. 432. "Dall' esistenza e dalla bellezza di una pittura possiamo argomentare all' esistenza e l'abilitá di un pittore; ma la pittura non fa conoscere direttamente il determinato pittore che l'ha eseguita. La correspondenza, che é richiesta tra cognizione e oggetto per avere cognizione oggetiva, é di tutt' altra natura da quella esistente tra effetto e causa. La causa puo restare un ignoto 'Noumenon di tipo Kantiano.'"

whose similitude is expressed in the effect. If one should see a statue of Hercules and had never before known Hercules, he would still know no more about Hercules than about Achilles.[22] It does not seem to have occurred to Ockham that from a statue of Hercules one could, perhaps, learn something about the sculptor. Practically the same answer is given to the objection that, at least if the cause is known as cause, then the effect proper to such a cause will also be known. To know a cause as cause according to Ockham already presupposes that I know the effect.[23] The argument here has been turned around, but he is still insisting on the same thing. From an existing effect I cannot know the particular cause. Neither from a knowledge of a given cause can I know that it must have this or that particular effect. Cause and effect are distinct things and always remain distinct. The knowledge of one never includes the knowledge of the other, just as the existence of one never includes the existence of the other.

In attempting to evaluate Ockham's position on causality two points seem to be fairly clear. The first is that he seems to have held the existence of causality. Not only does he affirm frequently that there are such things as cause and effect, but he actually attributes universal causality to God. He speaks of the heavenly bodies as causes, and he thinks that, in many cases at least, we can safely conclude to the fact that created things exercise causality upon one another. It is true that he questions whether such statements can be demonstrated in the philosophical sense, but we are not at present concerned with that. In view of what Ockham himself says it would be difficult to deny that he admitted the validity of causality.

In the second place, it is equally clear that his analysis of how we come to a knowledge of causality leaves something to be desired. By the time he has finished that analysis there is little left to causality except a mere sequence of events. Be-

[22] *Prolog. in Sent.*, 9, L. "Quando notitia similitudinis causat notitiam illius cujus est similitudo, illa non est causa sufficiens cum intellectu, sed necessario requiritur notitia habitualis illius cujus est similitudo."

[23] *Ibid.*, F.

cause of his theory of cognition Ockham had to restrict knowledge of cause and effect to what could actually be experienced in the real order. Since the things which could be experienced were absolutely distinct and were apprehended as such, he was forced to admit that causality could mean no more than the constant succession of one thing after another. To admit an intuition of a causal influx distinct from A and B by which A could be called the cause of B would have involved him in great difficulty. To have an intuition of something meant that the particular thing in question existed in its own right as a distinct singular. It could then be known in its own right distinct from everything else. It could even be created by God and maintained in existence as distinct from everything else. Obviously there was no hint in our experience of any such thing. There was nothing left for him to do but to deny that the causal relation was really distinct from the thing itself.

Reduction of Causality to a Contingent Predicable

In answer to the objection that what comes to a thing accidentally must be really distinct from that thing, Ockham replied that an accident can sometimes mean only a contingent predicable. Causality is this sort of an accident, and as such does not signify anything really distinct from the thing itself. If *accident* is to be taken here as something really inhering in a subject, then causality cannot be called an accident.[24] Besides, to make causality something real in its own right would involve a contradiction. He argues from one of his favorite principles viz., that God can do anything by Himself which He ordinarily does through the medium of secondary causes. Now God can through the medium of secondary causes bring it about that a certain thing becomes an agent, and then there will come to that agent the relation of efficiency. God, therefore

[24] *Quodlibeta*, 6, 12. "Illud quod accidentaliter convenit alicui non est idem cum illo. Sed respectus effectivus est hujusmodi. Ergo, respondeo quod accidens aliquando accipitur pro predicabili contingenter. Et sic respectus causalitatis est accidens; sed tale non significat aliquam rem distinctam a rebus absolutis. Aliquando accipitur pro accidente inherente subjecto extra animam, et sic non est accidens ista relatio."

could bestow upon that same thing the relation of efficiency without the help of any other created cause. Now consider what has happened. We have something which God has made an efficient cause. But the only thing it can possibly have effected is that relation of efficiency. However, we have already said that God had done that. Hence, either we have an efficient cause that has effected nothing, or God cannot really do everything that secondary causes can do. In either case we end up with a contradiction.[25]

Similarly in the following question of the *Quodlibeta,* Ockham proceeds to reduce all relations to identity with some absolute. Aristotle, he tells us, did not really mean to say that relations exist outside the mind. In the predicaments the Philosopher is treating of the terms of propositions. Some of those terms are absolute, as those employed to signify substance and quality. Some terms are connotative, as those used to signify quantity, and some are relative. These signify a relation because they are coined to signify one thing and to consignify another without whose existence such terms could not be verified.[26]

Causality as such is a term of this kind. When we say a thing is a cause, we mean to signify the thing directly and to consignify another thing which we call an effect. The converse is also true. He is insisting again that what is apprehended is first one thing and then another. Because they are apprehended

[25] *Ibid.*, "Omnem rem quod Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda efficiente, per se potest facere sine omni causa efficiente. Si ergo in ista efficiente ponatur respectus efficientiae causatus a Deo mediante ista efficiente, Deus potest illum respectum facere sine causa secunda. Ponatur ergo in esse et tunc impossibile sequitur. Quia Deus efficit illum respectum in illa efficiente. Ergo istud est efficiens . . . et non est efficiens nisi illius respectus. Ergo non solus Deus efficit illum respectum. Et ita ex illa propositione sequitur contradictio."

[26] *Quodlibeta,* 6, 16. "In predicamentis philosophus tractat de terminis propositionum. Quia isti termini aliqui sunt absoluti sicut termini in genere substantiae et qualitatis. Aliqui sunt connotativi sicut termini in genere quantitatis; et aliqui relativi. Qui ideo significant ad aliquid, quia sunt instituti ad significandum unum, aliquid aliud consignificando, sine cujus existentia et cognitione non potest talis terminus de aliquo verificari. . . . Et ideo isti termini proprie sunt in ad aliquid et condividuntur contra illos terminos quod absolute significant substantiam et qualitatem et nihil aliud significant."

habitually in association with each other, or as following one upon the other, we can call one a cause and the other an effect. Neither cause nor effect signifies anything in the real order distinct from the things themselves. Cause and effect are contingent predicables which have meaning only in the mind.

It can be admitted, I think, that Ockham's analysis of causality was taken from the physical order. In that sense it was, as F. Copleston points out, a completely empirical investigation.[27] We can admit, too, that in this order it is often impossible to tell just what is the particular and immediate cause of a given effect. We do experience many effects the causes of which are hidden from us. But when we say, even if we do not know the particular cause of the effect, there is a cause, then we are going beyond the mere physical order and asserting a conclusion that is valid in all orders of being. This conclusion is based on and follows from fundamental principles, such as: From non-being cannot come being; whatever is moved is moved by something else; potency can be reduced to act only by something already in act. We are saying, further, that in our experience of one thing acting on another we come to a knowledge that there is more here than just the association—however constant and habitual it may be—of those two things. In other words, we are affirming as something real a causal connection which makes understandable the constant association we actually experience. It is because of this that we can assert that the same reality must be at work in other orders where change and becoming also take place.

Ockham, however, made no such claim. His apprehension of change and becoming was limited to the world of empirical knowledge, and in that experience he admits nothing beyond the physical. In all of his analysis causality means nothing more than association, sequence, and succession. He knows only the things themselves which are associated, or which succeed one another with habitual regularity. Again it is his theory of knowledge which forbids him to go any further. All

[27] Copleston, F., S.J., *A History of Philosophy*, vol. III, p. 72, Newman Press, Westminster, Maryland, 1955.

abstractive cognition presupposes an intuition of the singular existent. Such abstract knowledge differs from the intuitive in that it tells us nothing about the existence or non-existence of things. Furthermore, this abstract knowledge cannot go beyond the data of intuitive knowledge, but can only combine, relate, and draw conclusions. Now if the data acquired from intuitive knowledge, from experience of the existing world, give only association and sequence as far as causality is concerned, then how are we justified in asserting that causality is something real which transcends mere association in its metaphysical implications? And if some of those metaphysical implications are actually denied, as they were by Ockham, can we say that he meant any more by causality than the actual experience which he describes?

Conceivably it could be answered that, while all that is actually apprehended in experience is association and succession, it is still possible to justify causality metaphysically by reasoning on the data of experience. Yet such an answer would have its difficulties for Ockham. For him to admit this would also entail admitting that there was something in reality which was not and could not be intuited. In itself this is not an insurmountable difficulty, since Ockham is willing to admit as much of God or an angel. What seems to make such an explanation impossible is the fact that to admit it is to admit also that a causal influx, since it is real, is a singular existent in its own right. As such it would be absolutely distinct from every other thing. We have seen, however, that Ockham denied the reality of such relations as distinct from the things which are related. He made of them mere contingent predicables existing as such only in the mind. In the light of this it is very difficult to see how causality could have meant any more for Ockham than did the experiential fact. Gilson's conclusion seems to be entirely valid.

> Since the origin of causality cannot be found in the thing itself, or in the intuition of the thing by the intellect, it must be explained by some reason; and there is but one: it is what Ockham called *habitualis notitia,* and what Hume will simply call habit.

True enough there are such things as relations of causality, and there is an essential order of dependence between effects and their causes, for their regular succession never changes; but since there is nothing more in causality than the habitual association of ideas caused in us by repeated experience, there is nothing more than a regular sequence of events in physical causality.[28]

It is little wonder, then, that we find Ockham refusing to build an argument for the existence of God on the foundation of the universal validity of the causal proposition. In the light of what we have seen, it is difficult to understand just what Ockham means when he refers to God as a universal cause. Certainly, there is nothing in his experience which makes such an affirmation possible. This Ockham realized. Whatever affirmations he may make about the divine causality—and he makes many—he was never able to accept any of them as really demonstrative. He gives many reasons for his refusal to accept them. Almost all of them will return later to keep modern philosophy, or at least much of it, locked within the limits of physical experience.

It is evident, too, I think, what a tremendous difference there is between the realism of a philosopher like Ockham and the realism of St. Thomas. In the long run Ockham can be certain of only one reality—the concrete, material singular which is present to the knower and grasped by him in a singular intuitive act of the mind. When all relationships are identified with the ontological reality of the singular existent, the result is a universe of such startling uniqueness and independent realities that very few conclusions can be drawn philosophically about their origins. The result for metaphysics is disastrous. It can no longer be—as it was for St. Thomas—the expression of an insight into the existential structure of the real. Metaphysics, as Ockham conceived it, can only represent the mental relationships which the mind itself establishes between its various conceptualizations of a myriad of concrete singulars. This is a science of concepts, a logic, which enables one to think consistently and coherently about reality, but which gives one no

[28] Gilson, E., *op. cit.*, pp. 87 seq.

assurance that reality is in any way like the concepts which one forms of it.

It comes as no surprise, then, to find Ockham asserting that much of what was once considered philosophically demonstrable is really in the realm of faith. It simply became impossible for him to separate philosophy from revelation and theology and retain any certainty. As far as any truth which transcends experience is concerned, that truth can be substantiated only by a revelation or an infallible authority. Take away that revelation and that authority, and man is left with sensible experience and probability. In such a situation there can be only one possible approach to certainty—the method of investigation and verification employed by the natural sciences. Ockham would find himself much more at home in the philosophical milieu of today than he did in that of the fourteenth century.

St. Thomas had given philosophy its charter, asserting that intellect was made for being and capable of achieving an understanding of being in its own right. Experience was necessary, of course, but it was possible to transcend experience because the mind could understand what was demanded to make experience itself possible. In understanding what lay behind experience the intellect gained a valid insight into the metaphysical structure of reality. Ockham recalled that charter. Philosophy might be able to get at being, but it was only sensible being with which it could adequately deal. In the last analysis it became apparent that philosophy could no longer deal adequately even with that.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The Meaning and Matter of History—A Christian View. By Martin Cyril D'Arcy, S. J. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959. Pp. 309, with appendix and index. $5.50.

" History started off under the protection of Clio, one of the Muses; it was under the inspiration of one who would give mortals insights into the meaning of man's drama. . . .

" Today, books on the philosophy of history are constantly appearing, but they are all open to the criticism of trying to generalize and find laws of behaviour on insufficient data. Either they have to fall back on the broadest generalizations or they omit facts or force facts in applying their laws. It may be, therefore, that a philosopher should be more modest in his claims, that he should confess to the historian that he cannot compete with him and has no intention of competing with him. He is an artist as well as a scientist, relying, if need be, on poetic truth to make an intelligible theme out of his vast material."

The above quotations from the present work might well serve as a thumbnail review for they sum up what the author has been trying to do in this book. Fr. D'Arcy does not attempt to formulate a philosophy of history although he does suggest the lines that should be followed if a sane and solid " philosophy " of history is to be arrived at. The author himself does not like the term " philosophy " of history. He is more than doubtful that systems based upon reason alone, systems such as those contrived by Hegel and Toynbee, can provide a solution to the multifarious riddles of history and really bring order into the seemingly chaotic movements of man upon the earth. And he is certain that for the Christian no such philosophy can exist. Without certain concepts for the knowledge of which man must depend upon Divine Revelation, and therefore, Faith (e. g. the doctrine of original sin), any interpretation of the past or attempt to provide a possible pattern for the future, must be in vain. Therefore, in common with C. S. Lewis (The Screwtape Letters) he prefers the term " historicism." But he does not use the word (as Lewis uses it) with overtones of contempt.

In an introductory chapter to this study of the different systems which historicists have invented ranging from Thucydides to Toynbee, Fr. D'Arcy examines the nature of historical knowledge to determine what right history has to claim any truth at all. He refutes the arguments advanced by certain scientists that history can never arrive at truth but only an approximation to truth, since it is impossible for it to proceed by the methods used by the

physical sciences to discover truth. Fr. D'Arcy admits the obvious (although many historians do not) and concedes that while history can and does use the physical sciences as auxiliaries, it cannot itself make use of the methods of the laboratory in arriving at its own peculiar certainty which differs from the certainty of the theologian, the metaphysician and the physical scientist—but it is none the less certain for all that. It is, if you will, a moral certainty, but moral certainty as used in the philosophic sense. For the certainty of history is surely as valid as the certainty of the law courts, and the evidence of history is no less convincing than much of the evidence upon which cases are decided at law. Fr. D'Arcy thinks that we can know more about the characters of history than we can know about the people who live next door and we can judge the times in which they lived better than we can judge our own because our judgment is not fogged by passion. If you would call this " only moral certainty " Fr. D'Arcy has no quarrel with you as long as you realize that it is as good and as great as any man has in conducting his social life in the present. To the objection that the conclusions of history rest ultimately to a great measure upon human faith, Fr. D'Arcy would reply that so, too, does much of human relationship in the present. And the nature of that faith and the certainty it produces, he believes, has never been adequately dealt with by the philosophers.

Having treated the problem of the possibility of obtaining certainty from history the author devotes the next section of his work to a discussion of " History and Historicism," the relative merits of history as mere bare chronicle (which the scientists and the historical positivists claim is the only history) and history as it is worked over by the minds of men of genius such as Gibbon and Momsen. It is Fr. D'Arcy's opinion that the chronicle, far from being the best and/or only history, is not worthy to be called history at all. He claims that it leads to no conclusion and might be compared to experiments in the laboratory which lead to no result. And this, while it might be the work of a skilled technician, is not the work of a scientist. It is only by passing through the mind of man that history can have any meaning or even cogency and clarity. It is only the mind of man that gives the world itself any meaning: ". . . for it is man who has slowly built up this new world of knowledge, putting the disparate together and tracing out processes which give meaning and unity to an otherwise senseless world. If we take away mind there is nothing left which could be recognized as true, beautiful and dynamic. The Signs of the Zodiac, the Milky Way and even the satellites have their names taken from them; gone are the moon-goddess and the months of the year, the names of the flowers of the field, and the virtue of fire and water. The circulation of the blood, the nervous system, the pharmacopeia are unrecorded, and we are left with blobs of matter, processes, death and life to which one can hardly attribute meaning, law, order or unification without implying mind. It is

not surprising that at various times philosophers have plumbed for a form of idealism, according to which the material world is nothing but latent mind. Without belief in God it is easy to fall back upon such a supposition." History needs the historicist as matter needs the scientist; as nature needs the poet; as the created cosmos needs the philosopher.

For want of a better name, the historicist, might be called a philosopher because he attempts to do for the matter of history what the philosopher tries to do for all of creation, i. e., put some order into apparent chaos and meaning into the seemingly meaningless. And, although man has been trying to do this for history for a very long time no one has succeeded in presenting a system that is satisfying to the mind and in accord with the facts. Despite his unquestionable genius, Hegel failed in his theory of thesis, antithesis and synthesis as an explanation of universal history. The best that can be said for it is that it does show the working of an extremely fine mind but it serves more as an intellectual exercise than as a working theory to explain history. It requires a constant forcing of the facts to fit the theory, but this, of course did not at all disturb Karl Marx when he penned his mystic " Das Kapital." Hegel's theory, robbed of mind and reduced to matter, served Marx very well indeed. The same inadequacy can be charged to Toynbee's theory of challenge and response. In the words of Pro. E. H. Carr, " Mr. Toynbee soars above the facts.' And this same critic levels the same charge against Oswald Spengler, another great modern historicist.

It is Fr. D'Arcy's opinion that only a Christian thinker can produce an acceptable philosophy of history and that such an endeavor cannot be a mere " philosophy." History can have no meaning unless the philosopher (or historicist to use the better term) bases his philosophy upon Divine Revelation. The theological concepts of Original Sin and the Redemption, the Divinity of Christ and the continuation of Christ in world history through His Church are absolutely essential if one is to get any meaning at all from the story of man on this earth. Unfortunately, the great Christian thinkers of the past paid practically no attention to the need for a " philosophy " of history. Augustine, in his " City of God " is the only one who even touched on its fringes and he was acting more as a polemicist with a case to state than as a philosopher when he did so. And his outlook is very limited since he is interested only in proving, in answer to pagan attacks, that Christianity was not the cause of Rome's decline but rather that the seeds of that decline had always been present in paganism and just happened to fructify co-incidentally with the rise of Christianity. And other theologians of the minor sort, such as Bossuet, fail because they knew too little of both theology and history. Bossuet, in his famous " Discours " written for the benefit of the Dauphin of France ties up the whole of history (meaning the Graeco-Roman, Judaic and Christian medieval) into a neat package which might well be labeled " The Workings of

Divine Providence." Providence holds no mystery for Bossuet. It is like a legend written on a wall and he who runs may read. Bossuet has no trouble at all in showing forth what was the real intent of the Divine Mind in all the events of such history as he knows.

Of all the historicists who have formulated theories of history Fr. D'Arcy considers Gianbattista Vico (1668-1744), *facile princeps*. Not because Vico had greater genius than Hegel or greater erudition than Toynbee, but because Vico had the inestimable advantage of being a convinced theist and, perhaps, a believing Christian. Vico, in accordance with the scholarly temper of his age, professed himself to be a strict scientist in his approach to history and claimed to use no method of which the most scrupulous scientist could not approve. But nonetheless the backbone of his work (upon which he labored for forty-five years) is the Christian concepts of Original Sin (which Vico thought he arrived at through logic—as the modern scholar Heard thought he discovered it through psychology), the Redemption (also a logical conclusion) and the Christian conception of Providence. With these tools to work with, the industrious Vico turns out a work that comes close to being a true and satisfying "philosophy" of history.

He has not yet, in Fr. D'Arcy's opinion, been even approached by modern theologians who have treated the subject. Of these Karl Barth has written the most, but with the principal end in view of proving that there can be no Christian philosophy of history, since the gap separating the City of God from the City of Man is unbridgeable. And the laws that apply in one city do not apply in the other. They cannot because each city is in a different world. Of the Catholics who have done some work on the subject, Père Yves Congar, O.P. seems to stand with Barth but Père Leopold Malevez, in an article in the Nouvelle Revue Théologique of March, 1949, holds that those who accuse Congar of holding for the Barthian dichotomy are mistaken. Père Malevez believes that is it a surface likeness only and it does not go very deep. To Barth this world is an exile and has no communication with the world of faith. But to Père Congar, as to all Catholics, Christ will be with us all days and the kingdom comes to be secretly perhaps, but sacramentally, and is ever operative in the souls of the just. However, Fr. D'Arcy thinks that Père Congar has little to offer for a true philosophy of history.

He finds of more interest the theories of Joseph Pieper, the German Thomist (at least I believe Pieper considers himself a Thomist) who offers the beginning of a philosophy of history in his work, *Übner das Ende der Zeit*. It is Pieper's opinion that neither philosopher nor historian is capable of formulating a "philosophy of history." "Theology," he says, "must take up the task of interpreting history, where science and philosophy come to the limits of their understanding." Pieper takes as his source-book for a philosophy of history the most mystical of the books of

the Bible, the Apocalypse of St. John, where the image of the two cities originated. Pieper does not hesitate to call what he has written a philosophy of history. "He holds," says Fr. D'Arcy, "that a Christian has an advantage because he knows from divine revelation the beginning and the end of it. Without such an aid from theology a so-called philosophy is bound to become nothing more than a sociology of culture."

Fr. D'Arcy, as I said in the beginning, does not present his own philosophy of history. But in the final section of this work he does indicate what he considers to be the basis of such a philosophy and gives a general description of the lines along which it should develop. He thinks that Cardinal Newman was on the right track when, in his *Essay on Development*, he explained the continuance of Christ in history by use of the Pauline figure of the Mystical Body. "A liason exists," says D'Arcy, "in that the Christian Religion is historical through and through and reaches out to all nations. Furthermore it has in every stage of its existence appropriated to its purposes the contemporary ideas, arts and organizations, and in turn breathed its own spirit into those native forces. Perhaps in this cross-fertilization we can find a clue to that Headship in all things of which St. Paul wrote."

It would seem from all this that the "philosopher" of history will be neither a philosopher nor a theologian but a mystic. For the Christian philosophy of history, as D'Arcy sees it, will have to be every bit as mystical as the mysterious workings of Hegel's unholy trinity of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. And, since everybody and his brother seems to be suggesting a philosophy of history, or at least a basis from which such a philosophy might be worked out, may I suggest that a much sounder basis than any treated by Fr. D'Arcy in this present work might be found in the tract "De Trinitate" as it is developed by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa Theologica*. It would seem to me that sound principles would be (and are) easier to find there than in a prophetical book such as the Apocalypse, which is replete with the language of prophecy, the meaning of which we probably will not know until the events it foretells come to pass. The Pauline doctrine of the Mystical Body has but recently begun to be systematically explored and developed. Further it could never, by its very nature, supply the key to universal history (even used in conjunction with the Apocalypse and the Book of Job) that is latent in the principles by which Aquinas develops his doctrine of the Trinity.

Fr. D'Arcy brings to this work all the resources of his great erudition and the keen mind of the philosopher. In my opinion the early part of the book suffers from lack of re-working. It reads like a lecture delivered from notes. The result is often obscurity of thought. The chapter on the history of Israel and those on Christianity and Historicism have too much repetition. I think once would be sufficient to review the Old Testament. Fr. D'Arcy manages to get in three or four reviews using, for the most

part, the same material each time. There is also, in my opinion, much material not having any particular bearing on a philosophy of history in these chapters, no matter what might be its interest for the moral theologian (practical moral, that is). It makes for heavy reading especially when one is plowing through it hoping to find something that looks like a philosophy of history. But these are the flaws in the diamond. The book is the best presentation of the subject of a Christian philosophy of history to appear recently in the English-speaking world.

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World Crisis and the Catholic. A Symposium. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1958. Pp. 245. $3.00.

It is the reviewer's opinion that *World Crisis and the Catholic* is an important book. A symposium of monographs written for the most part by distinguished scholars in connection with the Second World Congress for the Lay Apostolate (Rome, October 5-13, 1957), the book covers the whole field of Catholic Action, in such a way as to present a reasonable apologetic for the Faith, as well as a source of inspiration to the reader. No educated Catholic, priest or layman, who would understand the problems posed by the present world crisis, can afford to miss reading these pages. As one of the contributors expresses it: "the years we are living through—even the very months—are those of our last chance!" (p. 126)

Vittorino Veronese points out in his admirable preface that the book is written by men and women who differ in race, culture, language, profession, and, at times, opinion. There is no unity in the book save the common purpose of the writers to represent the Church as the last hope in an imperiled world. As Veronese declares in his preface: ". . . for the first time in history the world is beginning to feel and think itself *as a world* . . . where only the Catholic—the *Univeral*—Church can satisfy man's deepest longing for unity." This hunger for world unity in the midst of a gigantic struggle for political power by nations with conflicting political ideals is the consequence of man's realization that the forces of destruction brought to light by the development of physical research and technology will mean either a better world for all or no world at all.

The first chapter on *The Christian Statesman* presents an interview given by Chancellor Adenauer of the German Federal Republic. Mr. Adenauer is fully aware of the role of the Christian both as an individual and a member of society. He believes that since the instrument for achieving political aims in the modern democratic state is the political party, Christians, if they want to suffuse public life with Christian principles,

must do so through the political party. In this he carries on the tradition of the old Centre party in pre-Hitler Germany. The idea of a political party founded on comomn religious sentiments finds acceptance in many places throughout the world, but the idea does not appeal to American Catholics. Our two party system, thus far, has made unnecessary such political blocs in Congress.

Respecting the threat of atomic warfare on the one hand and dictatorship and technocracy on the other, the Chancellor says that the general condition of the whole world demands a developing *rapprochement* between free peoples leading "to a world seeking genuine peace and a sound ordered way of life." (From an allocution of Pope Pius XII to a German delegation on the Pope's 80th birthday).

Dr. Karl Stern, German-born convert from Judaism and an internationally recognized neuro-pathologist and psychiatrist, has succeeded in presenting *Group Psychology in the Atomic Era in the Light of Christian Philosophy* in language intelligible to the layman. Discussing briefly the destructiveness of nuclear energy and its terrifying implications, Dr. Stern sets up a parallel between the potential destructive energy of matter and the potential destructive forces in man's soul. "All this may sound gloomy," he remarks, "but it is no exaggeration to say that there exists an ocean of hostility and, if one was able to add all these elements of human aggressivenes and hatred up to one single whole, one would arrive at a force which is just as cosmic as that of nuclear energy." (p. 12) He points out "there is such a thing as collective hate, a collective tension and so on. And the same laws which govern the relations between individuals seem to govern also the relations of groups of people, social groups and groups of nations." (p. 13)

We are all aware of what propaganda can do to develop group hostility, as in Germany, Italy, Russia. Why could not the same instrument be employed for good? Certainly we can engender preferences. But can we foster love by such means? Dr. Stern quite correctly points out that love is intimately associated with the mystery of individual personality. It cannot be mass-produced. It must spring from personal conviction of the importance of *this* neighbor of mine. With modern means of communication, we can create group tensions, opinions and a favorable or unfavorable atmosphere, but adjusting "relationships between individuals is a matter of conscience." And here Christian love must operate with greater effectiveness from the personal, individual conviction of its necessity for integrating man and his society. While acknowledging that it is necessary to revise the moral theology of war owing to technological developments, Dr. Stern declares: "No group (of nations) can be psychologically integrated by a mere fear of danger from outside." Fully aware that love is the strongest bond of union, he says: ". . . it belongs to the noblest traditions of the Church that the love of the good should be stronger in us than fear

of the bad" (p. 20). He has no doubt about the ultimate triumph of Christianity.

Dr. Kotaro Tanaka, in his article, *World Peace and World Law,* expresses the opinion that ". . . there is no way of attacking this problem (world crisis) than the application of the methods required in social sciences generally speculative and empiric, theoretical and historical, spiritual and realistic, idealistic and positivistic and so on. We cannot agree with any so-called monism where method is concerned. Man with his flesh and blood and instincts which belong to the realm of nature, as a rational being belongs to the world of the spirit and the noble mission of the human being is nothing other than the spiritualization of nature. The peace so eagerly desired is inseparably connected with this mission in that peace means the termination of the struggle in which men are wolves towards one another and each wages war upon all the rest. There is no peace in the jungle. The human being alone has the privilege of striving for peace."

While stressing the importance of law in the quest for peace which is related to justice, Tanaka says we must be wary of falling into the error of believing in the omnipotence of law as did the legists in ancient China and the Western positivist school from Machiavelli and Hobbes to the thinkers of the latter part of the nineteenth century.

Dr. Tanaka's thesis is an answer to the enigma: evolution or revolution and it is comprehensive and convincing. With the idea of co-existence among nations of different ideologies, he has no sympathy. "Ideologically speaking, compromise and neutrality between 'two worlds' are unthinkable: "*tertium non datur.*"

Dr. John Ching-Hsiung Wu has one of the finest essays in the book. *Chistianity the Only Synthesis Really Possible Between East and West* is, in this reviewer's opinion, the best thing that has been written on the subject.

As the title suggests, Dr. Wu attempts to reconcile the East and the West by pointing out the moral and religious ideals common to both. Referring to the so-called non-Christian saints, (the pagan moralists), Dr. Wu remarks that it is no mere coincidence that these men should have flourished within the six centuries immediately preceding Christ. "Their doctrines . . . are not unmixed with errors, and even where they are not erroneous, they were inadequate and led the human mind to an *impasse.* But the very *impasse* underlined the necessity of the Revelation." The brotherhood ideal of the New Testament recognizes neither Jew nor Gentile, neither East nor West. What we have to synthesize are certain qualities of mind, patterns of thought and feeling acquired by the peoples of East and West. Anent the natural and pantheistic mysticism of the East, Wu regrets that more attention is not given to this branch of theology in the West. A devoted follower of Aquinas, he is aware of the importance of the intellectual approach to theology, but he believes that Sts. Bernard, Bonaven-

ture and John of the Cross should be better known by those who would present the truths of Christianity to the East. The Oriental has a mystical outlook towards the infinite and a fear of any attempt to define the Supreme Being—or as Wu states it " to confine the Infinite in the finite." (p. 160) The West, he thinks, quite differently leans towards a dogmatic expression of religious truths, lest while plunging into the mysterious " its clear cut notion of justice and right be lost." " Let me say that in order to convert the East we must know how to " baptize " the Eastern culture and philosophy of life. But since the most representative Eastern sages are all mystically inclined, we shall not be able to " baptize " them unless we first delve into a much neglected part of the Christian heritage, the inexhaustible mine of Christian mysticism." (pp. 160-161) " If we want to convert the East we must first find the real East in ourselves." " I venture to think that the real East is securely in the bosom of our Christian heritage." (p. 154)

Dr. Wu sees in today's crisis a challenge to East and West—(to) " the East in that we must show it that the Kingdom of God within us (is) the reality of which all its past philosophies have been but foreshadowings; (to) the West in that only (by) developing our interior life in proportion to our material civilization can we transmute the deadening weight of matter into a vessel of the Spirit." (p. 161)

Christopher Dawson gives an eminently satisfactory reply to the question he proposes: " *Is the Church too Western to Satisfy the Aspirations of the Modern World?* " As Mr. Dawson sees it the demand for the nationalization of the Christian Churches in many parts of the Orient is in conformity with the demand for territorial independence of foreign political control. But such a national Christian church would be in conflict with the fundamental principles of Catholicism. " If nationalism, whether East or West," says Dawson, " denies the right of the Church to exist as an autonomous spiritual society, it is a challenge to the law of God and the Kingship of Christ." (p. 164) The mission of the Church is essentially universal and supranatural. The rest of Mr. Dawson's essay is an elaboration of this thesis. Insisting upon the supernatural character of the Church, the author says the Church is not subject to the limitations of human culture but transcends human cultures and conforms them to her ends. This has been going on throughout the world since the establishment of the Church and it is evident today in the non-European world. The rise of nationalism in many parts of the modern world does not necessarily mean a conflict between East and West. " Rather," says Mr. Dawson, " it is the age-old conflict between the spiritual and temporal powers . . . which has now emerged as a vital question in the East."

Mr. George Meany, veteran labor leader and President of the A.F.L.—C.I.O., reviews briefly the labor movement in the United States in the light of Catholic moral principles and the history of unionism. Mr. Meany sees

little difference between conditions which led to Pope Leo's encyclical in 1891 and conditions in industry today. Of course conditions are not exactly the same. He notes: "A new development of science and technology is spreading across the industrial scene and reaching into places not affected by mechanical devices of former years" (p. 23). Mr. Meany thinks this is good. He says: "we do not fear this power developed by men. . . . We think it is a sign of the future and a realization of God's plan to have man discover ways to control the wealth of the world for the betterment of all peoples." He knows that the new instruments of production will not automatically cause a fair distribution of products. "Human beings themselves," he says, "will have to make conscious effort to safeguard progress by making it work for their betterment" (p. 24). Men must not be put into competition with machines, because to do so would "destroy the very purpose these inventions should serve—to work for the good of man" (p. 25).

Francesco Severi in his article, *Science and Religion Yesterday and Today,* by contrasting certain statements of the scientists, Laplace, Einstein, and Poincaré, attempts to show the progressive turning of scientific thought towards the transcendent. "All this," he says, "may be viewed as a precursor to the teaching of Pius XI, on the occasion of the renewal of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, that Science is one of the most beautiful of all harmonies, an instrument used by God for man's elevation, and can never be in contradiction with faith" (p. 35).

In the treatment of medicine in this book, Dr. Lopez-Ibor points out that changes are taking place in modern medicine in three directions: *a technical progress* to a truly wonderful degree, the socialization of medicine following the "social spirit of the age," and the emphasis on psychology.

The threefold change in medicine, argues Dr. Lopez-Ibor, discloses a basic truth that "sickness is not a purely physical, chemical or even biological event but a personal one" (p. 56).

Herman Baur in his *Christian Art in the Modern World* expresses the belief that *ars sacra* must be progressive in this sense that it be *au courant* with the times. If it clings to traditional forms it becomes outmoded, stagnant. He believes that whatever is sound in Catholic Art must be *en rapport* with the age in which it is created. He also maintains that modern Christian art is not so far removed from tradition as many people think. For example, abstract painting is said to run counter to the Christian spirit. "And yet," says Mr. Baur, "this particular genre, the representation of abstract concepts has had the right of entry into Christian churches from time immemorial. One has only to think Byzantine and Ottonian art . . ." (p. 79).

The last article in this book was written by Joseph Folliet. It is a fine analysis of the world crisis, in fact a synopsis of the book's content. He points out that "the world is today passing through one of the most

profound and serious crisis in its whole sublunary existence, a crisis aggravated by the phenomenon known to sociology as the acceleration of history. . . ." He also points out, however, that the church has faced crises before and to the amazement of her enemies and of not a few Christians unaided by hope she survived the storms that threatened her. In the history of the Church, says Folliet, there are falls and risings as in the *via crucis*. "We must keep to the way of the Cross but we must go on hoping and seeking for the Resurrection and the life of glory."

What Joseph Folliet has to say on the present crisis and the Church could not, in the opinion of the reviewer, have been better said. His apologetic for the Church is convincing.

With her inimitable artistry Gertrude Von La Forte gives us a fitting epilogue to *World Crisis and the Catholic*, a book which should be a best seller on any Catholic book list.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Reflections on Art: A Source Book of Writings by Artists, Critics, and Philosophers. By Susanne K. Langer (Ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958. Pp. 382.

This anthology is the work of one of our most notable philosophers in the field of aesthetics. From her own very wide reading she has selected some 26 essays, many of them from French and German periodicals. For the most part they are not philosophical in character but rather supply material for philosophical reflection. The writers are critics interested in pointing out certain aesthetic phenomena which are sometimes overlooked by aestheticians. It is this wealth of observation and example that will make the anthology useful, and set it apart from the usual collection of excerpts from formal treatises on aesthetics.

The weakness of the collection is that it gives us a good deal on the psychological aspects of the work of art, but very little on the work of art in its own proper character. The Aristotelian will feel that most of the writers are concerned with peripheral, rather than central aesthetic problems. However, he will find much here of interest on the role of time and of place in the arts, on imagery, aesthetic distance, emotive response, and illusion.

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The History of Philosophy. By Johannes Hirschberger. Translated from the German by Rt. Rev. Anthony N. Fuerst, S.T.D. Milwaukee: Bruce. Volume I: 1958. Pp. 516. $8.00. Volume II: 1959. Pp. 752. $9.50.

Since 1955 the English-speaking world has benefited from significant advances in the study of the history of philosophy. Chief among these has been the periodic publication over the past four years of the first five volumes of Fr. Copleston's monumental work *A History of Philosophy*. The translation in 1955 of Fr. Thonnard's *Precis d'Histoire de la Philosophie* under the English title *A Brief History of Philosophy* was received with well-merited enthusiasm. One of the most recent contributions to the rapidly expanding literature in this field is the translation of Professor Hirschberger's excellent two-volume study *Geschichte der Philosophie*. The German edition of Volume One was first published in 1949. This was followed by the publication of Volume Two in 1952.

In his Preface to Volume One the author distinguishes between the History of Philosophy as "a science of history" and as "philosophy." In the intricate manner typical of German scholarship he explains that the goal of the History of Philosophy as a science of history "is accomplished by examining the origins of both the men and their works, by placing them in their proper relation to greater spheres of thought, by correlating them with other contributions and with the all-pervading spiritual and cultural currents among peoples of various eras, and finally by unfolding for us the fundamental suppositions and the ultimate assumptions from which the concepts, the problems, and the teachings of philosophy have originally sprung as from a matrix."

As Philosophy, the author envisages the History of Philosophy as "an arduous and honorable search for truth . . . possessing inner continuity." Perhaps the most notable characteristic of Professor Hirschberger's work is that it brings together these two aspects of the History of Philosophy into a synthesis which can accurately be described as remarkable. While stating, as every History of Philosophy must, the facts concerning the life and thought of each philosopher, Hirschberger's book adds, as few Histories of Philosophy do, a third transhistoric dimension to a science too frequently drawn upon the bidimensional plane of time and place. The author intends his book to serve as a basic text and standard reference work for students of philosophy. He is not content, however, to compile and classify facts as do the authors of most Histories of Philosophy. He interprets the facts which he presents, and he makes no apology for doing so. More than most, this author is likely to suffer from the pens of reviewers adept at quoting out of context. Speaking of Aristotle's relationship to Plato, for example, Hirschberger asserts that Aristotle "personally was basically in accord with his master's thought." In another instance he tells us that there are many traces of Neo-Platonic doctrine in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. But Hirschberger, proceeding scientifically, constructs a cogent case for each of his conclusions, not neglecting to state whatever restrictions the evidence places upon them.

The highly original character of this work has resulted in certain imbalances in the amount of space allotted to some of the philosophers it treats. While devoting fourteen pages to Nicholas of Cusa, for example, the author concedes only six to William of Ockham. Similarly, he judges Master Eckhart deserving of eight pages, while he dismisses Eckhart's contemporary, Henry of Ghent, in eight lines. Nicolai Hartmann is allotted ten pages in contrast to less than a single page for Gabriel Marcel. But this is to criticize the author, however legitimately, for what he does not say rather than for what he says. And what he says is extraordinarily well said. His treatments of the British Empiricists and of Immanuel Kant are particularly penetrating. Generally speaking, Professor Hirschberger appears to be more at home in the Modern than in the Contemporary Period.

Appended to the English edition of Volume Two are four final chapters introduced under the title: *American Philosophical Thought and the Western Tradition*. These seventy pages have come from the able pen of Professor Donald A. Gallagher of Villanova University. He gives us here a clear, concise survey of the development of philosophy in the United States from its inception in the early 18th Century until the present day. It is to be hoped that Dr. Gallagher's contribution will eventually be given a separate publication. As a paperback it certainly would be more than marketable.

Although relatively expensive, these two volumes give good value for the price. They are sturdily bound and most readably printed on a good quality paper. They are calculated to withstand a great deal of handling by the student.

The translation into English is expertly done. Translations from the German are usually easy to recognize. This one is not. In fairness to the translator it should be pointed out that no other sentence in the entire work is as long or as involved as the one which we have quoted in this review from the Preface of Volume One.

Sectional bibliographies are interspersed throughout the work, a device which the student will find most convenient. Although some of these bibliographies could be more complete, they are all adequate for the use of undergraduate students of philosophy. Taken together they certainly constitute a more complete bibliography than is usually appended to similar works in this field.

It is to be hoped that Hirschberger's *The History of Philosophy* will receive a wide circulation in the United States. Such would certainly give added impetus to the advances which are now being made so rapidly in this field.

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The Visible Words of God. An Exposition of the Sacramental Theology of Peter Martyr Vermigli A. D. 1500-1562. By Joseph C. McLelland. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1957. Pp. 300 with index. $4.00.

Although he was one of early Protestantism's leading polemicists (Bellarmine often notices him), surprisingly little has been published, particularly in English, about Peter Martyr Vermigli (named after Peter Martyr, O. P.), the ex-Austin canon who, influenced by Juan Valdes, Bucer, Zwingli, Melanchthon and Erasmus, left the Church and his native Italy in 1542, and became a chief actor in the Protestant Revolt both on the

Continent (at Zürich and Strassburg, 1542-1547, and 1553-1562, and at the Poissy Conference, 1561) and in England 1547-1553, where he influenced Cranmer, lectured at Oxford, took part in the famous Oxford Disputation of 1549 on the Eucharist, managed to introduce into the Book of Common Prayer the Eucharistic doctrine still found there (the Second Edwardian Prayer Book, 1552), and probably inspired—*via* the Forty-Two Articles of 1553—the sacramental theology embodied in the Thirty-Nine Articles.

Dr. McLelland's study of this strangely neglected key figure is, therefore, despite many shortcomings, a definite contribution. After a 68-page biographical introduction (which tends to paint the book's hero all white, his opponents all back), *The Visible Words of God* expounds, in the ten chapters of its three parts, Vermigli's teaching on the sacraments, which "is not only the fullest expression of his theology, but also its key doctrine" (p. 71). Four appendices (bibliography; Vermigli's patristic sources; Bucer, Calvin and Vermigli; Definitive Statements of Vermigli's Eucharistic Teaching), and an index—quite inadequate—round out the volume.

It turns out that the Florentine who was so influential in shaping the theology of the English Reformation was a Calvinist rather than, as has been widely supposed, a Zwinglian. (For that matter, neither was Zwingli himself, McLelland contends, a "Zwinglian," in the usual sense of that term). Indeed, we must interpose after comparing the present work with R. Wallace's, *Calvin's Doctrine of the Word and Sacrament* (London, 1953), so faithfully does Vermigli echo Calvin that one must deny to the former the great originality claimed for him by McLelland.

In the course of his account of Vermigli's history and teaching, the author, a minister of the Presbyterian Church of Canada, engages in polemics on several fronts, inveighing with equal vigor against Catholics, Lutherans, Anglo-Catholics, and Anabaptists. Often he is needlessly offensive, and frequently he is thoroughly mistaken about Catholic positions, sometimes on his own, sometimes in accepting without protest Vermigli's gross distortions of Catholic doctrine and theology.

So abrupt is the movement of thought, so terse and turbid is the style of this book, which originated as a doctoral thesis written under the guidance of Prof. T. F. Torrance, of New College, Edinburgh, that even McLelland's fellow-Calvinists, however well versed in the subtleties and terminology of Reformed theology, will find the work difficult to follow.

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